Second,
Calvin emphasizes explicitly and repeatedly the effect of the fall on man’s
knowledge of God. Though men have a
naturally implanted knowledge of God given to them by and in creation, this knowledge
never develops into a “true” knowledge in the sense of a practical and
religious principle which leads them to worship God aright. Let me put that in my own words, but they are
words which, I think, rightly embody Calvin’s view. He believes that men have a natural
revelation of God, but that this natural revelation never results in a natural
theology which can guide them appropriately in worship or in life in general.
This emphasis is practically absent in Thomas.
Listen to Calvin:
It must also be remarked, that, though they strive against their own natural understanding, and desire not only to banish him thence, but even to annihilate him in heaven, their insensibility can never prevail so as to prevent God from sometimes recalling them to his tribunal. But as no dread restrains them from violent opposition to the divine will, it is evident, as long as they are carried away with such a blind impetuosity, that they are governed by a brutish forgetfulness of God. [1]
At length they involve themselves in such a vast accumulation of errors, that those sparks which enable them to discover the glory of God are smothered, and at last extinguished by the criminal darkness of iniquity. That seed, which it is impossible to eradicate, a sense of the existence of a Deity, yet remains; but so corrupted as to produce only the worst of fruits. Yet this is a further proof of what I now contend for, that the idea of God is naturally engraved on the hearts of men, since necessity extorts a confession of it, even from reprobates themselves. In a moment of tranquility they facetiously mock the Divine Being, and with loquacious impertinence in many derogate from his power. But if any despair oppress them, it stimulates them to seek him, and dictates concise prayers, which prove that they are not altogether ignorant of God, but that what ought to have appeared before had been suppressed by obstinacy. [2]
Third,
this very different assessment of the effect of the fall on man’s knowledge of
God comes to concrete expression in the very different use which Thomas and
Calvin make of a classic passage on the subject. I have in mind, of course, Psalm
53:1 which reads in part: “The fool has said in his heart, “There is no
God,” They are corrupt, and have committed abominable injustice; There is
no one who does good.” Both Thomas and
Calvin cite this text, but how different is the use they make of it!
Thomas
sees it as proof that the existence of God is not self-evident. He takes at
face value the fool’s assertion that there is no God. Aquinas says: “On the
contrary, no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as
the Philosopher … states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But
the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: The fool
hath said in his heart, There is no God (Ps. Lii. 1). Therefore that God exists
is not self-evident.” [3]
Calvin,
on the other hand, takes it as evidence of the deep depravity of the fool. The fool denies a knowledge of God that is ineradicably
implanted in him. Here is Calvin’s comment in the Institutes on Psalm
53:1 with some context:
While experience testifies that the seeds of religion are sown by God in every heart, we scarcely find one man in a hundred who cherishes what he has received, and not one in whom they grow to maturity, much less bear fruit in due season. Some perhaps grow vain in their own superstitions, while others revolt from God with intentional wickedness; but all degenerate from the true knowledge of him. The fact is, that no genuine piety remains in the world. But, in saying that some fall into superstition through error, I would not insinuate that their ignorance excuses them from guilt; because their blindness is always connected with pride, vanity, and contumacy. [4]
David’s assertion, that “the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God,” is primarily, as we shall soon see in another place, to be restricted to those who extinguish the light of nature and willfully stupefy themselves. [5]
[1] John Calvin, Institutes of the
Christian Religion (Book 1, Chapter 4, Section 2)
[2]Institutes of the Christian
Religion (Book 1,
Chapter 4, Section 4)
[3] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica
(Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1)
[4]Institutes of the Christian
Religion (Book 1,
Chapter 4, Section 1)
[5]Institutes of the Christian
Religion (Book 1,
Chapter 4, Section 2)
CBTS Faculty fully subscribe to the 1689 Confession of Faith, hold an advanced
degree in their field of instruction, and possess significant pastoral experience.
Richard
Muller is well-known for books like Unaccommodated Calvin. I had to read that book back in the days when
I was studying for my PhD. Muller’s
point (or at least one of his main points) was that the contrast between Calvin
and the Reformed Scholastics who followed him in the next century had been
overdrawn by many scholars in the 20th Century who had bought in to
the Calvin versus the Calvinists movement. Muller showed (I think
successfully.) that there were clear indications of a scholastic methodology in
Calvin that showed much more continuity with his Calvinistic successors and his
Medieval predecessors.
But now we are confronted with a much more specific claim. It is that Calvin was controlled not only by a methodology common to the Medieval scholastics, but that he adopted the Thomist views of natural theology and apologetics. Cf. J. V. Fesko’s Reforming Apologetics.
Sorry,
folks, as they say here in the South, That dog won’t hunt!
As I
said previously in this blog series, I recently read up on and then lectured on
Thomas Aquinas for my class in apologetics.
I immediately followed that with a lecture on Calvin’s masterful
treatment of the knowledge of God in Book 1, Chapters 1-9 of the Institutes. I think even a novice cannot fail to notice a
massive difference in the ethos of Thomas opening chapters in Summa
Theologica and Summa Contra Gentiles. But this is not a superficial impression
without a substantial basis. In this
case the accessibility and biblicity of Calvin manifests a much different
approach to the subject of the knowledge of God than that of Thomas
Aquinas. Let me lay out the theological
contrasts between Thomas and Calvin.
First,
Calvin identifies himself with a theological tradition in regard to the
knowledge of God which Thomas rejects.
Thomas rejects the notion that the knowledge of the existence of God is
naturally implanted. He argues, as we have seen, that strictly speaking the
knowledge of God is not self-evident. He admits: “To know God exists in a
general and confused way is implanted in us …” Yet he says that this is “not to
know absolutely that God exists, just as to know that someone is approaching is
not to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter that is
approaching.”[1]
He goes on in the next article to assert: “Hence, the existence of God, in so
far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His
effects which are known to us.” [2]
Calvin,
on the other hand, declares explicitly and repeatedly that men have a natural
knowledge of God which they cannot evade or erase. He has much more in common
with the Christian Platonist tradition embodied in Augustine, Anselm, the
Damascene, and Bonaventura which affirmed that the knowledge of the existence
of God was innate or at least naturally implanted in men. Listen to Calvin’s statements on this
subject. Calvin’s language here is absolutely incapable of misunderstanding.
We lay it down as a position not to be controverted that the human mind, even by natural instinct, possesses some sense of a Deity. For that no man might shelter himself under the pretext of ignorance, God hath given to all some apprehension of his existence, the memory of which he frequently and insensibly renews; so that, as men universally know that there is a God, and that he is their Maker, they must be condemned by their own testimony, for not having worshipped him and consecrated their lives to his service. If we seek for ignorance of a Deity, it is nowhere more likely to be found, than among the tribes the most stupid and furthest from civilization. But, as the celebrated Cicero observes, there is no nation so barbarous, no race so savage; as not to be firmly persuaded of the being of a God. [3]
We read of none guilty of more audacious or unbridled contempt of the Deity than Caligula; yet no man ever trembled with greater distress at any instance of Divine wrath, so that he was constrained to dread the Divinity whom he professed to despise. This you may always see exemplified in persons of a similar character …. The impious themselves, therefore, exemplify the observation, that the idea of a God is never lost in the human mind. [4]
It will always be evident to persons of correct judgment, that the idea of a Deity impressed on the mind of man is indelible. That all have by nature an innate persuasion of the Divine existence, a persuasion inseparable from their very constitution, we have abundant evidence in the contumacy of the wicked, whose furious struggles to extricate themselves from the fear of God are unavailing. [5]
The
contrast between Thomas and Calvin on this matter is clear.
More
to come…
[1] Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica (Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1)
[2] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra
Gentiles (Book 1, Chapters 10-12).
[3] John Calvin, Institutes of the
Christian Religion (Book 1, Chapter 3, Section 1)
[4]Institutes of the Christian
Religion (Book 1,
Chapter 3, Section 2)
[5]Institutes of the Christian
Religion (Book 1,
Chapter 3, Section 3)
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
There
is certainly much that is challenging in Fesko’s work. There is definitely much to be learned. Furthermore, given the directions Reformed
historiography has taken in recent years, it seems to me that a book like this had to be written. Let me commend a number of things in it.
First,
as I have just said, his summary of what a biblical and covenantal epistemology
looks like was well done. Presuppositionalist that I am, I still find it a very
helpful summary of the scriptural approach to how we know.
Second,
I much appreciated his account of the purposes of apologetics. Here is what he
says:
Apologetics, narrowly construed as a rational defense of Christianity, does not convert fallen sinners. … I argue that apologetics has a threefold purpose: (1) to refute intellectual objections to the Christian faith, (2) to clarify our understanding of the truth, and (3) to encourage and edify believers in their faith. (203-04)
I
think Fesko here helpfully articulates the fact that apologetics (narrowly
construed) has a negative and kind of secondary purpose. It does not and ought not to pretend to
create arguments for the existence of God which positively ground the believer’s
faith. Without pretending to understand
all that was in Fesko’s mind when he wrote this, it does suggest to me a number
of important features of the apologetic endeavor. First, apologetics is properly
defensive. It is an apologia or defense
of the faith. It is not, then, properly
(or narrowly) speaking a positive attempt to argue discursively for the
existence of God or the truth of Christianity.
It assumes the faith and defends the faith so assumed against
attack. Second, this suggests to me,
secondly, that the much disputed arguments for the existence of God appear
quite differently depending (1) on whether they are construed as the positive
ground or origin of the Christian’s faith in God or (2) whether they are
construed as defenses of a faith already assumed. I think that Bavinck and others have seen
something of this distinction when they have argued that these arguments are confirmations of or testimonies to the existence of God rather than proofs.[1] As testimonies and
properly constructed, the traditional “proofs” may have a certain defensive
value toward unbelievers and confirming value for believers. Third, it seems to
me that we may want to distinguish in our discussions of the existence of God
between apologetics more broadly considered as epistemology (how we know that
God exists) and more narrowly considered as apologetics (how we defend our
faith in the existence of God to unbelievers).
Thirdly
by way of commendation, it must be said that Fesko’s book exhibits many, fine
scholarly qualities. It manifests widely
read scholarship. It shows that he attempts to fairly represent those with whom
he differs. Though complicating his
argument, Fesko still nuances his views and especially his assessment of Van
Til. (108, 137, 141, 144)
Fourth,
I thought his account of faith seeking understanding was well said. In particular, I appreciated his statement to
the effect that “trusting authority lies at the root of all epistemology.”
(195)
Critiques
First,
from the beginning of his book till its end Fesko consistently fails to
understand the distinction between natural revelation and natural theology in
Presuppositionalism. There is no more
crucial distinction than this for Presuppositionalism in my opinion. When Van Til rejects natural theology, he is
not rejecting or giving up on the book of nature. With regard to the book of nature or natural
revelation, Van Til never tires of saying that believers and unbelievers have everything in common. The reader should consult Van Til’s essay
entitled, “Nature and Scripture,” in The
Infallible Word cited previously and his many other assertions to this
effect.[2] It simply is not true that Van Til denies the
commonality between believers and unbelievers with regard to common notions and
the like. This is, however, what Fesko
assumes everywhere. (4, 9, 12, 26, 48, 65, 68-69, 99, 100, 109, 110, 111, 114,
125, 126, 135-36, 146-147, 149, 194, 212, 219) Only if common notions are made
to consist in a natural theology created by depraved men, would Van Til oppose
such common notions. This critique
cannot be pursued without mentioning a second difficulty.
Secondly,
then, Fesko fails to weigh properly the apologetic effects of Thomas’
sub-biblical view of sin. (34, 72, 75, 78, 80, 84, 85, 94, 104) This is
important because it is exactly this factor which distinguishes Van Til’s
assessment of natural revelation from his assessment of natural theology. Natural revelation is the divine given of
human existence which at a basic level of awareness all men cannot escape. Natural theology is the human interpretation
of natural revelation. Because Van Til
holds with Reformed theology that men are totally depraved and that this
depravity affects their mind and reason radically, he cannot allow that a
natural theology can be any kind of preamble to faith. By definition such a natural theology is an
interpretive endeavor pursued by men who are totally depraved. Thus, it cannot be successful. Rather,
depraved human reason must and will inevitably corrupt the meaning of natural
revelation in any natural theology it creates.
Such a natural theology cannot serve in any sense as a preamble to
faith.
Let
me mention here that my own reading has convinced me that the categories and
terminologies with which Reformed Scholasticism discussed natural theology were
inadequate. They were inadequate
precisely because they did not clearly distinguish between natural revelation
and natural theology. Sometimes natural
theology is used by Reformed scholastics to mean natural revelation. Van Til’s apologetics pressed a distinction
between these two things that is, in my view, massively important.
This
brings up a third criticism. Unless
Fesko is willing to say that Thomas Aquinas has a fully biblical and Reformed
view of sin, and he does not seem to say this, he cannot expect Reformed
Christians to find in Aquinas a model for apologetic endeavor. Yet, clearly, Fesko offers Aquinas as a model
for Christian apologetics. (96) The whole hinge of the distinction between a
true natural revelation and a proper natural theology resides in one’s doctrine
of sin. If Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of
sin was inadequate, then his view of natural theology cannot be correct.
Fourth,
Fesko probably depreciates Calvin’s critique of scholasticism. (52, 53, 68, 69)
It seems to me that a statistical study of Calvin’s Institutes will show that Calvin
frequently cites Augustine with enthusiasm, but rarely cites Aquinas positively
or at all.[3] Furthermore, his references to scholastic
theology are mostly critical. One does
not have to disagree with Muller’s thesis of a scholastic method in Calvin to
argue that Calvin consistently rejected their doctrinal conclusions. (53) It
remains to be seen, in my view, what Calvin’s view of Aquinas’s theology might
have been. I am not convinced that
Calvin’s statements about the existence of God which are characterized as rhetorical by Muller (64) are the same in
character as Thomas’s five proofs for the existence of God.
Fifth,
Fesko engages repeatedly in the common, evidentialist misunderstanding of key
texts of Scripture and Calvin which assert the knowledge of God. He sees in these statements warrants for
arguments for God rather than statements of the fact that men know God without
discursive arguments. (62, 63, 64, 77,
89, 90) The fact is that Romans 1:18-23 does not teach that men may come to
know God or that men may argue for the existence of God from natural
reason. This passage and similar ones
teach rather that men actually do know
God from natural revelation without the complicated and lengthy arguments
of Anselm or Aquinas. We have heard
evidentialist and post-Enlightenment classically oriented apologists make this
mistake too often to overlook it when Fesko makes precisely the same mistake.
Sixth,
Fesko’s argument for Christians not claiming comprehensive knowledge of
everything on the basis of the Bible is imbalanced. Of course, the Reformed confessional
tradition makes clear that the sufficiency of Scripture is not its
omni-sufficiency for every science. Cf.
the Westminster and 1689 at 1:6. What Fesko fails to see, however, in his
polemic against Idealism and Worldview theory is that what the Bible does teach
sufficiently is basic and foundational for every other area of study. Fesko does not clearly state that, while
Christians do not claim that the Bible is sufficient for all knowledge, they do
believe that it is basic or foundational to all knowledge and that nothing is
properly understood unless understood theistically. While unbelievers have a functional or
working knowledge of some things, they have a proper theological knowledge of
nothing. (67, 98, 99, 104, 127, 129, 209, 215, 216, 217) Sometimes Fesko seems
to notice this. He makes clear, for
instance, that Scripture truth claims do create givens for the science of human
origins and universal origins. (216) It does this, however, because scriptural
knowledge, while not sufficient for non-religious and non-theological sciences,
is foundational for them. How can what
we believe about God not be basic for
all human knowledge? Yet, Fesko can say
that the covenantal exile in which they live does not mean that “everything
they do is wrong.” (210) We know what he means, but surely what he says is not
all the truth. In another sense and in
the most important sense, everything they do is wrong. Their covenant exile does affect everything
they do. Surely if any generation of
Americans should see this, we should.
Our culture is falling apart. In
the midst of the cultural disaster all around us—with its devastating effects
on everything and even on something so basic as gender identity—shall our
message be to unbelievers that not
everything you do is wrong. They are
wrong basically and foundationally about God, and this does affect
everything. But with his concern to
counter the triumphalism of some Christians and their excessive claims, Fesko
denies the antithesis between Christianity and other worldviews and the devastating
effects of this antithesis culturally and educationally. (120, 123, 130, 133,
194, 210, 211, 215)
Conclusion
We
are glad for the emphasis of Fesko and others that there is a generally agreed
upon classical theism that resides in the scholastic tradition of the church. We agree that 21st century
Christians do not get to re-define the Christian God. The Reformation itself, however, shows that
the scholastic tradition could deviate into bypaths. It also shows that one must account for
positive doctrinal development in the church.
For myself, and I suspect others, I am not ready to return to the
natural theology of Aquinas. I find in
Calvin, in the Reformed tradition, and Van Til’s Presuppositionalism a progress
of doctrine which improves upon the natural theology of Thomism.
[1]John Frame, The Doctrine of God
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing,
2002), 740; Herman Bavinck, ed. John Bolt, trans. Jon Vriend, Reformed
Dogmatics First(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 2:90, 91.
[2]The Infallible Word:
a Symposium, (Philipsburg,
NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1978), “Nature and Scripture,” 263-301. Cf. the tract by Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace and Witness-bearing (Lewis
J. Grotenhuis, Belvedere Road, Phillipsburg, NJ), 8f. Cf. his The Defense of Christianity and My Credo
(Philipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, n.d.), 11: “Natural revelation is
perfectly clear. Men ought through it
to see al other things as dependent on God. But only one who looks at nature
through the mirror of Scripture does
understand natural revelation for what it is. Furthermore, no one can see
Scripture for what it is unless he is given the ability to do so by the
regenerating power of the Holy Spirit.”
Cf. also page 24 of the same tract where Van Til approvingly cites
Calvin and says: “Calvin makes a sharp distinction between the revelation of
God to man and man’s response to that revelation. This implies the rejection of a natural
theology such as Aquinas taught.” He goes on to distinguish the responses to
God’s revelation by (1) man in his original condition, (2) mankind, whose
“understanding is subjected to blindness and the heart to depravity” (3) those
that are “taught of Christ” through Scripture and whose eyes have been opened
by the Holy Spirit.” In Van Til’s syllabus entitled, “An Introduction to
Systematic Theology,” reprinted in 1966 pages 75-109 emphasize the importance
of general or natural revelation. Cf. also Greg Bahnsen, Van Til’s Apologetic (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1998),
177-194. In these pages Bahnsen
documents Van Til’s commitment to “the inescapable knowledge of God in nature”
and the distinction between natural revelation and natural theology.
[3]I did a count of Book 1 of the Institutes (McNeil-Battles edition) [John
Calvin, Institutes of the Christian
Religion ed. By John T McNeill; trans. by Ford Lewis Battles (Philadlephia:
The Westminster Press, MCMLX) to confirm for myself the evidence. Here are the results of my own count. Calvin never mentions by name Thomas
Aquinas. There is one possible and
positive reference to his writings that I found (210). Calvin mentions Plato one time positively
(46). He mentions Aristotle by name 4
times once neutrally (82) and three times negatively (56, 194, 194). Calvin, on the other hand, mentions Augustine
by name and always positively 25 times (5, 76, 77, 77, 78, 92, 105, 106, 106,
110, 113, 126, 126, 127, 143, 144, 144, 144, 158, 207, 207, 208, 213, 234, 237)
and there is an additional possible reference to Augustine but not by name
(217). Augustine is massively the most cited church father in Book 1. I think this continues throughout Books 2-4.
I would say that these statistics present an obstacle for the idea of a
Thomistic Calvin.
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
Reforming Apologetics consists of an
introduction and eight chapters. The
introduction provides a survey of the book with the intention of summarizing
its argument.
The
first three chapters have for their purpose the rehabilitation of natural
theology. Fesko argues in Chapter 1
which is entitled, “The Light of Nature,” that natural theology has played a
vital role in high Reformed theology or Reformed Scholasticism. Utilizing Burgess’s lectures on the light of
nature (24), he rebuts scholarly views of a previous generation that Reformed
theology was opposed to natural theology and argues that the Reformed were one
with the “common catholic heritage” found in Aquinas and Augustine which
affirmed natural theology (25-26).
In
Chapter 2 Fesko discusses the idea of common notions. Once more from Anthony Burgess’s lectures on
the law he shows that “common notions” were a part of the theology of the
Puritans. He proceeds to argue that “common notions” were taught by the Greek
philosophers and were “the proximate source” of the concept in high Reformed
theology. (32) Once more Fesko concludes
that Reformed theology held a form of natural theology. (48)
In
Chapter 3 Fesko specifically addresses “Calvin.” That is the title of the chapter. Calvin’s views must be discussed because Calvin
is frequently seen as the opponent of natural theology. Fesko associates Van
Til with Barth’s famous rejection of natural theology. (51-52) This leads Fesko
to reiterate some of Richard Muller’s work showing that Calvin utilized a
scholastic methodology, though not so overtly as some later Reformed
theologians. He is careful to
distinguish between the use of this methodology and “specific doctrinal
outcomes.” (54) Nevertheless, Fesko argues that the traditional arguments for
the existence of God are implicit in Calvin’s writing. (63-65) Thus, he once
more concludes that Calvin held and taught a form of natural theology in
continuity with the catholic tradition. (68-69)
In
Chapters 4-7 Fesko turns to several specific issues raised by his claim that natural
theology is part and parcel of the Reformed tradition beginning with Calvin
himself.
Chapter
4 is simply entitled, “Thomas Aquinas.”
Fesko’s treatment of Van Til and Aquinas is strangely both blunt and
nuanced. Early in the chapter with
reference to Van Til’s critique of Aquinas—a critique that is basic to his
apologetic project— Fesko asserts: “Is Van Til’s critique accurate? The short
answer is no.” (72) Specifically, with reference to Aquinas’ five proofs for
the existence of God, Fesko argues that Van Til has wrongly characterized
Thomas as rationalistic. (75-80)
Obviously, this is an important point to which we must return in the evaluation
of Fesko’s arguments. But at this point
Fesko attempts to explain why Van Til has misread Thomas. Fesko’s interesting explanation for this is
threefold. “There are three chief
reasons: (1) reading Thomas in the light of postmedieval developments,
particularly a post-enlightenment reading; (2) trying to divide Aquinas the
philosopher from Aquinas the theologian; and (3) failing, ultimately, to
examine clearly the primary sources.” (81)
These are serious criticisms of Van Til.
Fesko, however, attempts to soften the blow for his Van Tillian
readers. He avers: “Just because Van Til
misread Aquinas does not mean that we must embrace everything that Thomas said.
Conversely, it does not mean that everything that Van Til said on these matters
is categorically wrong. Rather, the truth lies somewhere in the middle.”
(93) In another place he remarks: “Although he erroneously evaluated Aquinas’s
views, this does not invalidate all of Van Til’s insights about the problematic
nature of autonomous reason.” (95) In spite of these concessions,
Presuppositionalists are treated with this hair-raising assessment in the very
last sentences of this chapter: “Aquinas and other theologians of the Middle
Ages and patristic period belong equally to Protestants. They have insights to offer, and we have much
to learn from them regarding theology and, perhaps especially, apologetics.”
(96)
In Chapter
5 which is simply entitled, “Worldview,” Fesko provides us one of the more
unique subjects and viewpoints in his book.
Startlingly, he argues that the emphasis of James Orr, Abraham Kuyper,
and Cornelius Van Til on the idea that one’s worldview controls how one thinks
about everything is mistaken. It is, he
affirms, a mistaken viewpoint owing to the adoption of Idealist
perspectives. This contradicts,
according to Fesko, the idea of “common notions” for which he has been at such
pains to defend in his earlier chapters.
Here we see an attempt (typical of Westminster West) to resist the
claims of some Presuppositionalists, especially those of a Theonomic bent, to
make the Scriptures speak to everything in the world. With Van Drunen and others Fesko is
interested in reserving a place for natural law and showing that the Scriptures
are intended to have a limited range of authority to matters of religion and
Christian duty. One of the more
controversial claims of Fesko in this chapter is that Moses is dependent in his
exposition of the civil law of Israel either on the Code of Hammurabi or on
material that predates that code. (121-122) I find myself deeply ambivalent
about Fesko’s view in this interesting chapter.
Once more it needs discussion in the evaluative section of this review.
Chapter
6 treats “Transcendental Arguments.”
Once more Fesko seeks to bring Van Til and Apologetics back to the
touchstone of natural theology as taught by the Reformed Scholastics. He begins by citing Turretin who affirms a
natural theology partly innate and derived from common notions and partly
acquired by being drawn from the book of nature by discursive reasoning.
(135-136) This is one of the more difficult chapters in Fesko’s book because of
the fairly constant necessity of qualifying his critique of Van Til. He cannot say that the transcendental
argument is wrong. He acknowledges it to be a useful tool. (137) He cannot quite say that Van Til rejected the
use of evidence. He must limit this claim to “some Van Tillians” and suggest
that it follows from certain statements of Van Til. (137) Perhaps the most important and consistent
claim of this chapter is that the transcendental argument is not the Copernican
Revolution in apologetics which both Van Til and Van Tillians have claimed.
(136)
The
pivotal paragraph in this chapter deserves quoting and reads as follows:
This chapter deals with three issues, namely whether (1) Van Til engages in synthetic thinking; (2) some overemphasize the coherence theory of truth at the expense of the correspondence theory; and (3) the TAG is wedded to outdated philosophical trends. Van Til accused Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) of employing synthetic thinking, combining pagan and Christian thought in order to defend the faith. But although Van Til rejected Aquinas’s methodology, in truth his own TAG is similar. Both Aquinas and Van Til employed the dominant philosophies of their day in order to build an intellectual bridge to unbelievers; Aquinas and Van Til spoke with Aristotelian and Kantian accents, respectively. (137-138)
This
is a challenging chapter for Presuppositionalists. It exposes tensions on issues like the use of
evidence and the claims made for the TAG between Van Tillians (140-141);
between Knudsen and Van Til; (144) and between Van Til’s two main interpreters
Frame and Bahnsen. (136-137) The exposure
of such divergences is serious for Presuppositionalism. It certainly raises
interesting and important issues that require resolution. At the same time the
penetrating power of this chapter’s critique is limited by the fact that on
these issues Presuppositionalism is a moving target. Or perhaps it would be
better to say that it presents several different targets!
Chapter
7, “Dualisms,” is of less interest to this reviewer. The reason is, as Fesko himself says, “This
chapter … primarily interacts with the claims of Herman Dooyeweerd.” (8) The
link here with Van Til and mainstream Presuppositionalism is tenuous. Still Fesko
seeks to make the connection through the association of Van Til with Dutch
Neo-Calvinism (161-164). At any rate,
this chapter is of less significance to me because Dooyeweerd and his
philosophy is only distantly related to Van Til, difficult to the point of incomprehensibility,
and criticized by Cornelius Van Til himself.
Fesko
reaches the conclusion of his volume in Chapter 8, “The Book of Nature and
Apologetics.” Reading this chapter was
an unusual experience. I began the
chapter saying “yes, yes, and yes.” (195-206) I closed my reading of it by
saying “no, no, and no.” (206-219) How
and why did my response change so drastically?
I think the reason is that in the first part of the chapter Fesko simply
expounds the nature and the contours of a biblical and covenantal epistemology,
but in the second he critiques Presuppositionalism.
The
exposition of what Fesko calls “starting point, the necessary commitments for a
biblical apologetic methodology” and “the nature of epistemology … within the
framework of classic covenant theology: the covenants of redemption, works, and
grace” and “the two goals of a covenant epistemology, namely, love and
eschatology” is one of the best parts of the book. (194) I worried a little
about how closely Fesko related the covenant to creation. I believe there is an important and
confessional distinction between creation and the covenant. Cf. the Westminster
Confession of Faith chapter 7, paragraph 1.
The covenant was technically an addition to creation, but I can live
with Fesko’s statement of this because teleologically creation was for the
covenant and intended as the theatre of special revelation (as Calvin avers).
Fesko
began to lose and frustrate me when he began to critique Van Til and
Presuppositionalism on the basis of this epistemology. Once more I felt that there was a drastic misunderstanding
of Presuppositionalism in play here.
Fesko clearly has Presuppositionalism and Van Til in mind when he says,
“Apologetically, this means that believers can present the gospel in
conjunction with rational arguments and evidence and know that believers can
intellectually receive and comprehend the message.” (212) Whoever thought otherwise? Certainly not Van Til who teaches that
unbelievers “get it” very well!
The most depraved of men cannot wholly escape the voice of God. Their greatest wickedness is meaningless except upon the assumption that they have sinned against the authority of God. Thoughts and deeds of utmost perversity are themselves revelational, that is, in their very abnormality. The natural man accuses or else excuses himself only because his own utterly depraved consciousness continues to point back to the original natural state of affairs. The prodigal son can never forget the father’s voice. It is the albatross forever about his neck.[1]
But
on this point this review must next turn to an evaluation of Fesko’s important
book.
[1]The Infallible Word (Philipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and
Reformed, 1978) Cornelius Van Til, “Nature and Scripture,” 274-75.
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
But this
somewhat personal preface to the appearance of Fesko’s book provides no clear
idea of the nature of Fesko’s volume and its argument. To understand where Fesko is coming from involves an understanding of some
important currents which have arisen in Reformed scholarship in recent years.
One
of those currents has been the growing appreciation for the accomplishments of
what is known as the high Reformed Scholasticism of the late 16th
and 17th centuries. This
current is deeply reflected in the subtitle of Fesko’s work: Retrieving the Classical Reformed Approach
to Defending the Faith. The Classical Reformed Approach of which
Fesko speaks is a reference to the high Reformed Scholasticism just mentioned.
To
understand the story of the emergence of this renewed appreciation for Reformed
Scholasticism, one must go back to and provide a brief introduction to a theory
popular in previous generations of historians. The theory is known as Calvin versus the Calvinists.[1] Fesko mentions this theory explicitly and
takes issue with it in many places. (48, 50, 52, 53, 56, 67-69) This theory
over the years was elaborated in many ways.
Here is a chart which suggests its character and claims.
A key issue that informs Fesko’s critique of Van Til and
Presuppositionalism has to do with this claim that Calvin differed from his
theological descendants in rejecting the scholastic tradition informed by the
philosophical methodology of Aristotle.
Reformed historians under the influence of especially the work of
Richard Muller have raised serious questions about this view of Calvin. Muller in his Unaccommodated Calvin[2]
and Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics[3]has argued that this distinction is not
only exaggerated but probably false.
This is important with regard to Van Til and Presuppositionalism
because of two well-known claims of Van Til.
The first is that Calvin significantly and even drastically differed
from the Medieval Scholastics in his approach to apologetics and especially
natural theology. The second is that
later Reformed theologians drifted from Calvin into a view of apologetics that
actually returned to the views of Medieval Scholasticism.
The view associated with Muller and other contemporary historical
theologians is that to understand Calvin properly, he must be situated within the
classical, Christian theological tradition and not contrasted with it. This means that, far from being contrasted,
for instance, with Thomas Aquinas and the Medieval theological tradition, he
must be interpreted as working within it.
Similarly, this means that far from contrasting him with his Calvinist
theological successors he must be interpreted in harmony with them. Thomas Aquinas, the Medieval theologians,
Calvin, and the “Reformed Scholastics” of the succeeding generation are all
seen as utilizing the same scholastic methodology. Muller argues in Unaccommodated Calvin that, though this scholastic method is not as
apparent in Calvin, it informs many of his writings.
Flowing from this thesis is another and even more important
consequence. There is much more
commonality in Calvin’s actual theological system and affirmations with the Reformed
and especially the Medieval “Scholastics” than has generally been recognized.
This is a startling claim and not just for Presuppositionalists. Central
to Van Til’s claims regarding Presuppositionalism is a contrast especially with
Medieval Scholasticism’s approach to apologetics. The notion that Calvin had much more in
common with Thomas Aquinas than has been generally recognized is both
challenging and serious to Presuppositionalism.
What shall we make of this new paradigm of contemporary Reformed
historians? How should we respond to it
and the challenge it poses for Presuppositionalism’s claims? Though I am in general carried by Muller’s
thesis, I also believe that it is easily subject to overstatement and
abuse.
I am carried by it in so far as it is clear that many of the contrasts
between Calvin and the later Calvinists have been based on significant
misunderstandings of or imbalanced, one-sided treatments of Calvin. Into this category, for instance, must be
placed Brian Armstrong’s not too subtle attempt to present Calvin as the father
of Amyraldianism.[4] Into the same category must be placed R. T.
Kendall’s horrendous attempt to appropriate Calvin to universal atonement and his
intellectualist view of faith.[5] I am not familiar with any attempts to
appropriate Calvin for passibilist or semi-passibilist views of God, but it is
clear to me that Calvin held to classical views of the doctrine of God as
propounded by both Medieval and Protestant Scholastic theologians. This is an important point for those arguing
for a more “scholastic” Calvin.
At the same time, a warning must be stated. The current scholarly trend towards a scholastic Calvin must not be pressed to the point where certain differences between Calvin and some of his Reformed successors are denied. It is clear that there are differences between Calvin and the Reformed on a number of the subjects noted in the chart above. It seems to me that Calvin did define saving faith in terms which made assurance of salvation essential to saving faith. It seems clear to me that his views of the Christian Sabbath are neither as consistent nor complete as those of his Puritan successors. The degree of difference between Calvin and the Calvinists on these issues has been overstated. Seriously wrong practical conclusions have been drawn from these differences. Nevertheless, differences clearly do exist. On both of these issues I prefer the views of the confessional tradition found in the Westminster and 1689 Baptist Confession to those of Calvin. While at many points the confessional tradition closely reflects (and sometimes almost verbatim) the views of Calvin, there are distinctions between Calvin and the Calvinists that cannot be denied.
There are also places where I agree with Calvin against his Reformed
successors. It is well-known that a
revolutionary, political tradition developed among Calvin’s Presbyterian
successors. It is really clear that
Calvin is not the author of this tradition and in fact would have rejected this
development. I have documented the
reasons for this assertion in my essay on Political
Revolution in the Reformed Tradition: An Historical and Biblical Critique.[6] Suffice to say here, Calvin makes his
anti-revolutionary view clear in the Institutes
(4:20), in his commentaries on the key passages, and in his letters to the
French Reformed movement.
In the prevailing enthusiasm for Muller’s thesis, these distinctions
must not be forgotten. Muller himself in
Unaccommodated Calvin refuses to
claim Calvin for a full-blown doctrine of limited atonement.[7] William Cunningham (1805-1861) cannot be
accused of being influenced by 20th century historiography. Yet he cautions against wrongly flattening
the difference between Calvin and his successors. He has this to say about Calvin and the
Calvinists:
And it has often been alleged that Beza, in his very able discussions
of this subject, carried his views upon some points farther than Calvin himself
did, so that he has been described as being Calvino
Calvinior. We are not prepared to
deny altogether the truth of this allegation; but we are persuaded that there
is less ground for it than is sometimes supposed, and that the points of
alleged difference between them in matters of doctrine, respect chiefly topics
on which Calvin was not led to give any very formal or explicit deliverance,
because they were not at the time subjects of discussion, or indeed ever
present to his thoughts.[8]
Though some may think that John Murray was too influenced by the
historiography of his day, he provides this analysis of the issue.
It would be unhistorical and theologically unscientific to overlook or
discount the developments in the formulation of Reformed doctrine that a
century of thought and particularly of controversy produced. Study even of Calvin’s later works, including
his definitive edition of the Institutes
(1559), readily discloses that his polemics and formulations were not oriented
to the exigencies of debates that were subsequent to the time of his
writing. It is appropriate and
necessary, therefore, that in dealing with Calvin, Dort, and Westminster we
should be alert to the differing situations existing in the respective dates
and to the ways in which thought and language were affected by diverse
contexts. This is particularly necessary
in the case of Calvin. Too frequently he
is enlisted in support of positions that diverge from those of his successors
in the Reformed tradition. It is true
that Calvin’s method differs considerably from that of the classic Reformed
systematizers of the seventeenth century.
But this difference of method does not of itself afford any warrant for
a construction of Calvin that places him in sharp contrast with the more
analytically developed formulations of Reformed theology in the century that
followed.[9]
A definitive evaluation of Fesko’s claims based on Muller’s
historiography must await the following review of his volume. These cautionary thoughts are intended simply
to set the stage for that evaluation.
[1]Two important statements of this
historical paradigm are these: Brian G. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism and Humanism
in Seventeenth Century France (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1969.); John Calvin: A Collection
of Essays, ed. by G. E. Duffield, (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1968). In this collection see especially Basil
Hall’s “Calvin against the Calvinists,” 25f.
[2]Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin (Oxford: New
York, 2000).
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
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