The Philosophical Backdrop of Apologetic Development in the Modern Church

In the Modern Church period, Apologetic developments will again be summarized by means of a contrast between two great defenders of the faith, B. B. Warfield and Abraham Kuyper.  If we are to understand their work, however, the philosophical context in which they labored must be understood. Three major forms of philosophy are relevant for our purposes. They are Rationalism, Empiricism, and Kantianism. These schools had a significant impact on orthodox apologetics. G. H. Clark argues that the Reformation had very little influence on the development of philosophy.

But though the Reformation had very widespread effects on civilization, it did not have as much influence on the history of modern philosophy as might be expected.  The genius of the Reformation was to avoid the skepticism that results from dependence on unaided reason and to accept truth as a revelation from God; whereas the philosophical development is an attempt to show that knowledge is possible without recourse to any special or supernatural revelation.  Perhaps the chief influence of the Reformation on the philosophers was to lead them into inconsistencies … as the Middle Ages had diluted its Christianity with pagan ideas, so the modern philosophers … put varying thicknesses of Christian veneer over their basic secularism.^[1]

If Clark is right, Christianity had little influence on philosophy. This would mean, however, that the influence was mainly that philosophy influenced Christianity. If that is true, a knowledge of these philosophies is crucial so that we might understand how they had a bad impact on Christian and Reformed thinking.

Rationalism

Despite the amazing advances taking place in the physical sciences during the seventeenth century, “the philosophic hope for truth was not based on empirical discovery.”^[2]  Rather, philosophy looked inward to the human mind for the source of truth.  Since this school of philosophers looked mainly to the human mind itself and its logical abilities to construct true philosophy rather than to scientific experimentation with the natural world, they were known as rationalists.  Some of the most important of these rationalists were Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz.  Since they looked to the innate ideas contained in the human mind as the basis of their philosophy, the ontological argument for the existence of God was an important foundation stone for these philosophers.  For the same reason, Descartes started his philosophical reasoning with cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am).

Empiricism

The attempt to ground true philosophy through demonstrative logic on the examination of man’s mental ideas and structure of his mind itself was replaced by the attempt to ground philosophy on sensation, on the empirical (or experimental) examination of reality through the observation of the senses.  The major empiricists were British.  They provide interesting information about the nature and problems of Empiricism.  We will briefly survey them.

1. John Locke (1632-1704)

John Locke, as Clark has just noted, began the attack on rationalism.  It is important to understand the front on which this attack was begun.  Locke attacked the concept that the human mind has innate ideas.  The human mind was, for Locke, a tabula rasa, a blank slate.  Clark informs us:

When Locke decided to attack rationalism, he did not begin, as the previous account might seem to suggest, with an attempt to show the invalidity of the ontological argument; neither did he emphasize the failure to deduce the minor laws of physics and the particular events of history from the being of God.  Instead of centering his attention on these obvious and basic factors, he chose a point that has so little needed mention in the foregoing exposition that one may at first wonder whether it is really essential to rationalism at all.  Yet it proves to have been presupposed throughout.  The point concerns innate ideas.  Descartes indeed used the term innate very little, and Spinoza less.  But if knowledge is not received through sensation, the mind at birth must possess something in the way of intellectual equipment‑-the concepts of logic at least … whatever the extent of the ideal world, a theory in which knowledge is not altogether based on experience requires some innate ideas, just as a theory which finds knowledge in experience alone cannot admit even one.  Therefore Locke’s introduction to empiricism, Book I of his Essay, attempts the refutation.^[3]

He argued, therefore, that all knowledge is derived from our common experience. Clark says:

But the value of empiricism is not to be tied too closely to Locke’s introduction.  It is the constructive theory that counts.  If Locke can show in detail how all ideas, including the most abstract and speculative, are derived from common experience; if he can avoid skepticism and make knowledge possible for a mind unfurnished with prior ideas; if, in other words, he can justify empiricism, then the minor points about innate ideas are automatically disposed of … Empiricism is the theory that all knowledge is based on experience alone.^[4]

We will have occasion to notice that it is British Empiricism arising as it did on the eve of the eighteenth century and dominating Britain during that century, which most profoundly influenced the tradition of Christian apologetics with which our religious tradition is most familiar.  The importance of British Empiricism for the development of Protestant Christian Apologetics in the Modern Church is difficult to overstate.  It is most significant, therefore, that the next major advocates of empiricism were Bishop George Berkeley, an apologete for Christianity, and David Hume, its enemy.

2. George Berkeley (1685-1753)

Berkeley taught a form of empirical idealism in which the reality of the external world of matter was denied.  His philosophy may be summarized in the words esse is percipi (existence is perception).  Berkeley argued that all we can be certain of is what we perceive or sense.  There is no reason that behind our perceptions, there must be any material reality. Says Clark:

Berkeley was aware that nearly all men, and not Locke only, believed in the real external existence of material substances.  But he thought that only a little reflection was needed to convince anyone of the absurdity of the common view.  Matter is an abstract idea, and abstract ideas do not exist.  Even if they did, they would exist in the mind, the only place in which an idea can exist.  And because colors and tastes are perceptions, like pain, it is only in the mind that apples, mountains, and rivers exist, because these are ideas too, complex ideas, but nonetheless ideas … perceptions exist only in the perceiving mind.

If it be objected that although the perceptions exist only in the mind, there are real things outside the mind of which the perceptions are effects and copies, Berkeley replies that an idea can only be like or be a copy of an idea: a color can only be a color.  And further, are these alleged external things, of which the ideas are supposed to be copies, perceptible or not?  If they are perceptible, they are ideas in the mind.  If they are not perceptible, then a color would have to be a copy of something invisible, and solidity a copy of something intangible.  Can anything be greater nonsense?

A philosopher who wishes to defend the existence of matter ought to have reasons for believing it to exist, and he ought to be able to show its usefulness … ^[5]

Berkeley’s philosophy appeared to him to have an important religious significance.  Says Clark,  “For him this empiricism, which made the existence of God more evident than the existence of other men, and which deprived atheistic materialism of its material substance, was the bulwark of Christianity.”^[6]  Empiricism also had religious significance for David Hume, but in exactly the opposite direction.

3. David Hume (1711-1776)

Hume, as mentioned above, was the enemy of Christianity.  On the basis of his empirical philosophy, he denied the arguments for the existence of the soul, miracles, and God.  Without going into detail, Hume’s arguments were to the effect that causality, the soul, miracles, and God had never been a matter of empirical experience to him and, therefore, could not be regarded as proven.  Clark’s evaluation of Hume’s skepticism is helpful:

Hume had no intention of giving aid and comfort to Christianity; and many orthodox believers, knowing him to be an enemy, are tempted to attack his refutation and to put the argument for God’s existence in valid form.  But contrary to both Hume’s intentions and the fears of these particular believers, it could be that Hume injured himself more than Christianity.  If arguments from experience do not prove the existence of God, the trouble might lie in experience rather than in the existence of God.  The important point is not whether Hume can come to a knowledge of God, but rather whether Hume can come to a knowledge of anything.  It is empiricism that is on trial.  Can any knowledge be based on experience alone?^[7]

Clark’s point is a good one.  Perhaps empirical experience provides no basis to believe in the existence of God.  But it also provides no basis to believe in the idea of cause.  Human beings have a hard time functioning without the idea of cause.  This raises the question whether on the basis of Empiricism we can know anything for certain at all.^[8]

Kantianism

Immanuel Kant lived from 1724-1804.  He self-consciously attempted to synthesize (combine) rationalism and empiricism in his system of philosophy.  He hoped by this means to correct the errors of these two views and provide a workable basis for human knowledge.  Clark makes this point in his opening words about Kant:

Rationalism was the theory that all knowledge is based on logic alone.  Its ideal was the deductive method of mathematics, and physics was tortured to fit the scheme.  The empirical school went on the principle that all knowledge is based on experience alone, and mathematics was made an experimental science.  Although these two systems are otherwise so different, Kant found in them a profound similarity which he believed to be the cause of their failure.  His efforts to replace them he characterizes as a Copernican revolution … preceding philosophy had always assumed that human cognition revolves around or must conform to the objects of knowledge; but now Kant proposes to try the assumption that objects must conform to the conditions of cognition.  Since the first assumption has resulted in constant failure, the second is worth the attempt.^[9]

Kant, therefore, argues that space, time, causality, and other fundamental ideas simply reflect the structure of the human mind.  That is to say, our minds shape what we see, rather than what we see shaping our minds. Thus, the human mind imposes on reality‑-experience‑-of necessity these structures. Clark happily illustrates Kant’s viewpoint by way of the intelligent jelly jar.

Once upon a time a housewife made a batch of jelly and stored it on the pantry shelves for the winter.  One jelly glass, brighter than the others, sat through the months reflecting on its experience.  It noted that one winter its contents had been bright red in color, soupy in consistence, and had the taste of cherry.  Another winter its experience was dark blue, rubbery, and tasted like grape.  Its object on another occasion had been orange and bitter.  Then a most remarkable discovery jolted this Kantian jelly glass out of its dogmatic slumbers and empirical dreams.  Although the red, blue, yellow, sweet, and bitter came and went, the objects were always the same shape.  How could this be?  The change in experience could be accounted for by foreign material being poured into it; but the only permanent factor to account for the identity of shape must be the jelly glass itself.^[10]

Brilliant as this insight may seem to be, the final result was only more skepticism and the clearest manifestation yet of the futility of non-Christian thought.  Kantian epistemology could not account for vital aspects of human experience.

Here is why.  According to Kantian epistemology all sensation or experience is structured necessarily by the categories of the human mind.  Without these categories, no knowledge is possible.  All is merely the constant flux of sensation.  Among these categories of the mind is, of course, the category or idea of cause.  All sensation is, therefore, structured by the category of natural causality.  This being the case, there can, in the realm of pure reason, be no such thing as human freedom.  All our actions in the realm of sensation have a natural cause.  Furthermore, all knowledge consists in the structuring of experience or sensation by the rational categories of the human mind.  Thus, by definition, or we should say, by Kantian epistemology, the knowledge of God is impossible.^[11]

All of this, however, not only has ruled out any knowledge of God but has also ruled out of the realm of possible knowledge, human freedom, and, therefore, the whole realm of morality.  Yet Kant is convinced that moral imperatives or obligations do exist.  At the same time, he is convinced that they cannot be derived from experience or sensation.  Further, morality depends on the idea of human freedom for its reality and on the idea of the existence of God for its enforcement or sanction.  Also, the mental categories to which Kant has subjected all reality do not allow for, in fact, absolutely prohibit the knowledge or existence of God and free will.  Therefore, it would seem that Kant has no basis for moral law, what he calls the categorical imperative.

It is at this point that Kant introduces an important distinction in his philosophy.  It is true that in the `phenomenal’ world of sensation (subject as it is to the mental categories), there can be no morality.  Nonetheless, we must not forget that these categories and our experiences do not bring us into contact with the noumenal or ideal world.  We only know sensation and experience.  We do not know things in themselves.  Hence, Kant argues that in the `noumenal’ realm of the things in themselves, free will and moral law are a reality.  Furthermore, it is well that we act as if God Himself exists since this will give firmness and backbone to our commitment to the moral imperative.  Thus, in order to have a real moral existence, there is a kind of `transcendental’ necessity that we should presuppose that men are free and that God exists in the noumenal or ideal world.  Believe it or not, Kant would have us assume these things, even though the existence of such things and such a world is absolutely precluded by his rational epistemology.  Clark brings out the agonizing difficulties in Kant’s assumption of a noumenal world not ruled by the principles of the phenomenal world:^[12]

Kant on the other hand wants what he believes to be a real freedom without in the least minimizing the determinism of events in time.  All physical motions, and all series of psychological states likewise, are necessitated.  Therefore the motions and thoughts of a man committing theft are necessitated.  But the man, though he is partly in time, is partly beyond time.  It is in this latter respect that he is free.  Hence, concludes Kant‑-and the conclusion must certainly give us pause‑-hence the theft in itself could have been avoided, although the appearance of the theft could not have been avoided.^[13]

Conclusion: The Futility of Non-Christian Epistemologies

We may bring this overview of modern philosophy as it impacts Christian apologetics to a conclusion by remarking upon how Kant’s philosophy establishes the futility of non-Christian thought.  In the interests of reason and knowledge, Kant has been forced to banish human freedom from the world.  On the other hand, in the interests of his moral nature and personality, Kant has been forced to assume a world which is not subject to those categories which form the essence of rationality.  Thus, Kant combines a world of utter rationalism with a world of utter irrationalism in order to justify human experience as he knows it.^[14]

^[1]G. H. Clark, Thales, 302.

^[2]G. H. Clark, Thales, 308.

^[3]G. H. Clark, Thales, 358, 359.

^[4]G. H. Clark, Thales, 360.

^[5]G. H. Clark, Thales, 375-376.

^[6]G. H. Clark, op. cit., 378.

^[7]G. H. Clark, Thales, 391.

^[8]G. H. Clark, Thales, 394.  Clark concludes his treatment of empiricism with these words:  “Empiricism therefore fails at the beginning: it surreptitiously furnishes its unfurnished mind with the use of time and space, while it professes to manufacture these ideas at a later stage of the learning process.  Insist on a blank mind and learning never begins.  No wonder Hume called his philosophy Skepticism:  it is even more skeptical than he thought.  Thus the second modern attempt to establish knowledge leaves the subject in worse confusion than either rationalism or late scholasticism left it.”

^[9]G. H. Clark, Thales, 395-396.

^[10]G. H. Clark, Thales, 400-401.

^[11]G. H. Clark, Thales, 418.  Clark comments:  ” … it will be possible to consider Kant’s views on the proofs of God’s existence.  By this time Kant claims to have shown that mathematics and physics are possible; but since the categories cannot validly be applied beyond the range of sense perception it is clear that metaphysics and theology are impossible.  To support this conclusion, which is inherent in his exposition of the categories, he analyzes the traditional arguments and uncovers the fallacies they contain.”

^[12]The noumenal world for Kant was the physical world in itself.  The phenomenal world was the world as we see and experience it.  As the following sentences indicate, the two worlds were very different.

^[13]G. H. Clark, Thales, 428.

^[14]Thus is fulfilled Van Til’s repeated prophecy that it is only by the absurd procedure of combining rationalism with irrationalism that the unbeliever can hope to preserve himself and human experience as he knows it.

Sam Waldron

Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.