I. Thomas Aquinas

Introduction:

Medieval theology came to its peak in the work of the one known to Roman Catholics as Saint Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas lived during the High Middle Ages in the years 1225-1274. In his writings, Medieval theology received a systematic, logical, and thorough exposition.

• His Context

Medieval Theology exhibits a struggle between the spirit and principles of Neo-Platonism and those of Christianity. Van Til says:

Throughout the period of the Middle Ages the spirit of Plotinus and the spirit of Augustine are struggling with one another for supremacy.  The gospel of the grace of God through Christ may seem, at times, to be lost.  But the self-attesting Christ appears, in the end, to be victorious.

The early Church Fathers sought to present the Christ of the Scriptures to the men of culture of their day.  In doing so they all too frequently succumbed to the temptation of submitting the gospel of Christ to the standard of truth devised by the Greeks.  So too many of the theologians of the Middle Ages succumbed to the temptation to compromise with the principle of apostacy so strikingly and climactically expressed in the philosophy of Plotinus.^[1]

A few pages later, Van Til clarifies the precise nature of the compromise he has in mind.

If it is permissible to speak in general terms of medieval theology then this may be said to be its mark, namely, that committed as it is to the Christian doctrines of God, of creation, and redemption as revealed in Scripture it tones down and often virtually destroys these doctrines by combining them with a philosophy based on the principle of plenitude.  To profit from this sad mistake into which we all tend to fall it is imperative that the Christian principle be seen as the polar opposite of the principle of plenitude, the principle of the Great Chain of Being.  And to see this it must first of all be observed that both of these principles are principles that claim to interpret the whole of reality.  The Christian principle and the principle of plenitude alike include a view of God, of the world, and of man.^[2]

By the principle of plenitude Van Til refers to the idea that God as super-being necessarily unfolds his fullness in a great descending hierarchy or chain of being which stretches between himself and non-being. Van Til finds confirmation for his interpretation of Medieval Theology in one of its modern Roman Catholic defenders, Etienne Gilson.  Gilson speaks of God as “total being.”  As such he

more especially true being:  verum esse, and that means that everything else is only partial being, hardly deserves the name of being at all.  And thus all around that seems to us most obviously real, the world of extension and change around us, is banished at one stroke into the penumbra [fringe or border area‑-SW] of mere appearance, relegated to the inferior status of a quasi-unreality.  It is impossible to insist too much on the importance of this corollary, and its essential meaning at least must now be made clear.^[3]

It is as the heir of this great struggle and the systematizer of these two contrary views that we must look at Aquinas.

• His Forerunner

The medieval theologian Anselm, is the forerunner of Aquinas’ short view of faith and reason and Apologetics. In other words, he is the halfway point or house between Augustine and Aquinas.

Any treatment of Anselm’s apologetic significance must begin with an understanding of his view of faith and reason.  He follows Augustine and adopts his motto, Credo ut intelligam.  Yet all the emphasis of Anselm was on the ability of reason without faith in the Bible to prove or defend the truths of the Christian faith.  There appears to be no doctrine of the Christian faith which one could not prove by means of reason. Gordon H. Clark ably summarizes Anselm’s perspective:

In his general philosophic position Anselm followed Augustine, not slavishly nor sterilely, but pushed on with surprising originality to new fields of inquiry.  Adopting from Augustine the motto Credo ut intelligam, he accepted the essential identity of religion and philosophy and the competence of reason to rationalize faith.  Faith supplies the propositions with which one must start, propositions relating to the existence of God, the Trinity, the Atonement and so forth; reason is able to elaborate rational proofs of these doctrines.  In one sense the work of reason is superior to faith and in another it is not …  Apparently Anselm meant that the doctrines of the Bible and of the Church could be demonstrated apart from Scripture on independent grounds.  Reason therefore is in itself a source of information, and not simply the syllogistic process of deducing a system of consistent theology from the statements of Scripture.

The question now comes, Can all the doctrines of Christianity be demonstrated without appeal to Scriptural premises? …  Anselm seems to take it for granted and attempts to prove not only the existence of God and the Trinity … but the Incarnation as well and particularly the Atonement.  In his work Cur Deus Homo, a masterpiece of theology, Anselm is the first in church history to have grasped the precise significance of Christ’s death …  In the preface Anselm says of his book that “leaving Christ out of view, as if nothing had ever been known of him, it proves by absolute reasons the impossibility that any man should be saved without him … it is moreover shown by plain reasoning and fact that human nature was ordained for this purpose.” …  And at the end of the work Anselm’s pupil gives this conclusion:  “By this solution … I see the truth of all that is contained in the Old and New Testaments, for in proving that God became man by necessity, leaving out what was taken from the Bible … you convince both Jew and pagan by mere force of reason.”  Similarly in the Monologium he says,  “in order that nothing in Scripture should be urged upon the authority of Scripture itself, but that whatever the conclusion of independent investigation should declare to be true, should, in unadorned style, with common proofs and with a simple argument, be briefly enforced by the cogency of reason and plainly expounded in the light of truth.”^[4]

This summary of Anselm shows how the classical defense of the Christian faith by means of pure reason is beginning to take shape in this Medieval theologian.  Anselm believes that the Christian faith can be defended on the basis of pure reason and without reference to the authority of Scripture.

This tendency is given manifest exhibition in Anselm’s construction of the so-called ontological argument for the existence of God.  It is called the ontological argument because it insists that the greatest idea in our minds must also exist in being.  Ontology is the study of the nature of being or reality.  Ontological means having to do with being.  The proof itself is quite short, covering less than two pages.  Here it is:

And so, Lord, do thou, who doest give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe, and that thou art that which we believe.  And indeed we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.  Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Ps. 14:1).  But at any rate this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak–a being than which nothing greater can be conceived–understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.

For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists.  When a painter first conceives of what he will afterward perform he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it.  But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.

Hence even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding at least than which nothing greater can be conceived.  For when he hears of this, he understands it.  And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding.  And assuredly that than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist in the understanding alone.  For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality, which is greater.

Therefore if that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived.  But obviously this is impossible.  Hence there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

And it assuredly exists so truly that it cannot be conceived not to exist.  For it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist.  Hence if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived.  But this is an irreconcilable contradiction.  There is then so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.

So truly therefore dost thou exist, O Lord, my God, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist; and rightly.  For if a mind could conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absurd.  And indeed whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist.  To thee alone therefore it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others.  For whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist.  Why then has the fool said in his heart, there is no God, since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that thou dost exist in the highest degree of all?  Why? except that he is dull and a fool!

What shall we think of Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God?  First, it is obvious that it is not as clear and compelling as Anselm claimed it to be.  Of course, it is not to be expected that atheists should think it compelling.  Nor would their refusal to accept it prove that it is not.  But even theists and Christians have found it faulty or confusing.  Gordon H. Clark notes that even at the time of Anselm a monk named Gaunilo undertook to refute Anselm’s proof.^[5]  Second, it seems clear that upon examination, Anselm’s proof assumes an epistemology and philosophy that is influenced by a form of Christianized Platonic philosophy.

Indeed, the very idea that if we think something exists greater than which nothing else can exist, then it must exist seems suspiciously like the idea of Platonism that the human mind participates in the being of the ideal world and derives its ideas from thence.  Van Til’s comments on Gilson’s assessment of this argument confirm this point:

It is no wonder then, says Gilson, that Anselm discovered the ontological proof for the existence of God.  The whole point of this argument is to the effect that if one denies God one denies being … “The inconceivability of the non-existence of God could have no meaning at all save in a Christian outlook where God is identified with being, and where, consequently, it becomes contradictory to suppose that we think of Him and think of Him as non-existent” … ^[6]

With these introductory explanations in our minds, we may now proceed to deal with two important features of Aquinas’ Apologetics.

II. Faith and Reason in Aquinas

Aquinas adopts the same distinction between faith and reason which we saw in Anselm.  He disagrees with Anselm, however, on an important point.  Aquinas does not believe that it is possible to prove all Christian truths (or mysteries) on the basis of reason alone.  This disagreement was probably due to the fact Aquinas was trained in the philosophy and logic of Aristotle.  Thus, he was stricter about what it meant rationally to prove a doctrine.  This disagreement with Anselm led Aquinas to distinguish between philosophy, which was the realm of reason, and theology, which was the realm of faith.  Reason is sufficient to demonstrate the truths of philosophy.  Only faith in the Bible can lead us to the mysterious truths of the Christian faith.  Here is Aquinas’s precise statement in his Summa Theologica:

The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection presupposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith., something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated. ^[7]

Even more explicit are his assertions in Summa Contra Gentiles:

Since, therefore, there exists a twofold truth concerning the divine being, one to which the inquiry of the reason can reach, the other which surpasses the whole ability of the human reason, it is fitting that both of these truths be proposed to man divinely for belief.^[8]

Yet Aquinas made a further distinction.  Some truths fall within the sphere of both philosophy and theology.  Thus, philosophy and theology overlap.  Among the truths in this area of overlap is the existence of God.  This area of overlap is the area of natural theology which is able to prove the existence of God and other truths important to religion as well.  Thus, reason working in the area of natural theology is able to prove the existence of God and other basic, theological truths.  This natural theology forms a kind of introduction or preamble or rational prelude to the Christian faith.

Here is Gordon H. Clark’s summary:

As for his system, the distinction between faith and reason which Anselm had formulated but had not thoroughly applied was adopted by Thomas and worked out in great detail.  Theology is founded on revelation; philosophy is based exclusively on reason.

Aside from the Aristotelian epistemology by which Thomas wished to establish the first principles, Anselm would have agreed with all this.  But because Aquinas has a stricter sense of demonstration and insists as the above quotations show on formal validity, the disagreement begins to appear in that Aquinas does not regard all revealed truths as susceptible of philosophic proof, at least not by men …  For example, the doctrine of the Trinity, in spite of Augustine, Anselm, and Abelard, is no part of philosophy …  Similarly Thomas excludes from philosophy the doctrines of the temporal creation, original sin, the incarnation, purgatory, the resurrection of the body, the judgment, heaven and hell …

Some propositions, however, are to be found both in theology and in philosophy.  The reason is that the Scriptures are given for the salvation of all types of men, morons as well as geniuses; hence God included in his revelation information which indeed philosophers could obtain naturally, but which the duller and by far the more numerous part of humanity could never have figured out.  This is not to say that any one man can believe and know the same truth.  Understanding completes and puts an end to faith …  But though no person can believe and know a given truth, the truth itself may exist both in theology because it was revealed, and in philosophy because someone understood its demonstration.  Such is the case with the existence of God …  Thus natural theology, by which is meant the logical demonstration of the existence of God from first principles, is the boundary between theology proper and philosophy …  This makes natural theology the center of Thomas’ system and with it his fame is indissolubly bound.”^[9]

Mayers confirms what Clark says:

What, then, are the primary apologetic assumptions and implications of Thomas’s attempts to prove God rationally?  The most apparent implication is the independence of reason and faith.  Reason is neither inherently nor volitionally limited.  The philosopher can come to the same conclusion by reason as the theologian does by revelation and faith …  Natural theology based on the theistic arguments is developed independently of special revelation and the knowledge thereby of creation …  Believer and unbeliever thus can equally know the reality of God, if not all Christian truths.  Reasoning is unspoiled in both.  The Fall of man in disobedience to God is much less severe and radical here than in Augustine …^[10]

Mayers’ opinion seems vindicated by the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. In several places, Thomas argues that the existence of God is not self-evident because sinful men can conceive that God does not exist, and if something is self-evident, it cannot be conceived by anyone as not existing.  He proves this by citing “the ancients,” that is, the ancient Greek philosophers. He also cites the fact that the fool denies the existence of God.^[11]

The implications of this view of faith and reason for Christian apologetics are very important.  Aquinas’ treatment of reason clearly shows a great confidence in reason.  It also assumes that faith and reason are independent of each other.  It places believers and unbelievers in the same place with regard to the truth of the existence of God.  The fall of man and the reality of sin appear to have had little or no effect on the reasons of men.

This subject raises the issue of the effect of human depravity on the reasons of fallen men.  In apologetic studies, this is called noetic depravity. In turn, this raises the much bigger question of the whole matter of sin and grace in Aquinas.  I will first give a brief description of my understanding of sin and grace in Aquinas.  Then, with that information in hand, I will return to the subject of noetic depravity in Aquinas.

With regard to sin and grace, we must start with the perhaps surprising assertion to many that Thomas Aquinas was a thoroughgoing Augustinian in his view of predestination.  In one way, this should not be surprising, for everyone in medieval Catholicism felt the necessity to be Augustinian in their views of grace.  Nevertheless, most really did not understand or appreciate what Augustine really believed about sin and grace.  To his credit, Aquinas was too good a theologian to misunderstand or to disagree with Augustine.  Careful as his analysis and approach to this facet of theology was, when read carefully, he was a thoroughgoing Augustinian.  This is true with regard to decisive matters.

He was thoroughly Augustinian in his view of predestination.  In his treatment of predestination, Aquinas answers a number of questions in a way that only Augustine and his strict followers would answer.^[12]  Here is a brief summary.

• “Whether Men Are Predestined by God?” Yes!
• “Whether Predestination Places Anything in the Predestined?” No! (Men are passive in this matter.)
• “Whether God Reprobates Any Men?” Yes!
• “Whether the Predestined Are Chosen by God?” Yes!
• “Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination?” No!
• “Whether Predestination Is Certain?” Yes!
• “Whether the Number of the Predestined Is Certain?” Yes!
• “Whether Predestination Can Be Furthered by the Prayers of the Saints?” No, in that predestination is first determined regardless of the prayers of the saints. Yes, in that the effect of predestination—salvation—can be furthered by the prayers of the saints as a means of grace.

This last question and answer exactly parallels Augustine’s argument in his book entitled, Of Rebuke and Grace (as do all the others echo the anti-Pelagian teaching of Augustine.)

Similarly, and not surprisingly, Thomas also agrees with Augustine about what is now known as “irresistible grace.”  Once again, through his typical and very analytical treatment, Aquinas follows the course laid out by Augustine.^[13]  But the pinnacle is reached when Aquinas teaches what amounts to effectual calling or irresistible grace:

… since God’s intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints … that by God’s good gifts whoever is liberated is most certainly liberated.  Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it …^[14]

With such evidence in front of us, we may rather expect that Aquinas will follow what we know as the Calvinistic scheme by teaching the perseverance and preservation of the saints and the other doctrines of grace.  Sadly, this assumption is not the case.  Neither Augustine, his strict follower, Gottschalk, nor Thomas Aquinas affirm the preservation of the saints.  Grace may be lost unless one is also predestined to persevere. Once more, Thomas Aquinas is a good Augustinian when he says: “Many have meritorious works who do not obtain perseverance …”^[15]

Similarly, Aquinas also seems to have held confused and imperfect views of total depravity.  Sin, in fact, does not seem to occupy an important place in Thomas’s writings.  In Gilson’s index, there is no entry for sin, depravity, the fall, or folly.  For a discussion of Thomas’s view of sin, one must consult his doctrine of free will and grace. It is not surprising, then, that Thomas argues that natural light is sufficient for natural knowledge. Consequently, human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin.^[16]

The effects of this view of human nature become evident of what was seen above. In several places, Thomas argues that the existence of God is not self-evident because sinful men can conceive that God does not exist, and if something is self-evident, it cannot be conceived by anyone as not existing.  He proves this by citing “the ancients,” that is, the ancient Greek philosophers. He also cites the fact that the fool denies the existence of God.^[17] Surprisingly, instead of attributing such denials to the noetic depravity of men and the fact that they suppress the truth in unrighteousness (Rom. 1:18), Thomas takes these statements of the fool and the ancients at face value and uses them as an argument against the self-evident character of the existence of God. Nothing could more pointedly inform us of Thomas’s inflated view of the powers of fallen human reason.

Thus, despite the promising character of Thomas’s views of predestination and grace, he falls short of truly appreciating the total depravity of man, including his reason.  This, in turn, profoundly controls his approach to apologetics and the theistic proofs.

III. The Five Ways of Aquinas

“The Five Ways” refers to the five arguments which Thomas Aquinas brought in order to prove or demonstrate the existence of God. Those arguments are the argument from motion, the argument from efficient cause, the argument from possibility and necessity, the argument from gradation, and the argument from the governance of the world.^[18] The term, demonstrate, is significant because Thomas is asserting that his proofs provide more than suggestive or probable evidence for the existence of God.  Clark notes, “Obviously therefore with this Aristotelian background Thomas presents his proofs as formally valid demonstrations.”^[19]  Carnell writes similarly,  “Let us be careful to point out that Thomas is referring to deductive demonstration, not probable induction, in his proof for God.  “We can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects.”  Summa, I, Q. 2, A. 2.  This means that the proof must bear the same compulsion as a mathematical equation or a case of the syllogism.”^[20]

Clark and Carnell are certainly correct. It is evident throughout Aquinas’ treatment of the proofs that he intends them as formal demonstrations.  He denies that the existence of God is self-evident. In the process, he rejects both Anselm’s ontological argument and Augustine’s argument from truth.  He admits: “To know God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us …” Yet he denies that this is “not to know that absolutely that God exists, just as to know that someone is approaching is not to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter that is approaching.”^[21] He goes on in the next article to assert:  “Hence, the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.”^[22]  Similarly, in Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas argues:

[3] This, then, is the manner of procedure we intend to follow. We shall first seek to make known that truth which faith professes and reason investigates. This we shall do by bringing forward both demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which were drawn from the books of the philosophers and of the saints, through which truth is strengthened and its adversary overcome [Books I-III]. Then, in order to follow a development from the more manifest to the less manifest, we shall proceed to make known that truth which surpasses reason, answering the objections of its adversaries and setting forth the truth of faith by probable arguments and by authorities, to the best of our ability [Book IV].

4] We are aiming, then, to set out following the way of the reason and to inquire into what the human reason can investigate about God. In this aim the first consideration that confronts us is of that which belongs to God in Himself [Book I]. The second consideration concerns the coming forth of creatures from God [Book II]. The third concerns the ordering of creatures to God as to their end [Book III].

[5] Now, among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in Himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby His Existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily suppressed.^[23]

The Five Ways Presented

In order to introduce the student to the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God, I will borrow Clark’s translation of the first proof from his Thales to Dewey.

The first and more manifest way [to prove the existence of God] is the argument from motion.  It is certain and evident to our senses that in the world some things are in motion.  Now, whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.  For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.  But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.

Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.  Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects.  For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold.  It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i. e., that it should move itself.

Therefore whatever is moved must be moved by another.  If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again.  But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and consequently no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand.  Therefore it is necessary to arrive at the first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.^[24]

Clark notes that all the proofs are “essentially similar.”^[25]  For the satisfaction of the student I have added a file with this lecture a translation of Aquinas’ five ways and Carnell’s summary of them.^[26]

The Five Ways Discussed

• Their Character

If one is to understand the Five Ways and properly assess them, several things must be understood about them.

The first thing that must be understood is that the five proofs are built upon the denial of any innate knowledge of God.  Says Clark:

Thomas faced two other contrasting views.  One is that the existence of God is self-evident and neither needs nor is susceptible [capable‑-SW] of proof from prior first principles.  Those who hold this view argue that God has implanted in all men an elemental knowledge of himself.  The idea of God is innate.  On this showing any argument or so-called proof could be nothing more than a clarification of already present ideas; and such in effect was the nature of Augustine’s, Anselm’s and Bonaventura’s attempts.  Now, in one sense Thomas is willing to admit that God’s existence is self-evident: it is self-evident in itself, it is self-evident to God; but it is not self-evident to us.  God has not implanted ideas in the human mind, and all knowledge must be based on sensory experience.^[27]

The second thing that must be understood about Aquinas’ five ways is that he claimed biblical support for his methodology.  Says Clark:

We can also be assured that the proof is possible by the words of the apostle Paul,  “The invisible things of him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20).  This verse could not be true, says Thomas, unless the cosmological argument were valid.  That the demonstration proceeds “from the things that are made” is in accordance with Aristotle’s theory of demonstration.  There are two methods of demonstration:  one is from cause to effect, the other from effect to cause.  “From every effect the existence of its proper cause  can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends on a cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist… ^[28]

The third thing that must be understood is that these proofs assume Thomistic philosophy.  In other words they assume Aquinas’ peculiar mix of Christianity and Aristotelian philosophy.  Speaking of the first proof Clark remarks:

This quotation, however, is more realistically understood not as a complete demonstration, but as a summary of a demonstration.  Obviously, its premises need to have been established elsewhere. Potentiality and actuality, the definition of motion, the necessity of a mover, the repudiation of infinite regress, all are conclusions from a long series of prior arguments and involve discussions not only on physics, but chiefly on epistemology.  If there is a break anywhere in this long chain of reasoning, the culminating proof quoted above will depend on a fallacy …  Any discussion of Thomas’ philosophy is criticism of the proof of God’s existence, for this proof is the culmination of the philosophy …^[29]

This is also evident from what was said above about Thomas’s rejection of the idea that the existence of God is self-evident.  This rejection is a rejection of the Christian Platonism which informed the work of Augustine and Anselm. Their arguments worked for them because they held the platonic notion that certain (eternal) ideas are innate to the human mind.  Thomas, working with the more empirical views of Aristotle, did not find such a notion credible and, thus, of course, rejected the arguments for the existence of God being self-evident based upon it.^[30]

• Their Criticism

It is this philosophical foundation that opens Thomas’ proofs to criticism.  He has committed himself to proving the existence of God within the bounds of his philosophy.  Thomistic philosophy is committed to an empirical view of knowledge.  Etienne Gilson, the premier Aquinas scholar of the 20^th Century affirms this empirical commitment of Aquinas repeatedly in his treatment of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas.  In a footnote, we have perhaps his clearest affirmation of the empiricism of Thomas:

St. Thomas observes that what is known to us per se becomes immediately known to us through sense.  Thus, when we see the whole and the part, we know at once without further search that the whole is greater than the part. In I Sent., 3, 1, 2. It would be difficult to indicate more forcefully the empirical origin of all evidence, however abstract it may be.^[31]

All sorts of other things conspire to confirm Gilson’s assessment of Thomas’s empiricism.  It is evident in his denial of the self-evident existence of God which we have noticed above.  It is evident in the fact that all the theistic proofs begin with empirical reality.^[32]  It is evident in the pervasive references to Aristotle as the Philosopher in Thomas’s writings combined with his rejection of the innate ideas of Christian Platonism. This statement in the opening pages of Summa Theologica is typical:  “No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv. lect. vi.) states concerning the first principles of demonstration.”^[33] The famous illustration of Aristotle’s empiricism is found in Raphael’s famous painting entitled, The School of Athens.^[34]

Empiricism teaches that sense impressions are the only or primary source of knowledge.^[35]  Thus, all the objections which have been raised against empiricism are also criticisms of Aquinas’ proofs for the existence of God.

Without denying that there is something compelling about these proofs, it remains true that they are open to criticism by rigorous logic.  Carnell spends ten pages in criticizing these proofs.  R. B. Mayers and K. J. Clark also believe that the Thomistic proofs are invalid.^[36]  Some of the most convincing criticisms leveled at these proofs are as follows:

(1) There is no way empirically to demonstrate that the unmoved mover, first cause, necessary being, perfect being, and great designer are identical to the Christian Trinity.  Aquinas’ conclusion to his first argument is really only a leap of faith when he says, “Therefore it is necessary to arrive at the first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.”  The fact is that not everyone understands it to be the Christian God.  Thus, this argument falls short from the standpoint of Christian Apologetics.

(2) The argument from design does not take into account the evil in the world.  If the design and wisdom in the world demonstrate a great designer, what do those aspects of the world that appear evil and foolish demonstrate?  Carnell remarks, “Conscientiousness in empiricism indicates that life is a mixed affair:  partly good and partly bad.  Shall we then reason from this to an absolutely good God?  It is difficult to see how this follows… When one beholds the history of humanity, the struggle of animals, the untold waste and destruction in nature, the ruthless slaughter of human values, and the death of the universe under the hand of the second law of thermodynamics, it is difficult empirically to affirm that the universe is as perfect as the defenders of Aristotle’s arguments must have it for the arguments to be significant.  Is it not evident that when we reason after the pattern of the relation between the artist and his work, the poorer the work the less perfection we attribute to him?  A chip on the statue or a flaw on the canvas makes the artist inferior.  Is not God, then, less than all perfect? “^[37]

(3) The very concept of cause cannot be proven empirically.  An empirical epistemology rules out the existence of any non-empirical reality.  Empiricism demands something it can see (or sense), if it is to believe.  The problem is that no one has ever actually seen or sensed a cause.  Carnell says:

Hume carefully showed that what we think is a connection between cause and effect is but a fixation of the mind and does not represent a valid inference from sense perception.  Cause and effect are but habits or conventions of the intellect which express invariably related impressions that have taken rise from one’s viewing the concourse of flux.  Causation “implies no more than this, that like objects have always been placed in the relations of contingency and succession [In other words, all we can see is that certain things always happen in the same order.‑-SW].”  This removes the support of the argument.

Again, what the empiricist wants to know is why the universe need have an efficient cause at all.  If no reason need be given for God’s uncaused state, why not shift that prerogative to the universe?  [Hume remarks,] “By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be god; and the sooner we arrive at the Divine Being, so much the better.  When you go one step beyond the mundane system [the world‑-SW], you only excite an inquisitive humor [an overly curious spirit‑-SW] which it is impossible ever to satisfy.”^[38]

These final comments of Hume lead us to a fourth criticism of these theistic proofs.

(4) The cosmological argument for God’s existence is the argument from the fact that the world must have a cause.  The cosmological argument is built upon the assumption of sufficient reason.  In other words, the idea is that “nothing can be uncaused or the cause of itself.”  But the cosmological argument also is built on the denial of infinite regress.  Says Mayers as he continues:

…there must be a final cause or the continuum of cause and effect would “go on to infinity.”  The denial of the possibility of an unending sequence of causes and effects would seem to be an assumption “smuggled” into, and not logically demonstrated by, the argument …  The cosmological argument thus ultimately begs the question by concluding that God is the first efficient cause, but also an uncaused member, the existence of which was absolutely denied at the beginning of the argument.  This is certainly a greater logical inconsistency than accepting an infinite series of causes.^[39]

Kelly James Clark cites the response of the famous atheist Bertrand Russell to the cosmological argument.

Why does the universe exist?  Russell believes that it just does.  Period.  And that is the end of the reasoning process.  As Russell says:  “I should say that the universe is just there, and that’s all.”  Russell has chosen at a certain point to give up the principle of sufficient reason.  The theist, it is alleged, also gives up the principle of sufficient reason when it suits him.  The theist will answer the question “Why does God exist?”  in a similar fashion:  “He just does.”  The application of the principle of sufficient reason must stop somewhere, but it is not clear where one is rationally compelled to stop applying the principle.  It is difficult to defend one’s stopping point without appealing to one’s belief or nonbelief in God.  Surely the theist will think it appropriate to stop only with God, yet the nontheist will stop at the universe.^[40]

• Their Appeal

This a good place to take up the appeal of these arguments.  For it is undoubtedly true that these arguments have manifested over the centuries a certain measure of logical appeal.  The power and logic of the criticisms mentioned above do not remove or reduce the sense of many Christians that there is an element of truth in these arguments.

If we would understand this phenomena we must remember the perception of William Adams Brown who is cited by Carnell:

The professed purpose of the argument is to discover a cause adequate to account for the world we see, but the implied assumption is that this cause must at the same time be such as to satisfy the religious longings and needs of man.  But this result is possible only as we read into the evidence data which our religious intuitions supply; in other words, as we introduce into our procedure judgments of value of a kind which ordinary scientific reasoning excludes.^[41]

Mayers rejects both the validity of the cosmological argument and the idea of infinite regress (that there can be an infinite series of causes).  Mayers reasons that the cosmological argument does, however, present us with a choice.  “Although the argument puts us on the horns of a dilemma that either there is a First Cause or the universe is brute fact, it provides no rational reason demanded by the argument for why  I must grab the First Cause horn other than prior theological assumption or “gut” feeling.  This “gut” feeling is important to the evangelical apologist.  The intuitive attraction of the cosmological argument is the persuasive and pervading reality of general revelation.  General revelation, however, is an a priori fact concomitant with creation and not the derivative of an a posteriori argument from the fact of existence to the cause of such existence.”^[42]

Clark enlarges on the appeal of the cosmological argument by noting how dissatisfying it is even to atheists to live in a universe without rhyme or reason.  He comments on and then cites Bertrand Russell:

Of course the nontheist must live with the untoward consequences [unpleasant results‑-SW] of rejecting a sufficient reason, cause, or purpose for the existence of the universe.  The nontheist must contend with the fact that the world is at best inexplicable and man’s place in the universe is equally so.  Russell, in one of his more candid moments, recognizes man’s plight in his purposeless cosmos:

Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which science presents for our belief.  Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home.  That man is a product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins‑-all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.  Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.

Recognizing meaninglessness is, of course, not a reason for believing that the cosmological argument is sound.  The nontheist is not illogical for accepting these consequences.^[43]

Kelly James Clark is correct.  Empiricism provides no refutation of the despair, which is the alternative to accepting the theistic solution to the cosmological argument.  Yet, the candid remarks of Bertrand Russell, cited by Clark, provide a penetrating insight into the reason why so many minds have found the cosmological argument to appeal to their minds.  The fact is that the world if viewed as the ultimate reality, is not friendly to human values and ideals.  Furthermore, there is a kind of immediate awareness in the human being that the world is itself an effect which must find its cause and explanation outside itself.  Similarly, the other Thomistic proofs do point to and even assume (without admitting it) the common human awareness that we and the world we live in are dependent, created (or contingent), designed, and originated.  But such perceptions are not distinguishable from the fact that we have an immediate awareness of our Creator.  Hence, the appeal of these proofs is simply that they lay hold in many minds of the awareness of our and the world’s dependent, created character.  This is to say, however, that these proofs can only succeed when they frankly admit that they presuppose the existence of an independent Creator.  This means, however, that they are not proofs in the Thomistic sense at all.  They fail and must fail if they purport to begin with the neutral data of sense experience and a neutral empirical epistemology and, from thence, prove the existence of God.

^[1]Van Til, Conflict, 2:2:1.  It is to be noted that Van Til carefully qualifies his description of medieval theology.  He affirms that they held a Christian doctrine of God and creation.  It is just that (in Van Til’s view) they compromised this Christian commitment by utilizing concepts from Greek philosophy that are in subtle but destructive ways contrary to its Christian commitments. It is simply wrong for Keith Mathison to assert in the unqualified way that he does that “Van Til asserts throughout his writings that Aquinas denied the Creator-creature distinction and taught that God and His creation exist on a scale of being.” Cf. Tabletalk, August 2019: https://tabletalkmagazine.com/posts/christianity-and-van-tillianism-2019-08/.

^[2]Van Til, Conflict, 4, 5.

^[3]Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 64.

^[4]G. H. Clark, Thales, 252-254.

^[5]Clark, Thales, 257.

^[6]Van Til, Conflict, 20.

^[7]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 2.

^[8]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 4, Paragraph 1.

^[9]Clark, Thales, 271-272.

^[10]Ronald Mayers, Both-And: A Balanced Apologetic, 102, 103.

^[11]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 11, Paragraph 3:  “And, contrary to the Point made by the first argument, it does not follow immediately that, as soon as we know the meaning of the name God, the existence of God is known. It does not follow first because it is not known to all, even including those who admit that God exists, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. After all, many ancients said that this world itself was God.”  Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1: “On the contrary, no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher … states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God (Ps. Lii. 1). Therefore that God exists is not self-evident.”

^[12]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 23, Articles 1-8.

^[13]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 112, Articles 1-3.

^[14]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 112, Articles 3.

^[15]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 114, Article 9.  Since the true grace of regeneration was given through the sacrament of baptism, and it was plain that not all the baptized persevered, no one committed to the notion of baptismal regeneration in any sense could hold the Calvinistic view of the perseverance of the saints.

^[16]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 109, Article 2.

^[17]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 11, Paragraph 3:  “And, contrary to the Point made by the first argument, it does not follow immediately that, as soon as we know the meaning of the name God, the existence of God is known. It does not follow first because it is not known to all, even including those who admit that God exists, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. After all, many ancients said that this world itself was God.”  Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1: “On the contrary, no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher … states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God (Ps. Lii. 1). Therefore that God exists is not self-evident.”

^[18]See the attachment file with the entire quotation of the five ways from Thomas Aquinas.                 

^[19]Clark, Thales, 273.

^[20]E. J. Carnell, Introduction to Christian Apologetics, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 127.

^[21]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1.

^[22]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 2.

^[23]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 9, Paragraphs 3-5.

^[24]Clark, Thales, 274.  This is cited from Summa Theologica, Part I, Qu. 2, Art. 3.

^[25]Ibid.

^[26]Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 127-128.

^[27]Clark, Thales, 272-273. For the substantiation of Clark’s assertions, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapters 10-12.

^[28]Clark, Thales, 128.

^[29]Clark, Thales, 275.

^[30]Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, 1956), 48-51.

^[31]Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, 1956), 450. For similar statements of Thomas’s empiricism see pages 54-58, 76-83 of the same work.

^[32]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 13.

^[33]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1.

^[34]See the accompanying powerpoint slides of this painting.

^[35]Carnell, Apologetics, 126.  Carnell indicates that for Thomas “Sense impressions are the only primary source of knowledge.  Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu.  There are no `inborn ideas’; nor are there any notions, within the natural range of experience, infused into the mind by a divine influence… ”

^[36]Carnell, Apologetics, 129ff.; R. B. Mayers, Both-And, 99ff.; K. J. Clark, Return to Reason (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 17-34.

^[37]Carnell, Apologetics, 138.

^[38]Carnell, Apologetics, 135, 136.

^[39]Mayers, Both, 99-100.

^[40]Kelly Clark, Return to Reason, 23, 24.

^[41]Joad, God and Evil, 224.

[42]Mayers, Both, 100-101.

^[43]Kelly Clark, Return to Reason, 25.

Sam Waldron

Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.