*Editor’s Note: The following material is the last of Dr. Sam Waldron’s 20-part series on Presuppositional Apologetics. Click on the following numbers to read the accompanying parts of this series:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
Practical Conclusions: Presuppositionalism Systematically Presented and Explained
You have read several times during these blog posts the view of apologetics, which I have been teaching you as `presuppositionalism.’ Since that word is composed of a mouthful of syllables, you may have wondered what in the world such a word meant. I believe it is important for you to understand this word and grasp more clearly the view of defending the faith which it embodies. Therefore, in Part 4 of the lectures, I will attempt to systematically present and defend `presuppositionalism.’ I will do so under the following sections of thought.
Section 1: Its Rise Retraced
Section 2: Its Identity Defined
Section 3: Its Necessity Explained
Section 4: Its Justification Presented
Section 5: Its Evidence Considered
I. Its Rise Retraced
In our historical introduction to Apologetics you may remember that we traced the development of two basic perspectives with regard to the defense of the faith. We traced the development of these two views in the early church in Justin Martyr and Tertullian, in the medieval and reformation periods in Aquinas and Calvin, and finally in the modern period in Abraham Kuyper and B. B. Warfield. I want to review the things we said there about the Modern Period.
Kuyper and Warfield were probably the two great, Christian and Reformed theologians who labored in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet while agreeing on most other issues, they consciously disagreed with one another on the subject of apologetics. This disagreement was partially due to the fact that Warfield represented the British Reformed tradition represented by Princeton Seminary, while Kuyper represented the Dutch Reformed tradition represented by and associated with the city of Amsterdam.
A. Kuyper
Remember this characteristic statement of Kuyper.
There is no doubt then that Christianity is imperilled by great and serious dangers. Two life systems are wrestling with one another, in mortal combat. …. In this struggle Apologetics have advanced us not one single step. Apologists have invariably begun by abandoning the assailed breastwork, in order to entrench themselves cowardly in a ravelin [a ravine or deep ditch‑-SW] behind it.
Why has apologetics been so useless? The problem is human depravity.
He who is not born of water and the Spirit, cannot see the kingdom of God, and the human mind is sufficiently inventive so to modify its tactics, whenever you imagine that you have gained your point, your proof is bound to lose its force … The same is true in part of the apologetic attempt to refute objections raised against the content of our Christian confession, and more particularly against the Holy Scripture.[1]
Kuyper’s point of view is that human depravity has so drastically influenced human reason that it is hopeless to try to prove to the unregenerate the truth of Christianity. The total depravity of men renders apologetics practically hopeless and useless.
B. Warfield
You remember that Warfield approached this whole issue from a totally different perspective. He asserts that “Christianity makes its appeal to right reason” and adds that Christianity is “valid for all normally working minds.”[2] But what about sin? Warfield replies:
Sin clearly has not destroyed or altered in its essential nature any one of man’s faculties, although (since it has affected homo totus et omnis [This is Latin meaning totally and completely‑-SW]) it has affected the operation of them all. The depraved man neither reasons, nor feels, nor wills as he ought … Nevertheless, there is question here rather of perfection than of kind of performance.[3]
Elsewhere Warfield argues similarly:
Sin may harden the heart so that it will not admit, weigh or yield to evidence: but sin, which affects only the heart subjectively, and not the process of reasoning objectively, cannot alter the relations of evidence to conclusions … there are excellent reasons why every man should enter the kingdom of heaven; and these reasons are valid in the forum of every rational mind, and their validity can and should be made manifest to all.[4]
The differences between Kuyper and Warfield are evident, are they not? For Kuyper the fundamental point is that the reasons of men are depraved. Classical apologetics is, therefore, pointless. For Warfield, on the other hand, the fundamental truth is that Christianity is rationally defensible. Therefore classical apologetics is valid and important. Human depravity cannot affect the basic ability of men to appreciate the arguments for Christianity.
C. Van Til
Providence did something very interesting in Cornelius Van Til. It brought a man raised in a Dutch Reformed background to be trained and to teach in the British Reformed background of Princeton Theological Seminary. Thus, Van Til was forced to interact with both traditions of thought with regard to apologetics. I believe that the result was a synthesis of these two perspectives which brought together the biblical ideas in both of them. Most theologians would argue that Van Til agrees more with Kuyper than Warfield. Nevertheless, the result of his historically important ministry was to combine what was best from both traditions. This new system of apologetics came to be known as Van Tillianism or Presuppositionalism. It was the system of apologetics taught for many years by Van Til at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia.
What is the essence of Van Til’s presuppositionalism? It is contained in the word, presupposition. Van Til stressed the great importance of understanding that first principles or presuppositions greatly influence the way people think. He argued that everyone reasons in a way dictated and controlled by certain fundamental, spiritual commitments. Thus, he agreed with Kuyper that the intellects of unsaved men are totally depraved. He also agreed with Kuyper that as long as you make your apologetic appeal to intellects controlled by the presuppositions that God is dead and Christ is not His Son you are going to make no progress with the unconverted man. In fact by appealing to the intellect of the fallen man you actually undermine the case for Christianity.
Van Til did not, however, conclude from this that apologetics are useless. Here is where he disagreed with Kuyper and agreed with Warfield. Instead he recommended a new kind of apologetics which recognized that the minds of fallen men are controlled by anti-Christian presuppositions. Instead of appealing to their fallen minds he taught that Christians should challenge the very presuppositions of the non-Christian. They could do this by laying bare to the non-Christian his anti-Christian presuppositions, showing him that those presuppositions were terribly inconsistent with his entire experience of reality, and finally by pointing out that only Christian presuppositions explained what the non-Christian knows to be true about himself and the universe.
Fundamental to Van Til’s apologetic was a distinction which brought together Kuyper’s and Warfield’s views of human reason. Kuyper said that man’s intellect is fallen, and he cannot know God by using it. Warfield argued that man’s intellect is basically sound, and he can know God by using it. Van Til said in effect, “Stop. You are both right.” Ethically, man is fallen and does not know God; but constitutionally man is made in the image of God and cannot help but know God. Thus, while it is useless to appeal to man as fallen, yet it is useful to appeal to man as made in the image of God. It is right to tell him to give up his wicked hatred of God which colors his whole way of looking at things. It is necessary to urge him to adopt the Christian presuppositions which alone make sense of reality.
II. Its Identity Defined
Presuppositionalism is today‑-thanks greatly to the labors of Van Til‑-one of two major views of apologetics adopted by evangelicals. The other is known as evidentialism. As you might guess, while presuppositionalism emphasizes the importance of presuppositions, evidentialism emphasizes the importance of evidence. It will be helpful for you to understand the difference between these two views. I cannot do better to help you understand the two views than to quote the summary of them by Robert L. Reymond:
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Presuppositionalism, or Credo ut intelligan (“I believe in order that I may understand”–systems presupposing the primacy [supremacy‑-SW] of special revelation as providing the ground for the total theological enterprise [program‑-SW]. Group characteristics here are convictions that (1) faith in God precedes understanding everything else (cf. Hebrews 11:3), (2) elucidation [explaining‑-SW] of the system follows faith, (3) the religious experience must be grounded in the objective Word of God and the objective work of Christ, (4) human depravity has rendered autonomous [independent and self-sufficient‑-SW] reason incapable of satisfactorily anchoring its truth claims to anything objectively certain, and (5) a special regenerating act of the Holy Spirit is indispensable [vital‑-SW] for Christian faith and enlightenment. The Augustinian and consistent Reformed tradition is representative of this group.
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Evidentialism, or Intelligo et credo (“I understand and I believe”)–systems stressing some form of natural theology as the point at which apologetics begins. Group characteristics here are the following: (1) a genuine belief in the ability and trustworthiness of human reason in its search for religious knowledge, (2) the effort to ground faith upon empirical [having to do with the senses and their observations‑-SW] and/or historically verifiable [supportable] facts, and (3) the conviction that religious propositions must be subjected to the same kind of verification [evidence‑-SW] –namely, demonstration–that scientific assertions must undergo. The Thomistic Roman Catholic tradition, the (inconsistent) Reformed evidentialist tradition, and the Arminian tradition are representative of this group.[5]
III. Its Necessity Explained
As with every theological question, the answer to the debate between evidentialism and presuppositionalism must be found in the Scriptures. That is why most of our time in Apologetics has been spent in opening up the Scriptures to you. Now we must summarize what the Scriptures say about the proper kind of apologetics. I think you must agree with me that the Scriptures support what can only be called presuppositionalism. Let me give you a number of reasons why.
First, the Scriptures clearly teach that men are totally depraved, and that this profoundly effects the way they think and especially the way they respond to divine revelation.
Second, the Scriptures plainly teach the possibility and necessity of apologetics. In 1 Peter 3:15 and many other places it calls upon Christians to defend their faith.
Third, the Scriptures (in Rom. 1:18-23) plainly teach the key distinction made in presuppositionalism between man’s ethical ignorance of God and his constitutional knowledge of God. In other words, just as Van Til assumes men do know God even though in suppressing this knowledge in a sense they become ignorant of God. Thus, the Bible teaches that we should challenge fallen man’s intellectual systems by appealing to what he knows to be true as a man made in the image of God.
Fourth, the Scriptures plainly assume that the message of Scripture and the existence of God are self-attesting or self-authenticating. They assume that men do not need to have the existence of God proved to them. They also teach that giving evidence outside of or external to the Scriptures in order to prove them to be true is unnecessary. In other words, such evidence is not necessary as a basis for faith in the Scriptures. The scriptural view is clearly in contrast with one well-known evidentialist’s view. Listen to what he said:
Preaching without apologetics is scarcely preaching at all. It encourages naked credulity [gullibility‑-SW] and shallow conviction … The Christian gospel pleases both the heart and head. It is a rational and intelligent faith. Therefore, it cannot be presented on the spur of the moment without much reflective thought, in the spouting of proof texts and an appeal to religious excitement in the soul … Apologetics deals in the area of pre-evangelism. A twenty-minute sermon with three illustrations and a tearful invitation is simply insufficient grounds for requesting an intelligent decision for Christ.[6]
Fifth, the Scriptures teach that all of human life and human thought will be controlled by a man’s fundamental heart commitments. The Scripture teaches, “Watch over your heart with all diligence for from it flow the springs of life” (Prov. 4:23). Unless this heart commitment is challenged and changed, the unbeliever will inevitably think wrongly and reject any evidence offered for his approval.
IV. Its Justification Presented
You may remember that I concluded in our study of 1 Peter 3:15 the standpoint or startingpoint of the Christian’s defense of Christianity was the heart attitude of faith. In other words, I argued that full confidence in the truthfulness of Christianity must be the fundamental presupposition of his defense of the faith. I remarked at the time that the charge will be made against this view that it involves the Christian apologetic in circular reasoning. People will ask, Are you not assuming at the outset what must be proved?
I put off a systematic discussion of this objection with the remark that the Bible always and everywhere regards everything short of faith as wicked unbelief (Mark 16:16; John 20:27 with v. 31). Thus, it forbids us from ever adopting even theoretically a position of intellectual neutrality toward the claims of God and His Word. Something more, however, must be said in response to the charge of circular reasoning in order to completely answer it. And, in fact, the Christian can make a number of responses to this objection. The first is this …
A. All reasoning is in one sense circular reasoning.
i. The Thesis Illustrated
When I say that all reasoning is in one sense circular reasoning, I mean that all thinking grows out of certain first principles or presuppositions which cannot be proven (externally, empirically, or directly). Take for example the modern scientists who deny the possibility of miracles. We ask, Why do they deny the possibility of miracles? Their answer involves their doctrine of the absolute uniformity of the natural law. This doctrine has not been proven by science and cannot be proven by science. It certainly cannot be verified or supported within the epistemological framework of the modern scientists.
It will be helpful to expand on this last point which has to do with the epistemological inconsistency of unbelieving modern science. Modern science is built on an empirical epistemology. An empirical epistemology is a theory about how we know. An empirical epistemology is a theory of knowing which says that all knowledge is rooted in experiment and observation. We gain knowledge only through the scientific method of experimentation and sensory observation. The problem with both the empirical epistemology of the scientists and with their doctrine of the absolute uniformity of natural law is that neither of these views can be proven or verified within their own empirical system. They cannot be proven by means of an empirical epistemology methodology. In other words, when such a scientist denies the possibility of miracles, he is guilty of circular reasoning.
We may properly ask such a scientist several questions. Have you been everywhere in the universe? Have you existed from eternity? Have you proven that there is no God to disrupt your closed universe? Modern science with its empirical epistemology has not proven that there is no God. It has assumed that there is none in its unsubstantiated, groundless, and unwarranted assumption of an empirical and materialistic epistemology. It has assumed that what cannot be verified empirically is not true or real, but it cannot prove this assumption itself or its empirical epistemology empirically. In other words, it has reasoned in a circle. If the reasoning of modern science is circular and if all human reasoning is and must be circular, then no objection can be raised against Christianity merely on the basis that it reasons from presuppositions which cannot be externally or empirically verified.
ii. The Thesis Qualified
I am not denying that there is a kind of circular reasoning which is wrong and false. A while ago in fact I came across an example of bad, circular reasoning. There was an experiment by a man named Le Vay which was supposed to prove that part of a homosexual’s hypothalamus was characteristically smaller than a heterosexual’s? It turns out that there were big problems with this experiment. Here is a quotation from the Bay Area Reporter:
It turns out that LeVay doesn’t know anything about the sexual orientation of the control group, the 16 corpses “presumed heterosexual.” A sloppy control group like this is … enough by itself to invalidate [discredit‑-SW] the study. LeVay’s defense? He knows the controls are heterosexual because their brains are different from the HIV corpses. Sorry, doctor; this is circular logic. You can use the sample to prove the theory or vice versa, but not both at the same time.
In science and in anything else for that matter, it is wrong to assume what you are supposed to be proving. Le Vay violated this rule. He claimed to be proving by his experiment that the homosexual hypothalamus has a part smaller than that of heterosexual. Yet his only proof for the fact that the control group in his experiment was heterosexual is that this part of their brain was larger. This is, indeed, wrong, false logic.
But this is not the same thing as we are talking about here. How is what Le Vay was doing different from what we are doing? First, Le Vay was claiming to prove his conclusion scientifically. Thus, he contradicted himself by assuming what he said he was proving. Presuppositionalists do not claim to be scientifically proving the existence of God. They admit that they are assuming or presupposing it. Thus, there is no deception or contradiction involved. Second, there is a difference between presuppositions or first principles and scientific facts. What I am saying is that God and the size of the hypothalamus are not the same kind of thing. The relative size of a part of a homosexual’s hypothalamus can be tested by empirical or scientific investigation. The existence of God cannot. Science is empirical. It deals with things that can be seen, weighed, and measured. God is by definition not something that can be seen, weighed, or measured. Circular reasoning is wrong within empirical science. Third, other sciences do something similar to what presuppositionalists do in apologetics. Geometry is built on a set of theorems, axioms, or premises which cannot be proven or verified, but must simply be assumed. That is why they are called theorems, axioms, or premises. The only `proof’ for these axioms is that the results they give match up with reality. Similarly, the existence of God cannot be proved. The only `proof’ is that the existence of God and the truth of the Scriptures makes sense of the world, and nothing else does.
B. All Christian reasoning must be in one sense circular reasoning.
Here what I mean to say is that‑-unless we as Christians reason presuppositionally—what some would call circularly—, we are unfaithful to Christian truth. In fact, we leave a false impression in the minds of our hearers. If God and His Word do exist, and if they are who the Bible says they are, then they must possess an ontological [having to do with being] and epistemological priority over everything else. God and His Word must be the first things we know to be true. God and His Word must be the source of all truth. God and His Word must be the standard of all truth. In other words, God’s own Word must be the supreme court of truth from which there can be no appeal. If God is the first and original light, then everything else is seen in His light (Psalm 36:9). Van Til perceptively argues:
Protestants are required by the most basic principles of their system to vindicate [prove‑-SW] the existence of no other God than the one who has spoken in Scripture. But this God cannot be proved to exist by any other method than the indirect one of presupposition. No proof for this God and for the truth of his revelation in Scripture can be offered by an appeal to anything in human experience that has not itself received its light from the God whose existence and revelation it is supposed to prove. One cannot prove the usefulness of the light of the sun by turning to the darkness of a cave. The darkness of the cave must itself be lit up by the shining of the sun. When the cave is thus lit up each of the objects that are in it “proves” the existence and character of the sun by receiving their light and intelligibility from it.[7]
But this raises another common question, Is it the case, then, that the unbeliever has his presuppositions, and the believer has his, and that is the end of the argument? Have we simply reached a stalemate or standoff? Is the Christian only more honest about his presuppositions, but not more justified in claiming them to be true? Not at all! There is much else which must be said, and that brings us to …
C. The Christian may and must show that the non-Christian’s presuppositions do not make sense of reality and that Christian presuppositions do make sense of reality.
i. The Transcendental Argument Explained
The presuppositional argument for the existence of God is what has become known as “the transcendental argument.” This argument asks the question, What are the necessary preconditions or prerequisites of reality as we know it? What are the necessary preconditions of logic, knowledge, and morality? What has to be true in order for the world (especially with regard to being, logic, knowledge, and morality) to exist? Even in arguing against Christianity the unbeliever makes certain assumptions about these things. Can he justify or support these assumptions within his own system? Or, must he unconsciously utilize the Christian framework of thought (using what Richard Pratt calls “borrowed capital”) even to argue against Christianity?
The “transcendental argument,” therefore, has a negative or destructive use and a positive or constructive use. Negatively, the Christian seeks to identify the non‑Christian’s presuppositions and show that consistently carried out they frustrate and hinder the possibility of any knowledge at all. Positively, the Christian seeks to show that his presuppositions provide the conditions necessary for reality, even those aspects of reality which the unbeliever uses in his arguments against Christianity. Van Til’s presentation of the transcendental argument is as follows. First he presents the negative use:
It is not as though the Reformed apologist should not interest himself in the nature of the non-Christian’s method. On the contrary he should make a critical analysis of it. He should, as it were, join his “friend” in the use of it. But he should do so self-consciously with the purpose of showing that its most consistent application not merely leads away from Christian theism but in leading away from Christian theism leads to destruction of reason and science as well.[8]
Van Til then asserts that the transcendental argument also has a positive use.
Our argument as over against this would be that the existence of the God of Christian theism and the conception [idea‑-SW] of his counsel as controlling all things in the universe is the only presupposition which can account for the uniformity of nature and for the coherence [harmony‑-SW] of all things in the world. We cannot prove the existence of beams underneath a floor if by proof we mean that they must be ascertainable [able to be detected‑-SW] in the way that we can see the chairs and tables of the room. But the very idea of a floor as the support of tables and chairs requires the idea of beams that are underneath. But there would be no floor if no beams were underneath. Thus there is absolutely certain proof for the existence of God and the truth of Christian theism. Even non-Christians presuppose its truth while they verbally [in words‑-SW] reject it. They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account for their own accomplishments.
To use an analogy, the transcendental argument for the existence of God shows that the unbeliever is like a little child throwing a tantrum trying to hit God in the face. Even to hit God in the face, however, he must be held in the arms of God. So the unbeliever must presuppose (without realizing it) the existence of God in order to argue against the existence of God.
ii. The Transcendental Argument Illustrated
The transcendental argument may be illustrated in several ways. We may take in the first place the philosophy of naturalistic materialism as an example. What is naturalistic materialism? It is the view that everything in the universe is physical or material. Naturalistic materialism says that the material world of nature is all that exists or has ever existed. This is a common philosophy today. What is the transcendental argument against this philosophy? Naturalistic materialism can never explain man’s personal-conscious nature or provide the necessary preconditions to explain man’s personal‑conscious nature. Francis Schaeffer has shrewdly and wisely remarked that (in the naturalistic materialist universe) man is a fish in a world where there is no water. Man is a conscious and personal being in a universe which is by definition unconscious and impersonal. Christianity which says that the universe was created by an infinite and personal God provides an intellectual background or atmosphere in which man himself makes sense. Naturalistic materialism does not.
We may in the second place use atheism to illustrate the transcendental argument. Atheism says that there is no God. Atheism, however, can never explain man’s moral nature. Every unbeliever works on the practical assumption that certain things are wrong. Yet, non‑theistic ethics can never explain why. If there is no God, on what basis may we say that some things are morally wrong? If there is no God, then what can the source of moral obligation or duty be? Neither individual opinion nor social consensus have any right to tell anyone what they should do. The atheist himself does not consistently recognize these things as the source of morality. Only the existence of God can explain the sense of moral duty and guilt which are part of the experience of every man.
Pantheism, in the third place, may be used to illustrate the transcendental argument. Pantheism teaches that everything is God, and God is everything. Pantheism can never explain man’s moral nature. Every unbeliever works on the practical assumption that certain things are wrong, but pantheistic ethics can never explain why. If everything is God, then God does everything that happens. If God does it, it must be right. Since the pantheist believes that God does everything from raping and murdering to showing kindness to the needy, nothing can be morally evil. Everything must be morally good. The major problem with pantheism is that it does not explain our moral sense of right and wrong. Nor does it explain our sense of guilt and approval.
Yet despite the insufficiency of both atheism and pantheism, our godless and secular society has many moral opinions and ideas. These form the basis of its popular views. We may think of the war on drugs, the consensus against pornography, and even the right to privacy. We must ask the unbeliever why he believes these things are morally right or morally wrong. Atheism, pantheism, and naturalism provide no basis for these moral perspectives.
Take in the fourth place the ethical theory, Utilitarianism, to illustrate this point. Utilitarianism is a very popular substitute for a Christian-theistic ethic. It teaches that the right and good is determined by what makes people happy. Utilitarianism can never explain the problem of morality or provide a satisfactory ethic. When the utilitarian argues that you should do what makes you happy, or—more unselfishly or altruistically—what makes the most people happy and that this is the basis of ethics, he fails to answer several necessary and basic questions. The first is, Why should I do what makes me or others happy? How does their or my happiness make moral requirements on me? The second question is this, Even assuming that I should do what makes me and others happy, how do I know for sure what course of action will bring the most happiness in the long run? It is necessary to possess the gift of prophecy or the attribute of omniscience to make this ethic workable. The third is, By what principle should I decide what to do when it appears that my happiness and that of others will conflict? If the utilitarian replies that such a conflict will never occur, he must be asked upon what basis he is sure of this.
Only Christianity solves the problems which utilitarianism fails to answer. The presupposition of the existence of God provides a basis for moral duty. God made me. He owns me. He has, therefore, a right to my obedience. The existence of the living God solves the problem of knowledge raised by utilitarianism. We know what is right (and will make us and others happy) because the omniscient God has told us through His prophets. The existence of the living God provides a basis on which we can be sure that God’s glory, my happiness, and the good of others will never conflict. The Bible teaches that He has created a universe where these things never truly conflict.
Think in the fifth place by way of illustration of the transcendental argument of one of the central arguments against Christian theism. “If there is a god, why is there so much evil in the world?” The Christian may very forcefully ask, “On the other hand, if there is no God, how do you know what is evil? By what standard do you judge it to be evil? Why is anything moral evil? In your universe where is there any basis for the idea of evil itself? Only Christianity with its presuppositions of a personal and sovereign creator God can explain why man is a personal and moral being and why reality is personal and moral.
As valuable as the transcendental argument is, and as helpful as it is against the charge of circular reasoning, there is another perspective which must be vindicated as over against the charge of circular reasoning.
D. The presuppositions of the Christian are self‑attesting.
We have seen that much can be said in defense of presuppositionalism against the charge of circular reasoning. The Christian can argue that everyone reasons circularly in the sense that they reason on the basis of presuppositions which cannot be externally verified. The Christian can argue that presuppositional reasoning is different than circular reasoning in the bad sense. The Christian can argue that, if he is right, he must reason presuppositionally or contradict his own position. The Christian can argue transcendentally that the non-Christian’s presuppositions do not provide the necessary preconditions for the being, knowledge, and morality which the non-Christian himself assumes. Using the transcendental argument positively he can show that Christian presuppositions do provide the preconditions necessary for being, knowledge, and morality–reality as we know it in this world.
In the last place the Christian may appeal to the deepest awareness of the non-Christian himself. Christian presuppositions are self‑verifying. They verify themselves in the innermost being of every man! There is for this reason also no stalemate, no “Mexican stand-off,” no “Mutual Assured Destruction,” no deadlock or stalemate between the presuppositions of faith and those of unbelief. Christian presuppositions are self‑attesting. All others are not.
The reasoning of the Christian against the charge of circular reasoning and against all other arguments of the unbeliever is not addressed against honest doubt in an epistemological vacuum. It is addressed against a refuge of lies constructed by the unbeliever to hide from the sight of God. The Christian’s reasoning is intended to confront the unbeliever again and again with the truth he knows but is suppressing. The Christian’s reasoning–even his transcendental arguments–are not intended as deductive proofs for the existence of God or the truth of Christianity. This does not need to be proved, nor is it subject to deductive proof. The existence of God and the truth of Christianity are self-authenticating. The Christian’s reasonings are intended as arguments against the dishonesty of unbelief. For this purpose and seen in this light they are completely and irrefutably sound, valid, and true.
V. Its Evidence Considered
It is a popular misunderstanding that presuppositionalism is opposed to all use of evidences.[9] The terminology and names given to the two competing systems tend to contribute to this misunderstanding. For presuppositionalism whether it is proper to use evidences depends on the manner of the appeal to them. In evidentialism there is a direct appeal to the facts divorced from Christian presuppositions‑-outside the Christian interpretive context. Such an appeal implies that it is possible to view a given fact neutrally, without an interpretive context. In reality this is impossible. The very attempt to do so is prejudiced against Christian theism. An appeal to a fact lacking its Christian‑theistic context of interpretation is of necessity an appeal to it as understood on the basis of non-Christian presuppositions in a non‑Christian context of interpretation. Presuppositionalism appeals to facts within the Christian framework of interpretation. Each fact, then, becomes a reflection or manifestation of Christian truth. Hence, we may say that evidentialism appeals to the evidences as specimens in a laboratory, while presuppositionalism appeals to them as exhibits in a court of law.
Take a brick or concrete block, for instance. What is the meaning or significance of this brick? Can we truly understand the meaning of a brick divorced from its purpose or separated from the building of which it is a part? No! By itself the brick might be anything‑-a door stop, a child’s toy, a weapon. We only understand the brick in its context. Even so only in the context of Christian presuppositions can any individual fact be truly understood. The contrasting use of evidences by these two systems may be diagrammed as follows:
All of this is directly related to the biggest question with regard to evidences and arguments. That is the issue of the theistic proofs. Here we can only summarize briefly the major questions regarding this issue. Much more needs to be said and supported. Here, however, I am only summarizing things which previous lectures have expounded.
What is the validity of theistic proofs? Some have contented themselves with proofs for God and Christianity that are merely probabilistic. This appears to be the position of the kind of classical apologetics which prevailed at Princeton as espoused by B B. Warfield. Most Christian apologetes have assumed that the theistic proofs offered more than merely probable or suggestive evidence for the existence of God. This is true of Christian Rationalists like Augustine and Anselm. This is true of Christian Empiricists like Thomas Aquinas who, as we have seen, thought that his five ways provided a logical demonstration of the existence of God. Finally, Christian Presuppositionalists certainly assume that the transcendental argument for the existence of God provides absolutely certain and valid proof for the existence of God.
The next question is closely related to the first.
What is the purpose of theistic proofs? Some have thought of the theistic proofs as merely providing confirmation to believers or even testimony to all men of the existence of God. Such language seems to suggest that the proofs or not really logically valid proofs which demonstrate the existence of God. Such language may also assume that the true source of our knowledge of God is something other than the theistic proofs. Others have seen the theistic proofs as the true logical foundation of our knowledge of the existence of God and a foundation upon which the rest of theology must be built. This appears to be the view of Thomas Aquinas. Finally, Christian Presuppositionalists see the purpose of the theistic proofs provided by the transcendental argument as exposing the refuge of lies created the innate truth-suppressing tendencies of fallen men. The theistic proof forces men to see once more the naturally implanted knowledge of God within them.
What are the different approaches to theistic proofs? Often a wrong approach to the classification of apologetics bedevils the discussion of the theistic proofs. I have seen some online insist that all theistic proofs must be either a priori or a posteriori. They, then, assume that presuppositionalism argues in a rationalistic a priori way for the existence of God. We must, however, distinguish three varieties of Christian philosophy. Christian empiricism; Christian rationalism; and Christian presuppositionalism. The notion that evidentialism is a form of Christian empiricism argues in an a posteriori way and presuppositionalism in an a priori way is, thus, false. A posteriori arguments are the way of Christian Empiricism. A priori arguments are the way of Christian Rationalism. Presuppositionalism is not a form either of Christian empiricism or Christian rationalism. Thus, it uses neither of these methods or arguments. Historical examples of Christian Rationalism are Augustine’s argument from truth and Anselm’s ontological argument. Christian Empiricism is illustrated historically by Thomas Aquinas’s five ways. Presuppositionalism’s transcendental argument adopts neither approach.
What is the use that presuppositionalism’s transcendental argument makes of evidence? It uses the evidence of the world and reality, but not in a neutral fashion, but as it really is God-created evidence. With Van Til presuppositionalism regards each fact in the universe not as a “brute fact” existing on its own with no created meaning and significance, but rather presuppositionalism sees each fact as God-created and possessing an innate God’s created meaning. Thus, every fact—not just some facts—presupposes the existence of the living God.
[1]Kuyper, Principles, 385-386.
[2]Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield, “Introduction to Beattie’s Apologetics,” 2:99-100, 105.
[3]Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield, “A Review of De Zekerheid Des Geloofs,” (by Herman Bavinck), 117.
[4]Warfield, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,” 258.
[5]In Reymond’s book, The Justification of Knowledge, 8-9.
[6]Clark H. Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, 7, 9, 18.
[7]Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 109.
[8]Van Til, Defense of the Faith , 102.
[9]Thom Notaro in his book, Van Til and the Use of Evidence, shows at great length that Van Til and presuppositionalism are committed to the right use of evidence.

Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.