by Timothy Decker | Sep 15, 2025 | Apologetics, New Testament
*Editor’s Note: As more installments of this series are released, they will eventually be linked together.
A Worthy Inclusion? The Johannine Comma of 1 John 5:7–8
Part 4: Examining the Internal Evidence
In the case of the Comma of 1 John 5:7–8, many interpreters throughout history have marshaled a strong argument in favor of its inclusion primarily from the internal evidence. And so here, we may spend more time than at other parts.
There are two kinds of internal evidence to consider when negotiating textual variants. The first is scribal probability: what is a scribe more likely to do. In the case of the Comma, is he more or less likely to omit the Comma, or is he more or less likely to add the Comma? The second kind of internal evidence is intrinsic probability of the author; in this case, the author of 1 John, whom I take to be John the apostle. What is his style, vocabulary, propensities, etc.? The problem with these two matters of internal evidence is that they can be set against one another quite often. If a scribe was likely to “clean up” a reading or make it less offensive, but in doing so it goes against the author’s normal style or vocabulary, which is correct? This is one reason why I place a greater weight upon the external evidence, as it offers a far more objective set of criteria when negotiating textual variants.
For conversation partners, I will use the exegetes cited by the Trinitarian Bible Society (the primary publisher of the Scrivener Textus Receptus) in their article, “Why 1 John 5:7–8 is in the Bible.” They will go century by century, starting with Matthew Henry representing the 18th c., Robert L. Dabney the 19th c., and Edward Hills in the 20th c. For my part, I’ll add a 21st c. work by C. H. Pappas entitled In Defense of the Authenticity of 1 John 5:7.
The internal argument is one that rests primarily on intrinsic probabilities and grammatical difficulties. It asks the question: If the Comma was excluded, would John the author write with such discordant grammar at 1 John 5:7–8? Or to assert it positively: the inclusion of the Comma does not cause any grammatical disruption of 1 John 5:7–8 and therefore must be the correct reading. This is the strongest argument for its authenticity. Therefore, we will save it for the end while we take up some other internal arguments.
Weak Arguments
1) Three things, yea for four?
The weakest arguments for the Comma comes from those seeking to bring out some OT equivalent. For example, Hills said, “The omission… seems to leave the passage incomplete. It is common scriptural usage to present solemn truths or warnings in groups of three or four, for example, the repeated Three things, yea four of Proverbs 30, and the constantly recurring refrain, for three transgression and for four, of the prophet Amos.”[1] However, there are only 2 groups of witnesses, not three or four. And excluding the Comma, the group contains three witnesses (Spirit, water, and blood). Either it meets this criterion just as easily without the Comma (3 witnesses) or it does not with the Comma (only 2 groups of witnesses, not three or four). Therefore, it cannot “seem to leave the passage incomplete” as Hills began. But is this even an axiomatic truth that all of Scripture practices? If not, then why must we force it here?
2) Parallelism and Hebrew Poetry
A somewhat similar argument to Hills’ appeal to OT style was made by Charles Forster’s 1869 work, A New Plea for the Authenticity of the Three Heavenly Witnesses. He wrote, “To all readers acquainted with the rules of Hebrew parallelism it must at once be apparent, that a sentence so constructed authenticates itself; and speaks, at the same time, syntaxically for the authenticity of the text of the three Heavenly Witnesses.”[2] He based much of his ideas, not unexpectedly, upon the work of Roberth Lowth,[3] whose views on Hebrew poetry are now rejected in most circles.[4]
It is no boast when I say that I am well acquainted with biblical Hebrew poetry and its use of parallelism. Very recently, I published an article titled, “The Majesty of the Style of Biblical Hebrew Poetry,” on this very subject.[5] My doctoral dissertation research was to examine this poetic style in the NT, the very thing Forster was claiming for the Comma.[6] To demonstrate what this looks like in the Greek New Testament and from an apostolic poetic master (Paul), I have an upcoming article to be published called, “The Poetic Form and Theological Function of Romans 3:10–18.”[7]
I hope this is a sufficient demonstration that I am a reader “acquainted with the rules of Hebrew parallelism.” And I can tell you that from my study and research, it is not “apparent” to me at all that with or without the Comma, there are signs of biblical Hebrew poetry. If anything, Priscillian’s rendition of the earthly witnesses first and “what is more” the heavenly witnesses might be a case of the intensification in Hebrew poetry.[8] But there is not the contrastive grammar mixed with syntactic symmetry required for such poetry, whether written in either Hebrew or Greek. And to claim that the poetic structure is destroyed by excluding the Comma begs the question: why does there have to be a poetic structure in 1 John 5:7–8 at all?
But it gets worse. In my dissertation, I argued (along with many others) that the Lord’s Prayer is fashioned after biblical Hebrew poetry. The “doxology” of the Lord’s prayer is another notable TR inclusion that many dispute. Concerning the doxology, I made a passing text critical note saying, “Making use of internal evidence, slight as it might be, the pattern of BHP is all but absent in the disputed [doxology] phrase: οτι σου εστιν η βασιλεια και η δυναμις και η δοξη εις τους αιωνας αμην. While it maintains the triadic formula observed in the LP, it does so at the expense of being neither parallelistic nor terse. This observation is hardly conclusive for its omission. However, it does add more weight to the internal evidence that the doxology is out of touch with the style of its immediate context.”[9] If we demand the Comma’s inclusion at 1 John 5:7 based on its style of Hebrew poetry, then we have to demand the exclusion of the doxology concluding the Lord’s Prayer for the same reason.
It gets worse from there. If we demanded the inclusion of the Comma because it follow the rules of Hebrew poetic parallelism, then we would have to reject the TR reading at 1 John 2:12–14! This passage is almost certainly set in biblical Hebrew poetry, having noticeable characteristics of it in the NA28 text (and a good number of Byzantine manuscripts) but not in the TR. If we force parallelism as a proof for the Comma in one place, then we have to do so consistently with another, especially in the same epistle, and therefore reject the TR reading of 1 John 2:12–14!
Better Arguments
17th/18th-century Puritan Matthew Henry and 19th-century Presbyterian theologian, R. L. Dabney, offered many arguments for the Comma’s inclusion.[10] Dabney would eventually make the strongest argument from grammar, while Henry did not indicate any such discordance. However, they included other evidences that must be scrutinized.
Johannine Style
Speaking of the intrinsic probability or what John would have most likely written, Henry and Dabney point out that the Johannine usage of logos for the Son in 1 John 5:7 is consistent with John 1:1, 14. Likewise, they argued that similarity of language of “these three are one” (οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἕν εἰσι) in the Comma with John 10:30 “I and my father, we are one” (ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ἕν ἐσμεν), using the neuter “one” in both. However 1 John 5:8, the language is slightly different from John 10:30, adding a preposition and article to the adjective “one” (καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσιν).
Neither of these are convincing for the mere fact that anyone could duplicate John’s verbiage and style. Such an argument only bears weight when the variant is over different wording, not whether a word (or phrase) is absent or present. That is to say, this would be a strong argument if there was a variant of the Comma that used “Christ” rather than “Word” (logos) or the masculine “one” rather than the neuter. But intrinsic probability does not much assist with omissions or additions but only different word or stylistic choices. At best, we can say that the vocabulary of the Comma is Johannine enough to be believable that he wrote it.
Cause of an Omission
Secondly, Henry and Dabney appealed to the most important element of internal evidence: the reading that best accounts for the creation of the others is likely to be the original. Dabney argued that the exclusion of the Comma was intentional on the part of the anti-Trinitarians. But this is where such an argument breaks down, for Matthew Henry argued the opposite. He said in his Commentary, “It was far more easy for a transcriber, by turning away his eye, or by the obscurity of the copy, it being obliterated or defaced on the top or bottom of a page, or worn away in such materials as the ancients had to write upon, to lose and omit the passage, than for an interpolator to devise and insert it.”
I believe Henry has the better of Dabney here. In my experience of transcribing and collating manuscripts of 1 John, it is far more common to accidentally omit large sections due to homeoteleuton (“like endings”). When a word or phrase ends once and then again a second time, scribes will often return to the wrong word of phrase, thus skipping the section in between. For an example, see 1 John 2:23 (written about here). And so I agree with Hills, “The comma could easily have been omitted accidentally through a common type of error which is called homoioteleuton (similar ending).”[11] The second identical phrase “there are three bearing witness” could have been confused as the first phrase, and therefore all that was in between would have been omitted.
As possible as this is, it is less likely because the identical phrases “there are three bearing witness” with the Comma are not the same as without. The Comma includes the two qualifiers “in heaven” and “on earth” after each “there are three bearing witness.” Yet without the comma, there is only one set of witnesses with no descriptor of “on earth.” If a copyist’s eyes were to skip from the first “there are three bearing witness” to the verbatim second, then how does one account for the omission of “on earth” as his eyes would have returned to that very point if it were original?
NKJV: “7 For there are three that bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one. 8 And there are three that bear witness on earth: the Spirit, the water, and the blood; and these three agree as one.”
His eyes would have skipped the entire heavenly-witnesses clause and resume at the very point where it we would expect “on earth.” Yet this does not happen. There is no “on earth” phrase when the Comma is excluded. So while an accidental omission is possible, it does not account for all the omission.
However, there is also a reasonable explanation for how the Comma could have been added to the text rather than accidentally omitted. As we noted in the previous articles, concepts of the Comma only appeared in the North African Latin tradition early on, and mainly as mystical interpretation of the earthly witnesses of the “spirit, water, and blood.” Eventually, a portion of the Latin tradition would accept the Comma (see part 3). And when the Latin tradition was codified by the Roman Catholic Church in the council of Trent, there was a new incentive to have Greek manuscripts and printed editions to include it (see part 2).
In passing, I would like to point out why I do not place as much weight on internal evidence. (1) For those arguing for the same variant, they can often give conflicting theories, as Henry and Dabney did. But (2) there are usually decent theories both for and against an omission/addition. Only those variants that have no explainable alternative can make use of this internal evidence as a weighty argument.
Meaningless Repetition
Thirdly, both Henry and Dabney made a contextual-theological argument for the Comma’s inclusion. They both understood the exclusion of the Comma to lead to a tautology: “6 This is the One who came by water and blood, Jesus Christ; not with the water only, but with the water and with the blood. It is the Spirit who bears witness, because the Spirit is the truth. 7 For there are three that bear witness: 8 the Spirit and the water and the blood; and the three are in agreement” (LSB). Far from being a tautology or meaningless repetition, v. 6 explains that there are three witnesses, and vv. 7–8 makes it clear that the witnesses are in agreement. Further, 1 John has a great deal of repetition, making it seem tautological at times. What are we to do with those other passages, such as 1 John 1:6–10 or 1 John 2:12–14? Are those repititions redundant and meaningless? Perish the thought.
Anaphoric Article
Finally, Dabney makes a secondary grammatical argument that did not enter the mind of Henry. As noted numerous times now, the “three are one” in v. 7 with the Comma (οἱ τρεῖς ἕν εἰσι) is different than in v. 8 (οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσιν). Dabney assumed that the article before “one” in v. 8 is an article of previous reference, otherwise known as anaphoric. This would lead him to ask (p. 222),
“And these three agree to that (aforesaid) One,” the argument appears. What is that aforesaid unity to which these three agree? If the seventh verse is exscinded, there is none: the τὸ ἐν so clearly designated by the definite article, as an object to which the reader has already been introduced, has no antecedent presence in the passage. Let the seventh verse stand, and all is clear: the three earthly witnesses testify to that aforementioned unity which the Father, Word, and Spirit constitute.
However, this argument assumes the article is anaphoric, which I reject wholesale. The construction of the articular neuter singular adjective “one” (το εν) occurs in other places throughout the NT that are not anaphoric but make the adjective “one” either attributive or substantival (“the one thing”). First Cor 12:11, the articular neuter “one” makes it attributing the neuter Spirit (“the one and the same Spirit”). Phil 2:2, Paul attaches the article to the neuter “one” as the object of a participle making “one” substantival (lit. “thinking the one thing”). Likely the articular use of “one” in Matt 25:18 is also substantival and the object to the substantival participle (“the one receiving the one [talent]”). Therefore, if understood substantively in 1 John 5:8, that gives το εν the sense of “the same thing” as in “they are in agreement,” as the LSB and NKJV render. What is more, the articular adjective “one” το εν is the object of the preposition εις meaning “unto the one thing.” This preposition + article even more implies agreement, and makes an anaphoric article increasingly unlikely. Lastly, Greek grammarian Dan Wallace argues that such construction in 1 John 5:8 may even be a Semitism.[12] If so, it could mean “the three are as one.”
Though I save it for part 6, Dabney’s understanding of the anaphoric article leads to strange interpretive conundrums, not least of which is an Arian interpretation of the Comma. In summary, if the second group of witnesses are the same kind of oneness as the previous oneness of the heavenly witnesses, then the Arians must be correct, for the oneness of spirit/air, water, and blood are only of like substance but not the same substance. Therefore, the previous group must also only be of like substance. This cuts against orthodox Trinitarianism!
Summary
Thus far, we have seen some of the worst arguments for the inclusion of the Comma as well as some that deserve an answer. There are other proofs raised by interpreters, but this covers what one will mostly encounter. That only leaves the strongest argument for the inclusion of the Comma: the grammatical argument. I will take up that subject in the next article.
[1] Edward F. Hills, The King James Defended (Des Moines: The Christian Research Press, 1984), 211.
[2] Charles Forster, A New Plea for the Authenticity of the Three Heavenly Witnesses (London: Bell and Daldy), 238.
[3] See Lecture 19 of Robert Lowth, De Sacra Poesi Hebraeorum Praelectiones (London, 1753) and Robert Lowth, Isaiah a New Translation: With a Preliminary Dissertation and Notes, Critical, Philological, and Explanatory (London: Joseph T. Buckingham, 1815), x.
[4] See for example Fokkelman who claimed that “the triad synonymous/antithetical/complementary [of Lowth] cannot withstand critical scrutiny.” J. P. Fokkelman, Reading Biblical Poetry: An Introductory Guide, trans. Ineke Smit (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 26.
[5] Timothy L. Decker, “The Majesty of the Style of Biblical Hebrew Poetry,” Reformed Presbyterian Theological Journal 11, no. 1 (Spring 2025): 35–45.
[6] Timothy L. Decker, “The New Testament’s Majesty of the Old Testament’s Poetic Style: Interpreting New Testament Poems Stylized after Biblical Hebrew Poetry as Well as the State of Current New Testament Research” (Ph.D. dissertation, Capital Seminary & Graduate School, 2021).
[7] Timothy L. Decker, “The Poetic Form and Theological Function of Romans 3:10–18,” Calvin Theological Journal, forthcoming Fall 2025.
[8] See the article linked above: Decker, “The Majesty of the Style of Biblical Hebrew Poetry,” 36–37.
[9] Decker, “The New Testament’s Majesty of the Old Testament’s Poetic Style,” 206.
[10] Robert L. Dabney, “The Doctrinal Various Readings of the New Testament Greek,” Southern Presbyterian Review xxii, no. 2 (April 1871): 191–234.
[11] Edward F. Hills, The King James Version Defended (Des Moines: The Christian Research Press, 1997), 212.
[12] Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 47.
Dr. Timothy Decker is one of the pastors of Trinity Reformed Baptist Church of Roanoke, VA, having joined them in 2018. He holds a B.A. and M.A. biblical studies from Carolina University (formerly Piedmont International University), a Th.M. in New Testament from Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. in biblical studies from Capital Seminary and Graduate School. In his dissertation research, he examined the style of biblical Hebrew poetry in the New Testament. He has presented various papers at academic society meetings and authored numerous articles in several different scholarly journals. He is a member of ETS and IBR. When he is not reading or researching, he enjoys spending time with his wife and four children.
Courses taught at CBTSeminary: Elementary Greek I, Elementary Greek II
by Sam Waldron | Sep 11, 2025 | Apologetics
Presuppositional Ponderings after reading Thomas Aquinas
After Reading Aquinas!
“Everyone” knows that recently there has been quite a furor created by the claims of J. V. Fesko (Reforming Apologetics—Retrieving the Classical Reformed Approach to Defending the Faith), Keith Mathison (Christianity and Van Tillianism), Richard Muller (Aquinas Reconsidered), and other critics of Van Til. Their assertion is that Cornelius Van Til substantially misunderstood and/or misrepresented Thomas Aquinas in the construction of his presuppositional apologetics. In turn this exposes to criticism the supposed “Copernican” revolution which presuppositionalism claimed to represent in the area of Christian Apologetics.
As part of my course on Apologetics for CBTS, I do a historical introduction to the subject. After that I begin to delve deeply into the significance of the major, relevant, biblical passages for Christian Apologetics and for the major issues revealed by this historical introduction. Therefore, after lecturing on the contrast between Justin Martyr and Tertullian in the Early Church period and before coming to the contrast between Warfield and Kuyper in the Modern Church, I lecture on the contrast between Aquinas and Calvin in what I call the period of the Augustinian Church.
It was the lecture on Aquinas that caused me concern. Of course, the contrast for which I argue between Aquinas and Calvin is called into question by the advocates of Reformed Scholasticism. But the bigger issue was the propriety of the way that I (generally following Van Til’s lead) described Aquinas’s views.
I was encouraged, however, to see that I rarely quoted Van Til or his assessment of Aquinas in this lecture. Rather, the views of Gordon H. Clark, E. J. Carnell, and Kelly James Clark are much more frequently cited. Substantially, they give the same account of Thomas Aquinas as Van Til. Still, I felt that I was myself too reliant on secondary sources for my description of Thomas Aquinas and not well enough read in Thomas Aquinas to defend my treatment and description of his “classical approach” to Apologetics. I determined to make sure that I had rectified this before the lecture on Aquinas. Thus, I read the relevant sections of Thomas Aquinas for myself before giving this lecture.
I procured and then scoured on this issue the relevant sections of his Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologica. This reading caused considerable expansion of that lecture. It actually—in fact—expanded it into two lectures. What it did not do, however, was significantly change my understanding of Thomas Aquinas “Classical Apologetics” at all. I concluded that basically Van Til’s presentation of Thomas was right.
Now this conclusion should not really surprise anyone. In his recent blogs on the subject James Anderson points out that, even if Van Til was not deeply acquainted with Aquinas’ writings himself, he was at least using the exposition of Aquinas available from the premier Aquinas scholar of the 20th century. I refer to Etienne Gilson and his The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Here is what Anderson says: “I think it’s also fair to criticize Van Til for relying heavily on secondary sources and not engaging more directly with Aquinas’s works. Even so, Van Til engages frequently with Etienne Gilson, who was one of the leading authorities on Aquinas during Van Til’s career, so it’s not as though his secondary sources were dubious ones! If Van Til was interacting with Aquinas through the lens of Gilson and other contemporary scholars, then he was interacting with the interpretation of Aquinas that was dominant in his day.” [https://www.proginosko.com/2019/08/reforming-apologetics-thomas-aquinas/] As I read Gilson, it was clear to me that his treatment was a closely accurate portrayal of Thomas Aquinas, his Christian philosophy, and his Apologetics.
In this blog to follow I want to respond to the criticisms of presuppositionalism based on the fascination with Aquinas among some, contemporary Reformed scholars. I will point out several really misguided and unhelpful directions that are being taken in the current discussion of Aquinas and Christian Apologetics.
Why are we privileging Aquinas over Augustine?
One of the first things that became very clear to me as I read Aquinas was that with respect to the whole issue of apologetics and the proofs for the existence of God, he does not agree with Augustine, Anselm, and many other Christian theologians that preceded. They asserted (what Thomas denies) that the existence of God is self-evident or naturally implanted in man. This is evident in his whole approach to the whole subject. Here is his description of the arguments of those who say that the existence of God is self-evident in Summa Theologica Question 2, Article 2. Notice that Aquinas is presenting views he rejects!
Objection 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word “God” is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word “God” is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition “God exists” is self-evident.
Objection 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition “Truth does not exist” is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (Jn. 14:6) Therefore “God exists” is self-evident.”
These are descriptions of two well-known arguments for the self-evident-ness of the existence of God. The first is Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. The second is Augustine’s argument from the existence of truth. He does not mention here that these arguments were brought forward not only by Anselm, but by Augustine himself. This, however, was clear to anyone acquainted with Augustine. Augustine’s argument from truth is plain to see in Book 2 of his treatise on The Free Choice of the Will.
Aquinas denies that the existence of God is self-evident in both his Summa Theologica and in his Summa Contra Gentiles and rejects the above arguments. The five proofs are built, then, upon the denial of any innate knowledge of God. Says Gordon H. Clark:
Thomas faced two other contrasting views. One is that the existence of God is self-evident and neither needs nor is susceptible of proof from prior first principles. Those who hold this view argue that God has implanted in all men an elemental knowledge of himself. The idea of God is innate. On this showing any argument or so-called proof could be nothing more than a clarification of already present ideas; and such in effect was the nature of Augustine’s, Anselm’s and Bonaventura’s attempts. Now, in one sense Thomas is willing to admit that God’s existence is self-evident: it is self-evident in itself, it is self-evident to God; but it is not self-evident to us. God has not implanted ideas in the human mind, and all knowledge must be based on sensory experience.” [The quotation is from Clark’s, Thales to Dewey, 272-273.]
For the substantiation of Clark’s assertions, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapters 10-12.] In these places he mentions other Christian theologians with whom he is taking issue. Included among them are the ones he calls the Damascene and Bonaventura.
All of this is significant because it means that in favoring the classical apologetics of Aquinas contemporary Reformed theologians are selecting one from among several historically “scholastic” positions. They are really crediting Aquinas over Augustine. They are also privileging Christian Aristotelianism over Christian Platonism. It is well-known that the idea of the self-evident-ness of the existence of God appealed to Augustine, Anselm, and others because of their preference for a form of Christian Platonism which emphasized the importance of innate ideas over the Christian Aristotelianism of Aquinas which favored the importance of sensory or empirical evidence.
My point is not to argue for Christian Platonism—any more than I am arguing for Christian Aristotelianism. It is only to say that in their rush to identify Reformed Scholasticism with Aquinas contemporary Reformed theologian may have forgotten that there was a different and viable option available to our Reformed fathers that did not involve the adoption of Aquinas’s view of natural theology. That alternative was none other than the view of the one who was recognized by Calvin and others as the most important predecessor of the Reformation, Augustine himself.
There is certainly clear evidence (from the predominant number of times he quotes him in the Institutes) that Calvin privileged Augustine. Calvin frequently cites Augustine by name and generally positively. I think the number is 300 plus times in the Institutes. Having searched I can find only three places where he cites by name Thomas Aquinas. The references are not very positive, but usually rather equivocal. In spite of this, we are supposed to think that Calvin adopted Aquinas’s view of apologetics and the theistic proofs rather than Augustine. This is a really suspect way to reason.
Why are we privileging Aquinas over Augustine? Furthermore, why must we privilege either Christian Aristotelianism or Christian Platonism? Of course, I am not arguing that we return to the Christian Platonism of Augustine. I am saying, however, that there were certainly historical-theological alternatives available to the Reformed Scholastics that did not involve a return to “the classical apologetics” of Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas’ Inadequate Views of Noetic Depravity
Van Til and presuppositionalism object to Aquinas’s approach to natural theology and apologetics. One major reason given for this is that Thomism exhibits an over-confidence in fallen human reason. Does Thomas over-rate the ability of human reason and under-rate the effects of noetic depravity (the depravity of fallen man’s mind) in his natural theology? I think he does, but this requires a little explanation, if we are to be entirely fair to Thomas.
The picture that many have of Thomas Aquinas as a typical, semi-Pelagian Roman Catholic is certainly not correct. At key points on the doctrine of grace he follows Augustine carefully and deserves in those respects to be regarded as a strict Augustinian. This is, of course, a huge problem for modern Roman Catholicism because of its clearly semi-Pelagian tendencies.
Aquinas, in spite of modern Thomists’ misconceptions, was thoroughly Augustinian in his view of predestination. In his treatment of predestination Aquinas answers a number of questions in the way that only Augustine and his strict followers would answer. [Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 23, Articles 1-8.] Here is a brief summary.
- “Whether Men Are Predestined by God?” Yes!
- “Whether Predestination Places Anything in the Predestined?” No! (Men are passive in this matter.)
- “Whether God Reprobates Any Men?” Yes!
- “Whether the Predestined Are Chosen by God?” Yes!
- “Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination?” No!
- “Whether Predestination Is Certain?” Yes!
- “Whether the Number of the Predestined Is Certain?” Yes!
- “Whether Predestination Can Be Furthered by the Prayers of the Saints?” No, in that predestination is first determined regardless of the prayers of the saints. Yes, in that the effect of predestination—salvation—can be furthered by the prayers of the saints as a means of grace.
This last question and answer exactly parallels Augustine’s argument in his book entitled, Of Rebuke and Grace (as do all the others). Thomas echoes the anti-Pelagian teaching of Augustine.)
Similarly, and not surprisingly, Thomas also agrees with Augustine about what is now known as “irresistible grace.” Once again through his typical and very analytical treatment Aquinas follows the course laid out by Augustine. [Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 112, Articles 1-3.] But the pinnacle is reached when Aquinas teaches what amounts to effectual calling or irresistible grace: “… since God’s intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints … that by God’s good gifts whoever is liberated is most certainly liberated. Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it … [Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 112, Articles 3.]
With such evidence in front of us, we may rather expect that Aquinas will follow out what we know as the Calvinistic scheme by teaching the perseverance and preservation of the saints and the other doctrines of grace. Sadly, this assumption is not the case. Neither Augustine, his strict follower, Gottschalk, nor Thomas Aquinas affirm the preservation of the saints. Grace may be lost unless one is also predestined to persevere. Once more Thomas Aquinas is a good Augustinian when he says: “Many have meritorious works who do not obtain perseverance …” [Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 114, Article 9. Since the true grace of regeneration was given through the sacrament of baptism, and it was plain that not all the baptized persevered, no one committed to the notion of baptismal regeneration in any sense could hold the Calvinistic view of the perseverance of the saints.]
Similarly, Aquinas also seems to have held confused and imperfect views of total depravity. Sin, in fact, does not seem to occupy an important place in Thomas’s writings. In Gilson’s index there is no entry for sin, depravity, the fall, or folly. For a discussion of Thomas’s view of sin, one must consult his doctrine of free will and grace. It is not surprising, then, Thomas argues that natural light is sufficient to natural knowledge. Consequently, human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin. [Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 109, Article 2.]
The effects of this view of human nature become evident in Thomas’s approach to the existence of God. In several places Thomas argues that the existence of God is not self-evident because sinful men can conceive that God does not exist, and if something is self-evident it cannot be conceived by anyone as not existing. He proves this by citing “the ancients,” that is, the ancient Greek philosophers. He also cites the fact that the fool denies the existence of God.
Surprisingly, instead of attributing such denials to the noetic depravity of men and the fact that they suppress the truth in unrighteousness (Rom. 1:18), Thomas takes these statements of the fool and the ancients at face value. He then uses them as an argument against the self-evident character of the existence of God. Nothing could more pointedly inform us of Thomas’s inflated view of the powers of fallen human reason.
Here are the quotes from Aquinas: [Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 11, Paragraph 3: “And, contrary to the Point made by the first argument, it does not follow immediately that, as soon as we know the meaning of the name God, the existence of God is known. It does not follow first because it is not known to all, even including those who admit that God exists, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. After all, many ancients said that this world itself was God.” Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1: “On the contrary, no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher … states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God (Ps. Lii. 1). Therefore that God exists is not self-evident.”]
Thus, despite the promising character of Thomas’s views of predestination and grace, he falls short of truly appreciating the total depravity of man including his reason. This in turn profoundly controls his approach to apologetics and the theistic proofs. This is why Aquinas can say that the fool and the ancients disprove the self-evident-ness of the existence of God. This is clear evidence that Thomas indulged deficient views of human depravity.
They Just Keep Missing the Point
In my view those currently attacking Van Til and presuppositionalism are engaged in a gigantic enterprise of missing the point. They keep interpreting Romans 1:18-23 over and over and again and again wrongly! To put it differently, they keep making the same exegetical mistake over and over again. They keep affirming that Romans 1 teaches that we can demonstrate the existence of God to men. They keep saying that men can know that God exists. But that is emphatically not what the passage says. It does not say that men can know God. It does not say that we can demonstrate to men who do not know God that God exists. It says that men do know God and that they do not need this demonstrated to them. It will probably do no good to quote the passage—since this false understanding is so deeply embedded in the thinking of Classical Apologists—, but let me do so one more time. Here is what Paul actually says: “18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who suppress the truth in unrighteousness, 19 because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it evident to them. 20 For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that they are without excuse. 21 For even though they knew God, they did not honor Him as God or give thanks, but they became futile in their speculations, and their foolish heart was darkened.”
Men according to Paul not only may know God, they do know God. They know God because they suppress the truth in unrighteousness. They know God because that which is known about God is evident within them. They know God because since the creation of the world His eternal power and divine nature are clearly seen and understood. They know God because they are without excuse. (Paul grounds their accountability on the fact they know God. They are not simply potentially without excuse because they may come to know God. They are without excuse because they do know God.) Finally, they know God, because they sinfully refused to honor Him or give thanks.
The passage is clear. Men do not merely have the capability of knowing God after a theistic proof is presented. They know God before such a proof is presented. Yes, this knowledge is through the things that are made, but this does not mean that their knowledge of God is the result of a properly constructed theistic proof. Their knowledge of God is both mediated to them through creation and implanted in them by creation.
It should not be surprising that his modern followers misinterpret Romans 1. They are simply following in the footsteps of the identical mistake made by Thomas Aquinas.
Listen to his argument in Summa Theologica Question 2, Article 2: “The Apostle says: “The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rm. 1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.” Thomas takes (and the surrounding context of his assertion simply emphasizes this) Romans 1:20 to mean that the existence is not self-evident or implanted in man, but can be demonstrated.
Listen to Thomas in Summa Contra Gentiles, Chapter 12, which is entitled: “THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED BUT IS HELD BY FAITH ALONE.” Once more in proving that the existence of God can be demonstrated, he brings up Romans 1:20. He says: “The falsity of this opinion is shown to us, first, from the art of demonstration which teaches us to arrive at causes from their effects. Then, it is shown to us from the order of the sciences. For, as it is said in the Metaphysics [IV, 3], if there is no knowable substance higher than sensible substance, there will be no science higher than physics. It is shown, thirdly, from the pursuit of the philosophers, who have striven to demonstrate that God exists. Finally, it is shown to us by the truth in the words of the Apostle Paul: “For the invisible things of God… are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20).” Once more, it is clear that Thomas has misunderstood Romans 1. He thinks it means that one can “arrive at” and “demonstrate” that God exists. I have to say it again. This is not what Romans 1:20 teaches. It teaches men do know God. It is not something that they “arrive at” after it has been demonstrated to them. To echo Paul’s argument in Romans 1:18-21: if the knowledge of God is something to be arrived at, then their being without excuse is something to be arrived at. According to Paul, all men are without excuse precisely because they do know God without the necessity of demonstration.
Calvin and Aquinas Contrasted
Richard Muller is well-known for books like Unaccommodated Calvin. I had to read that book back in the days when I was studying for my PhD. Muller’s point (or at least one of his main points) was that the contrast between Calvin and the Reformed Scholastics which followed him in the next century had been overdrawn by many scholars in the 20th Century who had bought in to the Calvin versus the Calvinists movement. Muller showed (I think successfully.) that there were clear indications of a scholastic methodology in Calvin that showed much more continuity with his Calvinistic successors and his Medieval predecessors.
But now we are confronted with a much more specific claim. It is that Calvin was controlled not only by a methodology common to the Medieval scholastics, but that he adopted the Thomist views of natural theology and apologetics. Cf. J. V. Fesko’s Reforming Apologetics.
Sorry, folks, as they say here in the South, That dog won’t hunt!
As I said previously in this blog, I recently read up on and then lectured on Thomas Aquinas for my class in apologetics. I immediately followed that with a lecture on Calvin’s masterful treatment of the knowledge of God in Book 1, Chapters 1-9 of the Institutes. I think even a novice cannot fail to notice a massive difference in the ethos of Thomas opening chapters in Summa Theologica and Summa Contra Gentiles. But this is not a superficial impression without a substantial basis. In this case the accessibility and biblicity of Calvin manifests a much different approach to the subject of the knowledge of God than that of Thomas Aquinas. Let me lay out the theological contrasts between Thomas and Calvin.
First, Calvin identifies himself with a theological tradition in regard to the knowledge of God which Thomas rejects. Thomas rejects the notion that the knowledge of the existence of God is naturally implanted. He argues, as we have seen, that strictly speaking the knowledge of God is not self-evident. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1) and Summa Contra Gentiles (Book 1, Chapters 10-12). Here is what he says in these places. He admits: “To know God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us …” Yet he says that this is “not to know absolutely that God exists, just as to know that someone is approaching is not to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter that is approaching.” He goes on in the next article to assert: “Hence, the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.”
Calvin, on the other hand, declares explicitly and repeatedly that man have a natural knowledge of God which they cannot evade or erase. He has much more in common with the Christian Platonist tradition embodied in Augustine, Anselm, the Damascene, and Bonaventura which affirmed that the knowledge of the existence of God was innate or at least naturally implanted in men. Listen to Calvin’s statements on this subject. Calvin’s language here is absolutely incapable of misunderstanding.
We lay it down as a position not to be controverted that the human mind, even by natural instinct, possesses some sense of a Deity. For that no man might shelter himself under the pretext of ignorance, God hath given to all some apprehension of his existence, the memory of which he frequently and insensibly renews; so that, as men universally know that there is a God, and that he is their Maker, they must be condemned by their own testimony, for not having worshipped him and consecrated their lives to his service. If we seek for ignorance of a Deity, it is nowhere more likely to be found, than among the tribes the most stupid and furthest from civilization. But, as the celebrated Cicero observes, there is no nation so barbarous, no race so savage; as not to be firmly persuaded of the being of a God. (1:3:1)
We read of none guilty of more audacious or unbridled contempt of the Deity than Caligula; yet no man ever trembled with greater distress at any instance of Divine wrath, so that he was constrained to dread the Divinity whom he professed to despise. This you may always see exemplified in persons of a similar character …. The impious themselves, therefore, exemplify the observation, that the idea of a God is never lost in the human mind. (1:3:2)
It will always be evident to persons of correct judgment, that the idea of a Deity impressed on the mind of man is indelible. That all have by nature an innate persuasion of the Divine existence, a persuasion inseparable from their very constitution, we have abundant evidence in the contumacy of the wicked, whose furious struggles to extricate themselves from the fear of God are unavailing (1:3:3)
The contrast between Thomas and Calvin on this matter is clear.
Calvin and Aquinas Contrasted Some More!
Second, Calvin emphasizes explicitly and repeatedly the effect of the fall on man’s knowledge of God. Though men have a naturally implanted knowledge of God given to them by and in creation, this knowledge never develops into a “true” knowledge in the sense of a practical and religious principle which leads them to worship God aright. Let me put that in my own words, but they are words which, I think, rightly embody Calvin’s view. He believes that men have a natural revelation of God, but that this natural revelation never results in a natural theology which can guide them appropriately in worship or in life in general. This emphasis is practically absent in Thomas. Listen to Calvin:
It must also be remarked, that, though they strive against their own natural understanding, and desire not only to banish him thence, but even to annihilate him in heaven, their insensibility can never prevail so as to prevent God from sometimes recalling them to his tribunal. But as no dread restrains them from violent opposition to the divine will, it is evident, as long as they are carried away with such a blind impetuosity, that they are governed by a brutish forgetfulness of God. (1:4:2)
At length they involve themselves in such a vast accumulation of errors, that those sparks which enable them to discover the glory of God are smothered, and at last extinguished by the criminal darkness of iniquity. That seed, which it is impossible to eradicate, a sense of the existence of a Deity, yet remains; but so corrupted as to produce only the worst of fruits. Yet this is a further proof of what I now contend for, that the idea of God is naturally engraved on the hearts of men, since necessity extorts a confession of it, even from reprobates themselves. In a moment of tranquillity they facetiously mock the Divine Being, and with loquacious impertinence in many derogate from his power. But if any despair oppress them, it stimulates them to seek him, and dictates concise prayers, which prove that they are not altogether ignorant of God, but that what ought to have appeared before had been suppressed by obstinacy (1:4:4)
Third, this very different assessment of the effect of the fall on man’s knowledge of God comes to concrete expression in the very different use which Thomas and Calvin make of a classic passage on the subject. I have in mind, of course, Psalm 53:1 which reads in part: “The fool has said in his heart, “There is no God,” They are corrupt, and have committed abominable injustice; There is no one who does good.” Both Thomas and Calvin cite this text, but how different is the use they make of it!
Thomas sees it as proof that the existence of God is not self-evident. He takes at face value the fool’s assertion that there is no God. Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica (Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1) says: “On the contrary, no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher … states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God (Ps. Lii. 1). Therefore that God exists is not self-evident.”
Calvin, on the other hand, takes it as evidence of the deep depravity of the fool. The fool denies a knowledge of God that is ineradicably implanted in him. Here is Calvin’s comment in the Institutes on Psalm 53:1 with some context:
While experience testifies that the seeds of religion are sown by God in every heart, we scarcely find one man in a hundred who cherishes what he has received, and not one in whom they grow to maturity, much less bear fruit in due season. Some perhaps grow vain in their own superstitions, while others revolt from God with intentional wickedness; but all degenerate from the true knowledge of him. The fact is, that no genuine piety remains in the world. But, in saying that some fall into superstition through error, I would not insinuate that their ignorance excuses them from guilt; because their blindness is always connected with pride, vanity, and contumacy. (1:4:1)
David’s assertion, that “the fool hath said in his heart, There is no God,” is primarily, as we shall soon see in another place, to be restricted to those who extinguish the light of nature and wilfully stupefy themselves. (1:4:2)
Calvin and Aquinas Contrasted Yet More!
Fourth, there is a very different view of the usefulness of philosophy espoused by Thomas in contrast to Calvin. Thomas cites with admiration “the philosopher,” Aristotle, throughout his works and certainly in his treatment of the knowledge of the existence of God. This statement in the opening pages of Summa Theologica is typical: “No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv. lect. vi.) states concerning the first principles of demonstration.” (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1)
Calvin, in contrast, denounces the value of philosophy and the schools.
Cold and frivolous, then, are the speculations of those who employ themselves in disquisitions on the essence of God, when it would be more interesting to us to become acquainted with his character, and to know what is agreeable to His nature. (1:2:2)
This disease affects, not only the vulgar and ignorant, but the most eminent, and those who, in other things, discover peculiar sagacity. How abundantly have all the philosophers, in this respect, betrayed their stupidity and folly! For, to spare others, chargeable with greater absurdities, Plato himself, the most religious and judicious of them all, loses himself in his round globe …. I speak exclusively of the excellent of mankind, not of the vulgar, whose madness in the profanation of divine truth has known no bounds. (1:5:11)
Fifth, and consequently, Calvin sees little value in the theistic proofs brought forward by scholastics like Thomas. This is, first of all, the case because men are intuitively and immediately struck by the glory of God in creation in such a way as to make the theistic proofs unnecessary.
As the perfection of a happy life consists in the knowledge of God, that no man might be precluded from attaining felicity, God hath not only sown in the minds of men the seed of religion, already mentioned, but hath manifested himself in the formation of every part of the world, and daily presents himself to public view, in such a manner, that they cannot open their eyes without being constrained to behold him. His essence indeed is incomprehensible so that his Majesty is not to be perceived by the human senses; but on all his works he hath inscribed his glory in characters so clear, unequivocal, and striking, that the most illiterate and stupid cannot exculpate themselves by the plea of ignorance. (1:5:1)
And, in the first place, whithersoever you turn your eyes, there is not an atom of the world in which you cannot behold some brilliant sparks at least of his glory. But you cannot at one view take a survey of this most ample and beautiful machine in all its vast extent, without being completely overwhelmed with its infinite splendour. (1:5:1)
Thomas acknowledged that some men are incapable of either following or profiting from his theistic proofs. Listen to what he says under Book 1, Question 2:.
Reply to Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes in Book 1nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.
Calvin, on the other hand, thinks this evidence is open even to those who are not experts.
Of his wonderful wisdom, both heaven and earth contain innumerable proofs; not only those more abstruse things, which are the subjects of astronomy, medicine, and the whole science of physics, but those things which force themselves on the view of the most illiterate of mankind, so that they cannot open their eyes without being constrained to witness them. Adepts indeed, in those liberal arts, or persons just initiated into them, are thereby enabled to proceed much further in investigating the secrets of Divine Wisdom. Yet ignorance of those sciences prevents no man from such a survey of the workmanship of God, as is more than sufficient to excite his admirations of the Divine Architect … since the meanest and most illiterate of mankind, who are furnished with no other assistance than their own eyes, cannot be ignorant of the excellence of the Divine skill, … it is evident, that the Lord abundantly manifests his wisdom to every individual on earth. (1:5:2)
This same emphasis is sounded a few paragraphs later. Here, however, Calvin explicitly decries the need for long and laborious argumentations to prove the existence of God. If anything ever qualified as long and laborious argumentation, it was surely Thomas’s “Five Ways.”
We see that there is no need of any long or laborious argumentation to obtain and produce testimonies for illustrating and asserting the Divine Majesty; since, from the few which we have selected and cursorily mentioned, it appears that they are every where so evident and obvious, as easily to be distinguished by the eyes, and pointed out with the fingers. (1:5:9)
Thomas, of course, elaborates at some length his careful and technical demonstrations of the existence of God as the foundation for his argument both in Summa Theologica and in Summa Contra Gentiles. He says:
[5] Now, among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in Himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby His Existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily suppressed. (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 9, Paragraphs 5.)
Sixth, not surprisingly as a result of all this, Thomas and Calvin interpret the apologetic significance of Romans 1:19-20 very differently.
Thomas sees this classic text as proof that the existence of God may be demonstrated by philosophical argument to men. In chapter 12 Aquinas is refuting the “the opinion of those who say that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated but is held by faith alone.” In response he says: “Finally, it is shown to us by the truth in the words of the apostle Paul: “for the invisible things of God… are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20).
Calvin, on the other hand, sees Romans 1:19-20 as proof that all men (“even the most stupid tribe”) know God intuitively or immediately in creation. He says:
The reason why the prophet attributes to the heavenly creatures a language known to every nation [Ps. 19:2 ff.] is that therein lies an attestation of divinity so apparent that it ought not to escape the gaze of even the most stupid tribe. The apostle declares this more clearly: “What men need to know concerning God has been disclosed to them, . . . for one an all gaze upon his invisible nature, known from the creation of the world, even unto his eternal power and divinity. [Rom. 1:19-20 p.] [Institutes, 1:5:1]
In the foregoing I have compiled six, plain differences in the apologetic approach of Thomas and Calvin to the existence of God. Whatever we may think of finding a scholastic methodology in Calvin, we do not find a Thomistic natural theology.
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
by Sam Waldron | Sep 11, 2025 | Apologetics
*Editor’s Note: The following material is the last of Dr. Sam Waldron’s 20-part series on Presuppositional Apologetics. Click on the following numbers to read the accompanying parts of this series:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
Practical Conclusions: Presuppositionalism Systematically Presented and Explained
You have read several times during these blog posts the view of apologetics, which I have been teaching you as `presuppositionalism.’ Since that word is composed of a mouthful of syllables, you may have wondered what in the world such a word meant. I believe it is important for you to understand this word and grasp more clearly the view of defending the faith which it embodies. Therefore, in Part 4 of the lectures, I will attempt to systematically present and defend `presuppositionalism.’ I will do so under the following sections of thought.
Section 1: Its Rise Retraced
Section 2: Its Identity Defined
Section 3: Its Necessity Explained
Section 4: Its Justification Presented
Section 5: Its Evidence Considered
I. Its Rise Retraced
In our historical introduction to Apologetics you may remember that we traced the development of two basic perspectives with regard to the defense of the faith. We traced the development of these two views in the early church in Justin Martyr and Tertullian, in the medieval and reformation periods in Aquinas and Calvin, and finally in the modern period in Abraham Kuyper and B. B. Warfield. I want to review the things we said there about the Modern Period.
Kuyper and Warfield were probably the two great, Christian and Reformed theologians who labored in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Yet while agreeing on most other issues, they consciously disagreed with one another on the subject of apologetics. This disagreement was partially due to the fact that Warfield represented the British Reformed tradition represented by Princeton Seminary, while Kuyper represented the Dutch Reformed tradition represented by and associated with the city of Amsterdam.
A. Kuyper
Remember this characteristic statement of Kuyper.
There is no doubt then that Christianity is imperilled by great and serious dangers. Two life systems are wrestling with one another, in mortal combat. …. In this struggle Apologetics have advanced us not one single step. Apologists have invariably begun by abandoning the assailed breastwork, in order to entrench themselves cowardly in a ravelin [a ravine or deep ditch‑-SW] behind it.
Why has apologetics been so useless? The problem is human depravity.
He who is not born of water and the Spirit, cannot see the kingdom of God, and the human mind is sufficiently inventive so to modify its tactics, whenever you imagine that you have gained your point, your proof is bound to lose its force … The same is true in part of the apologetic attempt to refute objections raised against the content of our Christian confession, and more particularly against the Holy Scripture.[1]
Kuyper’s point of view is that human depravity has so drastically influenced human reason that it is hopeless to try to prove to the unregenerate the truth of Christianity. The total depravity of men renders apologetics practically hopeless and useless.
B. Warfield
You remember that Warfield approached this whole issue from a totally different perspective. He asserts that “Christianity makes its appeal to right reason” and adds that Christianity is “valid for all normally working minds.”[2] But what about sin? Warfield replies:
Sin clearly has not destroyed or altered in its essential nature any one of man’s faculties, although (since it has affected homo totus et omnis [This is Latin meaning totally and completely‑-SW]) it has affected the operation of them all. The depraved man neither reasons, nor feels, nor wills as he ought … Nevertheless, there is question here rather of perfection than of kind of performance.[3]
Elsewhere Warfield argues similarly:
Sin may harden the heart so that it will not admit, weigh or yield to evidence: but sin, which affects only the heart subjectively, and not the process of reasoning objectively, cannot alter the relations of evidence to conclusions … there are excellent reasons why every man should enter the kingdom of heaven; and these reasons are valid in the forum of every rational mind, and their validity can and should be made manifest to all.[4]
The differences between Kuyper and Warfield are evident, are they not? For Kuyper the fundamental point is that the reasons of men are depraved. Classical apologetics is, therefore, pointless. For Warfield, on the other hand, the fundamental truth is that Christianity is rationally defensible. Therefore classical apologetics is valid and important. Human depravity cannot affect the basic ability of men to appreciate the arguments for Christianity.
C. Van Til
Providence did something very interesting in Cornelius Van Til. It brought a man raised in a Dutch Reformed background to be trained and to teach in the British Reformed background of Princeton Theological Seminary. Thus, Van Til was forced to interact with both traditions of thought with regard to apologetics. I believe that the result was a synthesis of these two perspectives which brought together the biblical ideas in both of them. Most theologians would argue that Van Til agrees more with Kuyper than Warfield. Nevertheless, the result of his historically important ministry was to combine what was best from both traditions. This new system of apologetics came to be known as Van Tillianism or Presuppositionalism. It was the system of apologetics taught for many years by Van Til at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia.
What is the essence of Van Til’s presuppositionalism? It is contained in the word, presupposition. Van Til stressed the great importance of understanding that first principles or presuppositions greatly influence the way people think. He argued that everyone reasons in a way dictated and controlled by certain fundamental, spiritual commitments. Thus, he agreed with Kuyper that the intellects of unsaved men are totally depraved. He also agreed with Kuyper that as long as you make your apologetic appeal to intellects controlled by the presuppositions that God is dead and Christ is not His Son you are going to make no progress with the unconverted man. In fact by appealing to the intellect of the fallen man you actually undermine the case for Christianity.
Van Til did not, however, conclude from this that apologetics are useless. Here is where he disagreed with Kuyper and agreed with Warfield. Instead he recommended a new kind of apologetics which recognized that the minds of fallen men are controlled by anti-Christian presuppositions. Instead of appealing to their fallen minds he taught that Christians should challenge the very presuppositions of the non-Christian. They could do this by laying bare to the non-Christian his anti-Christian presuppositions, showing him that those presuppositions were terribly inconsistent with his entire experience of reality, and finally by pointing out that only Christian presuppositions explained what the non-Christian knows to be true about himself and the universe.
Fundamental to Van Til’s apologetic was a distinction which brought together Kuyper’s and Warfield’s views of human reason. Kuyper said that man’s intellect is fallen, and he cannot know God by using it. Warfield argued that man’s intellect is basically sound, and he can know God by using it. Van Til said in effect, “Stop. You are both right.” Ethically, man is fallen and does not know God; but constitutionally man is made in the image of God and cannot help but know God. Thus, while it is useless to appeal to man as fallen, yet it is useful to appeal to man as made in the image of God. It is right to tell him to give up his wicked hatred of God which colors his whole way of looking at things. It is necessary to urge him to adopt the Christian presuppositions which alone make sense of reality.
II. Its Identity Defined
Presuppositionalism is today‑-thanks greatly to the labors of Van Til‑-one of two major views of apologetics adopted by evangelicals. The other is known as evidentialism. As you might guess, while presuppositionalism emphasizes the importance of presuppositions, evidentialism emphasizes the importance of evidence. It will be helpful for you to understand the difference between these two views. I cannot do better to help you understand the two views than to quote the summary of them by Robert L. Reymond:
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Presuppositionalism, or Credo ut intelligan (“I believe in order that I may understand”–systems presupposing the primacy [supremacy‑-SW] of special revelation as providing the ground for the total theological enterprise [program‑-SW]. Group characteristics here are convictions that (1) faith in God precedes understanding everything else (cf. Hebrews 11:3), (2) elucidation [explaining‑-SW] of the system follows faith, (3) the religious experience must be grounded in the objective Word of God and the objective work of Christ, (4) human depravity has rendered autonomous [independent and self-sufficient‑-SW] reason incapable of satisfactorily anchoring its truth claims to anything objectively certain, and (5) a special regenerating act of the Holy Spirit is indispensable [vital‑-SW] for Christian faith and enlightenment. The Augustinian and consistent Reformed tradition is representative of this group.
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Evidentialism, or Intelligo et credo (“I understand and I believe”)–systems stressing some form of natural theology as the point at which apologetics begins. Group characteristics here are the following: (1) a genuine belief in the ability and trustworthiness of human reason in its search for religious knowledge, (2) the effort to ground faith upon empirical [having to do with the senses and their observations‑-SW] and/or historically verifiable [supportable] facts, and (3) the conviction that religious propositions must be subjected to the same kind of verification [evidence‑-SW] –namely, demonstration–that scientific assertions must undergo. The Thomistic Roman Catholic tradition, the (inconsistent) Reformed evidentialist tradition, and the Arminian tradition are representative of this group.[5]
III. Its Necessity Explained
As with every theological question, the answer to the debate between evidentialism and presuppositionalism must be found in the Scriptures. That is why most of our time in Apologetics has been spent in opening up the Scriptures to you. Now we must summarize what the Scriptures say about the proper kind of apologetics. I think you must agree with me that the Scriptures support what can only be called presuppositionalism. Let me give you a number of reasons why.
First, the Scriptures clearly teach that men are totally depraved, and that this profoundly effects the way they think and especially the way they respond to divine revelation.
Second, the Scriptures plainly teach the possibility and necessity of apologetics. In 1 Peter 3:15 and many other places it calls upon Christians to defend their faith.
Third, the Scriptures (in Rom. 1:18-23) plainly teach the key distinction made in presuppositionalism between man’s ethical ignorance of God and his constitutional knowledge of God. In other words, just as Van Til assumes men do know God even though in suppressing this knowledge in a sense they become ignorant of God. Thus, the Bible teaches that we should challenge fallen man’s intellectual systems by appealing to what he knows to be true as a man made in the image of God.
Fourth, the Scriptures plainly assume that the message of Scripture and the existence of God are self-attesting or self-authenticating. They assume that men do not need to have the existence of God proved to them. They also teach that giving evidence outside of or external to the Scriptures in order to prove them to be true is unnecessary. In other words, such evidence is not necessary as a basis for faith in the Scriptures. The scriptural view is clearly in contrast with one well-known evidentialist’s view. Listen to what he said:
Preaching without apologetics is scarcely preaching at all. It encourages naked credulity [gullibility‑-SW] and shallow conviction … The Christian gospel pleases both the heart and head. It is a rational and intelligent faith. Therefore, it cannot be presented on the spur of the moment without much reflective thought, in the spouting of proof texts and an appeal to religious excitement in the soul … Apologetics deals in the area of pre-evangelism. A twenty-minute sermon with three illustrations and a tearful invitation is simply insufficient grounds for requesting an intelligent decision for Christ.[6]
Fifth, the Scriptures teach that all of human life and human thought will be controlled by a man’s fundamental heart commitments. The Scripture teaches, “Watch over your heart with all diligence for from it flow the springs of life” (Prov. 4:23). Unless this heart commitment is challenged and changed, the unbeliever will inevitably think wrongly and reject any evidence offered for his approval.
IV. Its Justification Presented
You may remember that I concluded in our study of 1 Peter 3:15 the standpoint or startingpoint of the Christian’s defense of Christianity was the heart attitude of faith. In other words, I argued that full confidence in the truthfulness of Christianity must be the fundamental presupposition of his defense of the faith. I remarked at the time that the charge will be made against this view that it involves the Christian apologetic in circular reasoning. People will ask, Are you not assuming at the outset what must be proved?
I put off a systematic discussion of this objection with the remark that the Bible always and everywhere regards everything short of faith as wicked unbelief (Mark 16:16; John 20:27 with v. 31). Thus, it forbids us from ever adopting even theoretically a position of intellectual neutrality toward the claims of God and His Word. Something more, however, must be said in response to the charge of circular reasoning in order to completely answer it. And, in fact, the Christian can make a number of responses to this objection. The first is this …
A. All reasoning is in one sense circular reasoning.
i. The Thesis Illustrated
When I say that all reasoning is in one sense circular reasoning, I mean that all thinking grows out of certain first principles or presuppositions which cannot be proven (externally, empirically, or directly). Take for example the modern scientists who deny the possibility of miracles. We ask, Why do they deny the possibility of miracles? Their answer involves their doctrine of the absolute uniformity of the natural law. This doctrine has not been proven by science and cannot be proven by science. It certainly cannot be verified or supported within the epistemological framework of the modern scientists.
It will be helpful to expand on this last point which has to do with the epistemological inconsistency of unbelieving modern science. Modern science is built on an empirical epistemology. An empirical epistemology is a theory about how we know. An empirical epistemology is a theory of knowing which says that all knowledge is rooted in experiment and observation. We gain knowledge only through the scientific method of experimentation and sensory observation. The problem with both the empirical epistemology of the scientists and with their doctrine of the absolute uniformity of natural law is that neither of these views can be proven or verified within their own empirical system. They cannot be proven by means of an empirical epistemology methodology. In other words, when such a scientist denies the possibility of miracles, he is guilty of circular reasoning.
We may properly ask such a scientist several questions. Have you been everywhere in the universe? Have you existed from eternity? Have you proven that there is no God to disrupt your closed universe? Modern science with its empirical epistemology has not proven that there is no God. It has assumed that there is none in its unsubstantiated, groundless, and unwarranted assumption of an empirical and materialistic epistemology. It has assumed that what cannot be verified empirically is not true or real, but it cannot prove this assumption itself or its empirical epistemology empirically. In other words, it has reasoned in a circle. If the reasoning of modern science is circular and if all human reasoning is and must be circular, then no objection can be raised against Christianity merely on the basis that it reasons from presuppositions which cannot be externally or empirically verified.
ii. The Thesis Qualified
I am not denying that there is a kind of circular reasoning which is wrong and false. A while ago in fact I came across an example of bad, circular reasoning. There was an experiment by a man named Le Vay which was supposed to prove that part of a homosexual’s hypothalamus was characteristically smaller than a heterosexual’s? It turns out that there were big problems with this experiment. Here is a quotation from the Bay Area Reporter:
It turns out that LeVay doesn’t know anything about the sexual orientation of the control group, the 16 corpses “presumed heterosexual.” A sloppy control group like this is … enough by itself to invalidate [discredit‑-SW] the study. LeVay’s defense? He knows the controls are heterosexual because their brains are different from the HIV corpses. Sorry, doctor; this is circular logic. You can use the sample to prove the theory or vice versa, but not both at the same time.
In science and in anything else for that matter, it is wrong to assume what you are supposed to be proving. Le Vay violated this rule. He claimed to be proving by his experiment that the homosexual hypothalamus has a part smaller than that of heterosexual. Yet his only proof for the fact that the control group in his experiment was heterosexual is that this part of their brain was larger. This is, indeed, wrong, false logic.
But this is not the same thing as we are talking about here. How is what Le Vay was doing different from what we are doing? First, Le Vay was claiming to prove his conclusion scientifically. Thus, he contradicted himself by assuming what he said he was proving. Presuppositionalists do not claim to be scientifically proving the existence of God. They admit that they are assuming or presupposing it. Thus, there is no deception or contradiction involved. Second, there is a difference between presuppositions or first principles and scientific facts. What I am saying is that God and the size of the hypothalamus are not the same kind of thing. The relative size of a part of a homosexual’s hypothalamus can be tested by empirical or scientific investigation. The existence of God cannot. Science is empirical. It deals with things that can be seen, weighed, and measured. God is by definition not something that can be seen, weighed, or measured. Circular reasoning is wrong within empirical science. Third, other sciences do something similar to what presuppositionalists do in apologetics. Geometry is built on a set of theorems, axioms, or premises which cannot be proven or verified, but must simply be assumed. That is why they are called theorems, axioms, or premises. The only `proof’ for these axioms is that the results they give match up with reality. Similarly, the existence of God cannot be proved. The only `proof’ is that the existence of God and the truth of the Scriptures makes sense of the world, and nothing else does.
B. All Christian reasoning must be in one sense circular reasoning.
Here what I mean to say is that‑-unless we as Christians reason presuppositionally—what some would call circularly—, we are unfaithful to Christian truth. In fact, we leave a false impression in the minds of our hearers. If God and His Word do exist, and if they are who the Bible says they are, then they must possess an ontological [having to do with being] and epistemological priority over everything else. God and His Word must be the first things we know to be true. God and His Word must be the source of all truth. God and His Word must be the standard of all truth. In other words, God’s own Word must be the supreme court of truth from which there can be no appeal. If God is the first and original light, then everything else is seen in His light (Psalm 36:9). Van Til perceptively argues:
Protestants are required by the most basic principles of their system to vindicate [prove‑-SW] the existence of no other God than the one who has spoken in Scripture. But this God cannot be proved to exist by any other method than the indirect one of presupposition. No proof for this God and for the truth of his revelation in Scripture can be offered by an appeal to anything in human experience that has not itself received its light from the God whose existence and revelation it is supposed to prove. One cannot prove the usefulness of the light of the sun by turning to the darkness of a cave. The darkness of the cave must itself be lit up by the shining of the sun. When the cave is thus lit up each of the objects that are in it “proves” the existence and character of the sun by receiving their light and intelligibility from it.[7]
But this raises another common question, Is it the case, then, that the unbeliever has his presuppositions, and the believer has his, and that is the end of the argument? Have we simply reached a stalemate or standoff? Is the Christian only more honest about his presuppositions, but not more justified in claiming them to be true? Not at all! There is much else which must be said, and that brings us to …
C. The Christian may and must show that the non-Christian’s presuppositions do not make sense of reality and that Christian presuppositions do make sense of reality.
i. The Transcendental Argument Explained
The presuppositional argument for the existence of God is what has become known as “the transcendental argument.” This argument asks the question, What are the necessary preconditions or prerequisites of reality as we know it? What are the necessary preconditions of logic, knowledge, and morality? What has to be true in order for the world (especially with regard to being, logic, knowledge, and morality) to exist? Even in arguing against Christianity the unbeliever makes certain assumptions about these things. Can he justify or support these assumptions within his own system? Or, must he unconsciously utilize the Christian framework of thought (using what Richard Pratt calls “borrowed capital”) even to argue against Christianity?
The “transcendental argument,” therefore, has a negative or destructive use and a positive or constructive use. Negatively, the Christian seeks to identify the non‑Christian’s presuppositions and show that consistently carried out they frustrate and hinder the possibility of any knowledge at all. Positively, the Christian seeks to show that his presuppositions provide the conditions necessary for reality, even those aspects of reality which the unbeliever uses in his arguments against Christianity. Van Til’s presentation of the transcendental argument is as follows. First he presents the negative use:
It is not as though the Reformed apologist should not interest himself in the nature of the non-Christian’s method. On the contrary he should make a critical analysis of it. He should, as it were, join his “friend” in the use of it. But he should do so self-consciously with the purpose of showing that its most consistent application not merely leads away from Christian theism but in leading away from Christian theism leads to destruction of reason and science as well.[8]
Van Til then asserts that the transcendental argument also has a positive use.
Our argument as over against this would be that the existence of the God of Christian theism and the conception [idea‑-SW] of his counsel as controlling all things in the universe is the only presupposition which can account for the uniformity of nature and for the coherence [harmony‑-SW] of all things in the world. We cannot prove the existence of beams underneath a floor if by proof we mean that they must be ascertainable [able to be detected‑-SW] in the way that we can see the chairs and tables of the room. But the very idea of a floor as the support of tables and chairs requires the idea of beams that are underneath. But there would be no floor if no beams were underneath. Thus there is absolutely certain proof for the existence of God and the truth of Christian theism. Even non-Christians presuppose its truth while they verbally [in words‑-SW] reject it. They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account for their own accomplishments.
To use an analogy, the transcendental argument for the existence of God shows that the unbeliever is like a little child throwing a tantrum trying to hit God in the face. Even to hit God in the face, however, he must be held in the arms of God. So the unbeliever must presuppose (without realizing it) the existence of God in order to argue against the existence of God.
ii. The Transcendental Argument Illustrated
The transcendental argument may be illustrated in several ways. We may take in the first place the philosophy of naturalistic materialism as an example. What is naturalistic materialism? It is the view that everything in the universe is physical or material. Naturalistic materialism says that the material world of nature is all that exists or has ever existed. This is a common philosophy today. What is the transcendental argument against this philosophy? Naturalistic materialism can never explain man’s personal-conscious nature or provide the necessary preconditions to explain man’s personal‑conscious nature. Francis Schaeffer has shrewdly and wisely remarked that (in the naturalistic materialist universe) man is a fish in a world where there is no water. Man is a conscious and personal being in a universe which is by definition unconscious and impersonal. Christianity which says that the universe was created by an infinite and personal God provides an intellectual background or atmosphere in which man himself makes sense. Naturalistic materialism does not.
We may in the second place use atheism to illustrate the transcendental argument. Atheism says that there is no God. Atheism, however, can never explain man’s moral nature. Every unbeliever works on the practical assumption that certain things are wrong. Yet, non‑theistic ethics can never explain why. If there is no God, on what basis may we say that some things are morally wrong? If there is no God, then what can the source of moral obligation or duty be? Neither individual opinion nor social consensus have any right to tell anyone what they should do. The atheist himself does not consistently recognize these things as the source of morality. Only the existence of God can explain the sense of moral duty and guilt which are part of the experience of every man.
Pantheism, in the third place, may be used to illustrate the transcendental argument. Pantheism teaches that everything is God, and God is everything. Pantheism can never explain man’s moral nature. Every unbeliever works on the practical assumption that certain things are wrong, but pantheistic ethics can never explain why. If everything is God, then God does everything that happens. If God does it, it must be right. Since the pantheist believes that God does everything from raping and murdering to showing kindness to the needy, nothing can be morally evil. Everything must be morally good. The major problem with pantheism is that it does not explain our moral sense of right and wrong. Nor does it explain our sense of guilt and approval.
Yet despite the insufficiency of both atheism and pantheism, our godless and secular society has many moral opinions and ideas. These form the basis of its popular views. We may think of the war on drugs, the consensus against pornography, and even the right to privacy. We must ask the unbeliever why he believes these things are morally right or morally wrong. Atheism, pantheism, and naturalism provide no basis for these moral perspectives.
Take in the fourth place the ethical theory, Utilitarianism, to illustrate this point. Utilitarianism is a very popular substitute for a Christian-theistic ethic. It teaches that the right and good is determined by what makes people happy. Utilitarianism can never explain the problem of morality or provide a satisfactory ethic. When the utilitarian argues that you should do what makes you happy, or—more unselfishly or altruistically—what makes the most people happy and that this is the basis of ethics, he fails to answer several necessary and basic questions. The first is, Why should I do what makes me or others happy? How does their or my happiness make moral requirements on me? The second question is this, Even assuming that I should do what makes me and others happy, how do I know for sure what course of action will bring the most happiness in the long run? It is necessary to possess the gift of prophecy or the attribute of omniscience to make this ethic workable. The third is, By what principle should I decide what to do when it appears that my happiness and that of others will conflict? If the utilitarian replies that such a conflict will never occur, he must be asked upon what basis he is sure of this.
Only Christianity solves the problems which utilitarianism fails to answer. The presupposition of the existence of God provides a basis for moral duty. God made me. He owns me. He has, therefore, a right to my obedience. The existence of the living God solves the problem of knowledge raised by utilitarianism. We know what is right (and will make us and others happy) because the omniscient God has told us through His prophets. The existence of the living God provides a basis on which we can be sure that God’s glory, my happiness, and the good of others will never conflict. The Bible teaches that He has created a universe where these things never truly conflict.
Think in the fifth place by way of illustration of the transcendental argument of one of the central arguments against Christian theism. “If there is a god, why is there so much evil in the world?” The Christian may very forcefully ask, “On the other hand, if there is no God, how do you know what is evil? By what standard do you judge it to be evil? Why is anything moral evil? In your universe where is there any basis for the idea of evil itself? Only Christianity with its presuppositions of a personal and sovereign creator God can explain why man is a personal and moral being and why reality is personal and moral.
As valuable as the transcendental argument is, and as helpful as it is against the charge of circular reasoning, there is another perspective which must be vindicated as over against the charge of circular reasoning.
D. The presuppositions of the Christian are self‑attesting.
We have seen that much can be said in defense of presuppositionalism against the charge of circular reasoning. The Christian can argue that everyone reasons circularly in the sense that they reason on the basis of presuppositions which cannot be externally verified. The Christian can argue that presuppositional reasoning is different than circular reasoning in the bad sense. The Christian can argue that, if he is right, he must reason presuppositionally or contradict his own position. The Christian can argue transcendentally that the non-Christian’s presuppositions do not provide the necessary preconditions for the being, knowledge, and morality which the non-Christian himself assumes. Using the transcendental argument positively he can show that Christian presuppositions do provide the preconditions necessary for being, knowledge, and morality–reality as we know it in this world.
In the last place the Christian may appeal to the deepest awareness of the non-Christian himself. Christian presuppositions are self‑verifying. They verify themselves in the innermost being of every man! There is for this reason also no stalemate, no “Mexican stand-off,” no “Mutual Assured Destruction,” no deadlock or stalemate between the presuppositions of faith and those of unbelief. Christian presuppositions are self‑attesting. All others are not.
The reasoning of the Christian against the charge of circular reasoning and against all other arguments of the unbeliever is not addressed against honest doubt in an epistemological vacuum. It is addressed against a refuge of lies constructed by the unbeliever to hide from the sight of God. The Christian’s reasoning is intended to confront the unbeliever again and again with the truth he knows but is suppressing. The Christian’s reasoning–even his transcendental arguments–are not intended as deductive proofs for the existence of God or the truth of Christianity. This does not need to be proved, nor is it subject to deductive proof. The existence of God and the truth of Christianity are self-authenticating. The Christian’s reasonings are intended as arguments against the dishonesty of unbelief. For this purpose and seen in this light they are completely and irrefutably sound, valid, and true.
V. Its Evidence Considered
It is a popular misunderstanding that presuppositionalism is opposed to all use of evidences.[9] The terminology and names given to the two competing systems tend to contribute to this misunderstanding. For presuppositionalism whether it is proper to use evidences depends on the manner of the appeal to them. In evidentialism there is a direct appeal to the facts divorced from Christian presuppositions‑-outside the Christian interpretive context. Such an appeal implies that it is possible to view a given fact neutrally, without an interpretive context. In reality this is impossible. The very attempt to do so is prejudiced against Christian theism. An appeal to a fact lacking its Christian‑theistic context of interpretation is of necessity an appeal to it as understood on the basis of non-Christian presuppositions in a non‑Christian context of interpretation. Presuppositionalism appeals to facts within the Christian framework of interpretation. Each fact, then, becomes a reflection or manifestation of Christian truth. Hence, we may say that evidentialism appeals to the evidences as specimens in a laboratory, while presuppositionalism appeals to them as exhibits in a court of law.
Take a brick or concrete block, for instance. What is the meaning or significance of this brick? Can we truly understand the meaning of a brick divorced from its purpose or separated from the building of which it is a part? No! By itself the brick might be anything‑-a door stop, a child’s toy, a weapon. We only understand the brick in its context. Even so only in the context of Christian presuppositions can any individual fact be truly understood. The contrasting use of evidences by these two systems may be diagrammed as follows:

All of this is directly related to the biggest question with regard to evidences and arguments. That is the issue of the theistic proofs. Here we can only summarize briefly the major questions regarding this issue. Much more needs to be said and supported. Here, however, I am only summarizing things which previous lectures have expounded.
What is the validity of theistic proofs? Some have contented themselves with proofs for God and Christianity that are merely probabilistic. This appears to be the position of the kind of classical apologetics which prevailed at Princeton as espoused by B B. Warfield. Most Christian apologetes have assumed that the theistic proofs offered more than merely probable or suggestive evidence for the existence of God. This is true of Christian Rationalists like Augustine and Anselm. This is true of Christian Empiricists like Thomas Aquinas who, as we have seen, thought that his five ways provided a logical demonstration of the existence of God. Finally, Christian Presuppositionalists certainly assume that the transcendental argument for the existence of God provides absolutely certain and valid proof for the existence of God.
The next question is closely related to the first.
What is the purpose of theistic proofs? Some have thought of the theistic proofs as merely providing confirmation to believers or even testimony to all men of the existence of God. Such language seems to suggest that the proofs or not really logically valid proofs which demonstrate the existence of God. Such language may also assume that the true source of our knowledge of God is something other than the theistic proofs. Others have seen the theistic proofs as the true logical foundation of our knowledge of the existence of God and a foundation upon which the rest of theology must be built. This appears to be the view of Thomas Aquinas. Finally, Christian Presuppositionalists see the purpose of the theistic proofs provided by the transcendental argument as exposing the refuge of lies created the innate truth-suppressing tendencies of fallen men. The theistic proof forces men to see once more the naturally implanted knowledge of God within them.
What are the different approaches to theistic proofs? Often a wrong approach to the classification of apologetics bedevils the discussion of the theistic proofs. I have seen some online insist that all theistic proofs must be either a priori or a posteriori. They, then, assume that presuppositionalism argues in a rationalistic a priori way for the existence of God. We must, however, distinguish three varieties of Christian philosophy. Christian empiricism; Christian rationalism; and Christian presuppositionalism. The notion that evidentialism is a form of Christian empiricism argues in an a posteriori way and presuppositionalism in an a priori way is, thus, false. A posteriori arguments are the way of Christian Empiricism. A priori arguments are the way of Christian Rationalism. Presuppositionalism is not a form either of Christian empiricism or Christian rationalism. Thus, it uses neither of these methods or arguments. Historical examples of Christian Rationalism are Augustine’s argument from truth and Anselm’s ontological argument. Christian Empiricism is illustrated historically by Thomas Aquinas’s five ways. Presuppositionalism’s transcendental argument adopts neither approach.
What is the use that presuppositionalism’s transcendental argument makes of evidence? It uses the evidence of the world and reality, but not in a neutral fashion, but as it really is God-created evidence. With Van Til presuppositionalism regards each fact in the universe not as a “brute fact” existing on its own with no created meaning and significance, but rather presuppositionalism sees each fact as God-created and possessing an innate God’s created meaning. Thus, every fact—not just some facts—presupposes the existence of the living God.
[1]Kuyper, Principles, 385-386.
[2]Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield, “Introduction to Beattie’s Apologetics,” 2:99-100, 105.
[3]Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield, “A Review of De Zekerheid Des Geloofs,” (by Herman Bavinck), 117.
[4]Warfield, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Knowledge of God,” 258.
[5]In Reymond’s book, The Justification of Knowledge, 8-9.
[6]Clark H. Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case, 7, 9, 18.
[7]Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 109.
[8]Van Til, Defense of the Faith , 102.
[9]Thom Notaro in his book, Van Til and the Use of Evidence, shows at great length that Van Til and presuppositionalism are committed to the right use of evidence.
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
by Sam Waldron | Sep 11, 2025 | Apologetics
*Editor’s Note: The following material is the nineteenth of Dr. Sam Waldron’s 20-part series on Presuppositional Apologetics. Click on the following numbers to read the accompanying parts of this series:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
The Testimony of the Holy Spirit to the Self-Authenticating Scripture
I. The Self‑Authenticating Character of the Scriptures
We have seen to some extent the background of why the Scriptures authenticate themselves to men. Now we need to see that the Scriptures indeed teach the self-authentication of Scripture. Here we come to the true heart of the Reformed solution to the problem of the authentication of the Scriptures. Holy Scripture may not be attested finally by man, history, or the church; it must be self‑attested. The Scriptures are self-authenticating.
(1) The Bible everywhere asserts that the Scriptures are never to be viewed as a dead letter, but as the living Word of God (Jer. 23:28, 29; Luke 16:27‑31;[1] John 6:63; Acts 7:38, I Pet. 1:23‑25, and Heb. 4:12, 13).[2] As the living Word of God, the Bible confronts men with the voice of the one they know to be their Creator. Thus, the Scriptures in and of themselves demand to be believed and oblige all to whom they are ministered to believe.
(2) Without closely reasoned lengthy arguments about them or external evidence being added to them, the Scriptures are sufficient to warrant the infallible confidence in their truthfulness required for saving faith (Deut. 31:11‑13; John 20:31; Gal. 1:8, 9; Mark 16:15, 16).
(3) If one does not assign to the Scriptures the ability to compel belief in and of themselves, one raises serious questions about the doctrine of the sufficiency of the Scriptures (2 Tim. 3:16, 17). If the Scriptures are not sufficient for this most fundamental of spiritual issues, are they sufficient for anything? If they need to be supplemented by lists of evidences, then why should we deny that they need to be supplemented by works on worship and psychology, etc.
Calvin’s historically important statement of the self-authentication of Scripture is found in 1:7:2 and 1:7:5 of the Institutes. Parts of it deserve quotation here: “But with regard to the question, How shall we be persuaded of its divine original, unless we have recourse to the decree of the church? This is just as if anyone should inquire, How shall we learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter? For the Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black things do of their color, or sweet and bitter things of their taste.”[3]
Calvin’s statement and the biblical teaching regarding its self-authentication naturally raise the question: What should we think of the external arguments for the Scriptures which perhaps some of you have been taught? Some of the common external arguments often used are that Scripture is the all-time best-seller and that its prophecies are true. The biblical teaching does not mean that such arguments are without usefulness. It does mean that they are secondary to and dependent upon the self-authentication of Scripture.
The Scripture, then, is self-authenticating. This means that the best way to show that it is true is simply to preach and teach its message boldly. Spurgeon somewhere says that he was sometimes asked how he defended the Scriptures. He responds that he does not believe that he needs to defend Scripture. Scripture is like a lion, says Spurgeon. If we let it out of its cage, it will defend itself well enough.[4] Another interesting testimony to the self-authenticating power of Scripture comes from the pen of Archibald Alexander. This testimony is particularly interesting when it is remembered that Alexander was the father of a school of apologetics which did not properly understand the self-authentication of the Scriptures.
While spending a summer in Germantown, near Philadelphia, I was sent for to visit a young man whom I had often seen. He did not belong to my charge, but two pious ladies who did, were his friends, and had come out of the city to nurse him. He had a hemorrhage of the lungs, which left little room to hope for recovery. As he was a mild and moral man, I did not know but that he might be a professor of religion; but upon asking him a question respecting his hope, he frankly told me that he had been skeptical for many years, and had not belief that the Gospel was divine. I never felt more at a loss. The man was too weak to attend to argument, and if I could by reasoning convince him of his error, it would not be a saving faith, and he must die before this process could be gone through. I found that his infidelity afforded him no comfort in a dying hour, and that he wished he could believe in Christ. It occurred to me that the Word of God contained light and energy in itself, and that if he could not attend to the external evidences, the beams of truth might shine in upon his soul, and thus generate a saving faith by the efficient aid of the Spirit. After pointing out the probable sources of his skepticism, I requested the ladies who were attending on him to read certain portions of the Gospel to him, as he could bear it–for he was very low. This was done; and next day, when I came to see him, he declared that his doubts were all scattered, and that he had hope in Christ. Afterwards, he was never able to converse; but as far as is known he died in hope.[5]
II. The Testimony of the Holy Spirit to the Scriptures
A. The Basis of the Testimony of the Holy Spirit
It is now possible to understand the true meaning of the Reformed doctrine called the testimony of the Holy Spirit. It has an objective, rational basis in the self-authentication of Scripture. Calvin saw this clearly: “Let it be considered then as an undeniable truth, that they who have been inwardly taught by the Spirit, feel an entire acquiescence in the Scripture, and that it is self‑authenticated, carrying with it its own evidence, and ought not to be made the subject of demonstration and arguments from reason; but it obtains the credit which it deserves with us by the testimony of the Spirit.”[6]
The question may arise, however, If the Scriptures are self‑authenticating what is the need of additional testimony? Further, if they are self‑authenticating, how do we explain the unbelief and denial by which they are met by so many? This brings us to discuss the necessity of the testimony of the Holy Spirit.
B. The Necessity of the Testimony of the Holy Spirit
The cause or necessity of the testimony is in one word, sin. Human depravity has its noetic or intellectual effects. It perverts human intellectual endeavor. It causes men to suppress the truth and so spiritually blinds them to the light of divine revelation (Rom. 1:21; Eph. 4:17‑21; 2 Cor. 4:3, 4).
A conclusion may be drawn from what has just been said about what makes the testimony of the Holy Spirit necessary. There is nothing wrong with the self-attesting Scriptures. There is nothing wrong with man’s mental capacity to respond to the Scriptures properly. The problem is with man’s heart. His heart makes his intellect suppress the truth of the Scriptures in unrighteousness. The testimony of the Holy Spirit is, therefore, simply the removal of that evil heart. He takes away the evil, ethical disposition which makes men suppress the truth and, thus, blinds men to the light of divine revelation. The testimony results in an ethical transformation and not merely an intellectual operation. It does something to men’s hearts before it does something to their minds. But this brings us to …
C. The Demonstration of the Testimony of the Holy Spirit
The reality of the testimony of the Spirit to the Scriptures may be demonstrated along two lines of biblical argument.
i. From the Ethical Starting Point of All Proper Thinking (Including Our Thinking about Scripture)
The Bible teaches that if man is to think rightly, he must be right ethically. The following passages teach that the ability to think right and by that means see the self‑evidencing light of special revelation is dependent on a proper ethical disposition (Ps. 111:10; Prov. 9:10, 1:7, 15:33; John 3:19‑21, 7:16, 17; 2 Tim. 2:25; 2 Tim. 3:7; Jn. 10:26, 27). Faith, fear, doing God’s will, repentance, all these are spiritual and moral qualities without which we cannot think right. These qualities are necessary to make the sinner stop suppressing the truth of God and stop being blind spiritually to the light of divine revelation. The Bible teaches that they are produced in sinners by means of the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit. All those passages, therefore, which bear upon the regenerating work of the Spirit demonstrate or prove indirectly the doctrine of the testimony. The passages which speak of the Spirit’s saving work are well known and need not be cited here.
ii. From the Direct Statement of Scripture
As I just stated all those passages which teach that the Spirit changes a man’s heart and imparts to it those ethical qualities necessary to think right indirectly support the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Some passages dealing with the work of the Spirit, however, plainly mention how by His testimony He imparts the light of truth to men. The following passages make clear that it is the Spirit that creates faith in the Scriptures through His attesting work in the soul of man (Matt. 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:14f; John 3:3; 1 Cor. 2:4, 5; 1 Thess. 1:5; 2:13, 1 John 2:20, 21, 27).[7]
III. A Clarification of the Common Misconceptions or Misunderstandings about the Self‑Authentication of the Scripture.
A. The Misconception of Subjectivism
What do I mean by the misconception of subjectivism? Those who reject the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the authenticity of the Scriptures will often object to it by saying that it is completely subjective. They think that we are saying that we know that the Bible is the Word of God because we feel it to be so in our hearts. They often go on to ask, What kind of argument is it that is based on a feeling or something the Spirit tells you in your heart? Two answers may be given to this objection: (1) This objection does not take into account the basis of the testimony of the Holy Spirit. This is the objective, self‑authenticating character of the Scriptures as the Word of God.[8] It must be remembered that the self-authentication of the Scriptures is not to be divorced or withdrawn from the actual quality of the Scriptures. The self-authentication of the Scriptures is rooted in the divine perfections of Scripture, its claims, content, and attributes. C. W. Hodge summarizes its objective character when he says:
The Witness of the Holy Spirit to the Bible, then, is not objective in the sense of being the mystical communication to the mind of a truth or proposition, nor is it a subjective inference from Christian experience. It is simply the saving work of the Holy Spirit on the heart removing the spiritual blindness produced by sin, so that the marks of God’s hand in the Bible can be clearly seen and appreciated …Those who are born of the Spirit have their minds enlightened so that they are enabled and persuaded to accept the objective testimony which God gives the Bible, and to recognize immediately or behold intuitively the marks of God’s hand in the Scripture.[9]
Our Confession also makes plain that the self-authentication of Scripture is closely related to the actual quality of Scripture. Notice how the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith treats these qualities in Chapter 1, paragraphs 4 and 5:
4 The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed, dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the author thereof; therefore it is to be received because it is the Word of God.
5 We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the church of God to an high and reverent esteem of the Holy Scriptures; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, and the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man’s salvation, and many other incomparable excellencies, and entire perfections thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.
Plainly, the Confession sees the excellencies of Scripture as the way in which it abundantly evidences itself to be the Word of God. All the Holy Spirit does is to enable us to accept this evidence. Notice how paragraph 5 ends by saying that this testimony or witness is borne to our hearts “by and with the Word.”
(2) This objection does not take into account the unique position of God and His Word. We cannot and may not argue for the genuineness of the Bible, God’s Word, in the same way as we would for other historical events. To assume that we should and can is to commit the religious blunder of thinking God is altogether such a one as we are. The knowledge of God which general revelation imparts is of the same character. It cannot be proven like we prove other things. Those who charge the doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit with subjectivism are guilty of rationalism, attaching too much and the wrong kind of importance to human reason.
B. The Misconception of New Revelation
Both the professed friends and enemies of this doctrine sometimes speak as if the testimony provides men with new revelation in addition to the revelation given in the Scriptures. But the testimony of the Holy Spirit is not a new revelation. It does not add to the words of Scripture. We must not conceive of this testimony as a new revelation to the effect that “the Bible is the Word of God.” Kuyper comments:
It has often, however, been wrongly represented that this witness was meant in a magic sense of certain “ecstasy” or “enthusiasm,” and that it consisted of a super‑natural communication from the side of God, in which it was said to us, “This Scripture is my Word.” Thus it has been represented by some who were less well informed, but never by our theologians.[10]
The testimony of the Holy Spirit is not, therefore, akin to “the burning in the bosom” by which some Mormons are said to have defended their devotion to the Book of Mormon. Views like this have never been the teaching of the Bible or Reformed theology. For example, the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith clearly speaks of the “inward work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the word.” (1:5) The texts cited in support of this doctrine clearly distinguish between the gospel and the power by which men were persuaded to accept its claims (1 Thess. 1:5, 2:13; 1 Jn. 2:20, 21, 27). Admittedly, it may seem strange to speak of a testimony of the Spirit to the Scriptures which adds no words to it. This does not mean that this testimony is word‑less, but as was noted above, it comes in the very words of Scripture.
Here it will help us to remember that the testimony of the Spirit is primarily an ethical change He brings about in our hearts. When we remember that the testimony is primarily an ethical, rather than an intellectual, operation, then it becomes clear that the testimony does not consist in any new revelation. It is simply the removal of the evil, ethical attitude which hinders the proper reception of divine revelation. The testimony does not impart new light to the sinner, but new eyes.
C. The Misconception of the Warrant of Faith
The testimony of the Holy Spirit is not the basis of faith. Nor is it our final authority. We must always make a distinction between the basis of faith and the source of faith. The basis of faith is the self-authenticating Word of God. The source of faith is the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Before the theologians who wrote the Westminster Confession ever came to deal with the witness of the Spirit as that by which faith is produced in the heart of sinners (1:5), they made it very clear that the reason the Bible is to be believed is “because it is the Word of God.” (1:4) The Bible distinguishes clearly between the basis and source of faith (1 Thess. 1:5; 2:13).
It is very important to have this distinction well understood because the inspiration of the Scriptures by which they are constituted the Word of God is also a work of the Holy Spirit. It is a different work, however, than the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Thus, this distinction between the basis and source of faith is really a distinction between two different phases of the Spirit’s work. Inspiration is the work of the Spirit (Eph. 6:17; 2 Tim. 3:16; 2 Pet. 1:21). It is this phase of the Spirit’s work that may be in mind when the Westminster Confession speaks of the “Holy Spirit speaking in the Scriptures” (1:10).
It is crucial to keep this distinction between two different phases of the Spirit’s work clearly in mind in the context of modern theology.[11] For many modern theologians the Bible is merely the fallible witness to the Word of God. It becomes the Word of God when God speaks to them through it experientially. The problem is that such people if consistent will never obey the Word of God until they feel like it. Their authority is their own experience or feelings. Such a response to the Word of God is not the peculiar possession of those infected with Neo‑orthodoxy. Often Evangelicals wait till they have a feeling before obeying the Word, rather than obeying it upon its own innate authority as the Word of God.
[1]Note Owen’s comment on Luke 16:27‑31 in vol. 4 of his Works, 75-76: “But is it of this authority and efficacy in itself? See Luke 16:27-31, “Then he said” (the rich man in hell), “I pray thee therefore, father, that thou wouldest send him: (Lazarus, who was dead) “to my father’s house: for I have five brethren; that he may testify unto them, lest they also come into this place of torment. Abraham saith unto him, They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them. And he said, Nay, father Abraham: but if one went unto them from the dead, they will repent. And he said unto him, If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.” The question here between Abraham and the rich man in this parable,–indeed between the wisdom of God and the superstitious contrivances of men,–is about the way and means of bringing those who are unbelievers and impenitent unto faith and repentance. He who was in hell apprehended that nothing would make them believe but a miracle, one rising from the dead and speaking unto them; which, or the like marvelous operations, many at this day think would have mighty power and influence upon them to settle their minds and change their lives. Should they see one “rise from the dead,” and come and converse with them, this would convince them of the immortality of the soul, of future rewards and punishments, as giving them sufficient evidence thereof, so that they would assuredly repent and change their lives; but as things are stated, they have no sufficient evidence of these things, so that they doubt so far about them as that they are not really influenced by them. Give them but one real miracle, and you shall have them forever. This, I say, was the opinion and judgment of him who was represented as in hell, as it is of many who are posting thither apace. He who was in heaven thought otherwise; wherein we have the immediate judgment of Jesus Christ given in this matter, determining this controversy. The question is about sufficient evidence and efficacy to cause us to believe things divine and supernatural; and this he determines to be in the written word, “Moses and the prophets.” If he that will not, on the single evidence of the written word, believe [it–SW] to be from God, or a divine revelation of his will, will never believe upon the evidence of miracles nor any other motives, then that written word contains in itself the entire formal reason of faith, or all that evidence of the authority and truth of God in it which faith divine and supernatural rests upon; that is, it is to be believed for its own sake. But saith our Lord Jesus Christ himself, “If men will not hear,” that is, believe, “Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead,” and come and preach unto them,–a greater miracle than which they could not desire. Now, this could not be spoken if the Scripture did not contain in itself the whole entire formal reason of believing; for if it have not this, something necessary unto believing would be wanting, though that were enjoyed. And this is directly affirmed,–“
[2]Note again Owen’s comment on Luke 16:27‑31 Works, 4:75-76.
[3]Jonathan Edwards echoes the thoughts of Calvin and Owen at Works, 2:16.
[5]A. Alexander, Thoughts on Religious Experience, 233.
[6]1:7:5 of the Institutes
[7]Cf. John Murray’s exposition of these passages pp. 47‑54 of The Infallible Word.
[8]Cf. the statement of Calvin cited above from Institutes 17:5
[9]Infallible Word, 170.
[10]Kuyper, Principles of Sacred Theology, 557.
[11]John Frame, Hermeneutics, Authority, and Canon, 222 and 223. Frame remarks: “In modern theologians like Barth, however, this distinction loses its sharpness. For them, first, inspiration in the orthodox sense does not exist; God does not place His words on paper … Thus, in modern theology the internal testimony replaces the traditional concept of inspiration. It was the internal testimony, not inspiration, in this view, that motivated the original writing of Scripture, and it is the internal testimony (presently occurring, as we read and hear), not inspiration, that grounds our faith in Scripture.”
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
by Sam Waldron | Sep 11, 2025 | Apologetics
*Editor’s Note: The following material is the eighteenth of Dr. Sam Waldron’s 20-part series on Presuppositional Apologetics. Click on the following numbers to read the accompanying parts of this series:
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.
The Biblical and Reformed Doctrine of the Self-Authentication of Scripture
In past lectures we studied the defense of the existence of God. We may summarize the results of those studies by saying that the existence of God does not need to be proved to men. God has so constructed the minds of men and creation that together they reveal the existence of God and leave men without excuse for refusing to honor or give thanks to the living and true God. Thus, by nature, innately, men are aware of the existence of the living God.
When we come to the subject of the Bible, we confront a distinct issue. By nature and creation men are not aware of the Bible or its message. This is a fundamental principle of Christian theology. It is so fundamental that our 1689 Confession of Faith begins by stating it:
Although the light of nature, and the works of creation and providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to leave men inexcusable;2 yet are they not sufficient to give that knowledge of God and his will which is necessary unto salvation.
This means, of course, that only the Bible and its message can give this light. It is not available in nature. Because men do not know that the Bible is the Word of God in the same way that they recognize the existence of God by nature, it is essential for us to deal in a distinct way with the subject of the defense of the Bible as the Word of God. The question is, How do we know that the gospel of Christ presented to us in the Scriptures is true? This question is the question answered when we speak of the authentication of the Scriptures. Authentication refers to that which proves the Bible to be the Word of God. When we tell men how we know the Bible is the Word of God, we are authenticating the Scriptures.
In answering this question we are asking and answering two somewhat distinct questions. The two questions are: Why is the Bible authoritative? and How do I know it is authoritative? Christians in general have agreed that the Bible is innately authoritative because it is the Word of the living God. But a different question may be asked, How do I come to know and recognize that authority? How is that authority attested to me? When this question is asked, different answers have been given to it by those who believe that the Scriptures are the Word of God. It is this question with which we are now concerned: How is the Bible attested to me as true? In other words, How do we know that the message contained in the Scriptures is divine? In examining this subject three points will be considered.
- An Evaluation of the Alternative Theories of the Authentication of Scripture.
- A Presentation of the Biblical Doctrine of the Self‑Authentication of Scripture.
- A Clarification of the Common Misconceptions about the Self‑Authentication of Scripture.
I. An Evaluation of the Alternative Theories of the Authentication of Scripture
A. The Historical Appeal
There are those who appeal to the study of history in order to show that the Bible is the Word of God. This was the position of the Reformation Humanists like Erasmus. Many have followed them in more recent times. This view asserts that evidence outside or external to the Bible provided by historical investigation will attest to us the apostolic authorship and authenticity of the biblical canon. B. F. Westcott favors this view and summarizes it when he says, “external evidence is the proper proof both of the authenticity and authority of the New Testament …”[1]
I certainly do not wish to deny that the evidence provided by historical investigation supports the idea that the Bible is historically genuine. However, several objections may be raised against this position.
(1) It is contrary to the experience of most Christians. Very few, or none, come to believe that the Bible is the Word of God through a study of the historical evidence. Such a study has very little to do with the faith of most Christians. Does this mean that the faith of most Christians is defective or improper? Of course not!
(2) It is beyond the reach of most Christians. Many Christians do not have the intellectual capability of evaluating the thorny, historical questions regarding the Scriptures. Most do not have the time to read, let alone to understand, for example, Westcott’s weighty General Survey …
(3) It is insufficient for any Christian. What is biblical faith? It is the conviction, the inner certainty, the confident knowledge that the message of the Bible is true (Heb. 11:1). The fact is that the historical evidence (while important, helpful, and supporting) is neither clear, nor complete enough to ground true faith. This is why Warfield and others who have taken this position have admitted repeatedly that the evidence rises only to level of probability and then defended probabilism. At point after point judgments must be made on the basis of incomplete evidence. In support of this assertion I can only challenge the doubter to read for himself (even such a sympathetic and masterful treatment of the evidence as that presented by) Westcott.
(4) Ridderbos asserts, “An historical judgment cannot be the final and sole ground for the acceptance of the New Testament … To do so [accept the New Testament on such a basis‑-SW] would mean that the church would base its faith on the results of historical investigation.”[2] This would mean that for most Christians their faith, in reality, would be in the expert, the historical investigator himself. This would be a clear contradiction of the biblical view of faith and especially a passage like 1 Corinthians 2:4, 5.
B. The Ecclesiastical Appeal
Many appeal to the witness of the church in order to show that the Bible is the Word of God. Roman Catholicism is the key example of this position. It affirms that the Church is able to give the Christian an infallible authentication of the Canon. In other words, Roman Catholicism claims that the church is alone able to tell us for certain and with authority that the Bible is the Word of God. Of course, any view which gives to the Church any infallible authority must be unacceptable to Protestants. Furthermore, Rome contradicts the biblical teaching that “the canon is not established by the church, but the latter is established by the canon.” Thus Rome’s position involves “a reversal of the redemptive‑historical order.”[3] Compare the statement of Paul in Ephesians 2:20 that the church is built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets.
C. General Objections
Here two convincing objections which apply to both the historical appeal (the appeal to history) and to the ecclesiastical appeal (the appeal to the church) must be looked at.
(1) An objection which applies to both the positions given above is that the thing to which we appeal in order to attest the Bible tends to replace the Bible as one’s practical authority. In other words, that to which we appeal in order to prove the Bible becomes the real authority of those who appeal to it. This lessens or weakens the practical influence of the Bible.
This problem is shown to be real in Roman Catholicism. Roman Catholicism’s appeal to ecclesiastical authority to prove the Bible is associated with a tendency to destroy the practical authority of the Bible for Roman Catholics. This is so because in its appeal to the church to prove the Bible the Bible ceases to be the absolute standard. In each of the choices given above the Bible is to be attested by means of an appeal to a higher standard. Thus each of the attempted answers is virtually a denial of the authority of the Bible. To appeal to any external authority to prove the Bible is to make something else have more authority than the Bible. To make anything else have more authority than the Bible is a denial of the supreme authority of the Bible. Though it is helpful to make a distinction, logically, between the authority of the Scriptures for us and its authority in itself,[4] it should always be remembered that its authority in itself and with us is from a single cause and for a single reason. It is the Word of God.
(2) It is important to note at this point that the whole effort to discover some standard external to or outside of the Bible to prove it to be God’s Word is misguided. This is the case for two reasons. First, since God has spoken and the Bible is itself the living Word of God, the highest possible authentication is the Bible’s own witness to itself. Second, if we think that a divine revelation following the original giving of the Bible is necessary in order to confirm it as God’s Word, there is no place to stop. This second revelation would require a third revelation to confirm it as God’s Word and so on without end. If the Bible as God’s voice or word from heaven does not attest itself, no amount of voices or words from heaven will ever be sufficient to attest it. Stonehouse has well said, “The only concrete form in which that authentication can come, if it is not to be derived from another objective revelation from the Lord of heaven, must be nothing other than the voice of Scripture itself.”[5]
II. A Presentation of the Biblical Doctrine of the Self‑Authentication of Scripture
The Reformed view of the self‑authentication of the Scriptures must now be systematically stated and exegetically defended. The Reformed view has often been misunderstood as a subjectivistic (feeling-related) appeal to the internal testimony of the Spirit. This misconception occurs when the testimony of the Holy Spirit[6] is divorced from the Reformed doctrine of the self-authentication[7] of divine revelation.[8] The doctrine of the testimony of the Holy Spirit can only be properly understood as one of a trilogy or series of three Reformed doctrines concerning the authentication of divine revelation. Furthermore, a deep appreciation of the convincing character of the biblical evidence for the Reformed solution to the problem of the authentication of Scripture is only obtained by viewing this series of three of doctrines together.
A. The Self‑Authenticating Character of General Revelation
No one has more forcefully stated the significance of the self‑authenticating character of natural or creation revelation than Cornelius Van Til where he said:
The most depraved of men cannot wholly escape the voice of God. Their greatest wickedness is meaningless except upon the assumption that they have sinned against the authority of God. Thoughts and deeds of utmost perversity are themselves revelational, that is, in their very abnormality. The natural man accuses or else excuses himself only because his own utterly depraved consciousness continues to point back to the original natural state of affairs. The prodigal son can never forget the father’s voice. It is the albatross forever about his neck.[9]
According to the biblical view of creation revelation man is always immediately confronted with divine revelation. God in His revelation is ceaselessly authenticating Himself to man. The creature can never escape the Creator. Natural or general revelation is self‑authenticating because it is the revelation of the Creator to the creature made in His image. The biblical evidence for this has already been presented. It will be merely summarized here.
Psalm 19 asserts that creation has a voice. It was created by the Word of God. Now it speaks a word to men. With its voice it declares loudly, clearly, abundantly, ceaselessly, and universally the glory of the living God. Romans 1:18f. reflects on this Psalm. It goes on to assert that such revelation leaves men without excuse because it actually imparts to them a certain knowledge of God. By it that which is known about God is made evident in them and to them. His eternal power and divine nature are clearly seen and understood by men. Thus, in a certain sense, the apostle can assert that men know God, the law of God, and the ordinance of God that those who break His laws must die. Though they suppress the truth, they do possess the truth. This view of things is clearly confirmed by the rest of Scripture which steadfastly refuses to utilize rational argumentation to prove the existence of God. Even in Acts 17 where Paul faces complete pagans the existence and attributes are rather asserted, assumed, and declared than proven or argued. When Paul cites heathen poets in support of his testimony, it is clear that he assumes that even those barren of the light of redemptive revelation possess a certain suppressed knowledge of God that comes to distorted expression in their systematic thought.
Let it be clear what the force of the testimony of Scripture is. It is not that men may know God; nor that they potentially know God and will come to know Him if they will use their reason aright. It is not that men by natural revelation have a certain vague notion of some undefined deity. It is rather that men are immediately confronted with a clear and unavoidable revelation of the true and living God.
This distinct view of Scripture has been clearly asserted by the great teachers of the Reformed faith. Calvin frequently asserted just this in the opening pages of the Institutes (1:3:1, 2, 3; 1:4:1,2; 1:5:1,2,4, 11,15; 1:6:1,2). The statement of 1:5:4 is typical: “They perceive how wonderfully God works within them, and experience teaches them what a variety of blessings they receive from his liberality. They are constrained to know, whether willingly or not, that these are proofs of his divinity: yet they suppress this knowledge in their hearts.” Owen has made the point yet more clear and stated it with the precision of technical language. He says after citing Romans 1:19 and 2:14, 15: “And thus the mind doth assent unto the principles of God’s being and authority, antecedently unto any actual exercise of the discursive faculty [the capacity of men to engage in a line of reasoning‑-SW] or reason, or other testimony whatever.”[10]
The self‑authenticating character of Scripture has for its significant setting the self‑authenticating character of general revelation. The evidence for the self-authentication of Scripture is never given its proper weight divorced from this backdrop. John Murray has seen this relationship. “If the heavens declare the glory of God and therefore bear witness to their divine Creator, the Scripture as God’s handiwork must also bear the imprints of his authorship.”[11] This argument may, however, be put even more emphatically. It may be said that if general revelation is self‑authenticating, how much more must special revelation as it is written down in the Bible be self‑authenticating. The fact is that the great difference between general and special revelation is that special revelation has a far more direct and personal character than general revelation. In general revelation creation speaks to us of God. In special revelation God Himself approaches us directly and personally speaking words to us. J. I. Packer teaches that the purpose of God’s speaking to men is to make friends with them. He then goes on to speak of the fact that general revelation is insufficient for this end.
As against those who hold that general revelation, and `natural religion’ based on it, can suffice for man without the Bible, we must observe that Paul’s analysis shows up the insufficiency of general revelation. It shows us, first, that general revelation is inadequate as a basis for religion, for it yields nothing about God’s purpose of friendship with man, nor does it fully disclose His will for human life. Even Adam in Eden needed direct divine speech, over and above general revelation to make known to him all God’s will.[12]
If the comparatively indirect and impersonal general revelation authenticated itself to men as divine revelation, how much more will direct and personal speaking by God to men in special revelation constrain recognition by its self‑authentication. Owen makes this very point:
We need no other arguments to prove that God made the world but itself. It carrieth in it and upon it the infallible tokens of its original … Now, there are greater and more evident impressions of divine excellencies left on the written word, from the infinite wisdom of the Author of it, than any that are communicated unto the works of God, of what sort so ever. Hence David, comparing the works of God, as to their instructive efficacy in declaring God and his glory, although he ascribes much unto the works of creation, yet doth he prefer the word incomparably before them, Ps. xix. 1‑3, 7‑9, cxvlvii. 8, 9 etc., 19, 20.[13]
The relation of the self‑authentication of general revelation to the self‑authentication of the Scriptures (special revelation) may also be presented by way of the following three step piece of logic or syllogism.
Major Premise: Divine Revelation is Self‑Attesting.
Minor Premise: Scripture is Divine Revelation.
Conclusion: Scripture is Self‑Attesting.[14]
Let me illustrate how our knowledge of general revelation forms the essential context for appreciating the self-authenticating character of Scriptures. Revelation is like a jigsaw puzzle. General revelation like that we studied in Romans 1:18-23 gives us the borders of that puzzle, but the crucial inner pieces necessary to complete the puzzle are missing. From the border pieces you can tell generally what color and shape those pieces must be, but you cannot see the picture clearly because the crucial pieces are missing. Suppose a mother and a child were putting together such a jigsaw puzzle and realized when they were almost done that several crucial pieces were missing. They look all over the house for those missing pieces and finally under a cushion on the couch they find several jigsaw puzzle pieces. When they place them in the puzzle, they fit perfectly, they are the right color, and they complete the picture perfectly. Now suppose when the father comes home, he questioned them and asked how they knew for sure that they found the right pieces. Would he be able to convince them that they had the wrong pieces? No! What could they do to convince the father that they had the right pieces? All they could do would be to show him the puzzle and hope that he had not had such a bad day at work that he would not see the obvious fit.
It is precisely the same with the special revelation contained in the Bible. It fits with general revelation. First, it reveals the same God which men know by nature. Second, it reveals the same wicked situation which men know by nature. It teaches that men are wicked sinners doomed to death by a just God. Men, according to Romans 1:18-2:16 know this by nature. Third, it explains why a just God continues to show common grace to such wicked sinners. According to the Bible men are aware of the fact that God continues to show goodness to them despite their wickedness and despite His holiness. The Bible explains that mystery by revealing the purpose of God to save sinners. Fourth, the Bible reveals the only way in which wicked sinners under the wrath of God can be justified by a holy God. Even though its doctrine of the Son of God coming to suffer the penalty which His people deserved is too wonderful ever to have been thought of by natural reason, yet when it is considered it is obvious that only through such a gospel can sinners be saved. These pieces, you see, fit the puzzle of general revelation perfectly. This is the reason why when the Spirit opens sinners’ eyes, the gospel is immediately received. Its divine truthfulness is obvious. It fits the suppressed truth which the sinner already knows.
[1]B. F. Westcott, A General Survey of the History of the Canon of the New Testament, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980) 502.
[2]Ridderbos, Authority of the New Testament, (St. Catherine’s, Ontario: Paideia Press, 1978) 36.
[3]Ridderbos, Authority, 36. Cf. Calvin at 1:7:2 of the Institutes.
[4]The Latin is quoad nos and quoad se.
[5]Stonehouse in The Infallible Word, 105.
[6]The frequently used Latin phrase is testimonium Spiritus Sanctus.
[7]The frequently used Latin phrase is autopistia.
[8]Ridderbos, Authority, 9ff.
[9]Van Til in The Infallible Word, 274, 275
[10]John Owen, Works, 4:84, 87, 88.
[11]Murray on p. 46 of The Infallible Word.
[12]J. I. Packer, God Has Spoken (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1979) 54-55.
[13]John Owen, Works, 91.
[14]The propriety of this syllogism might be challenged especially with regard to the propriety of the major premise. The major premise is based on applying to revelation in general what is true of the self‑authentication of general revelation. This is justified by the fact that general revelation is self‑attesting because of the nature of the Creator/creature relationship. Since this same relation underlies all revelation, divine revelation in general must be self‑attesting.
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.