by Sam Waldron | Jan 28, 2025 | Apologetics
I. Thomas Aquinas
Introduction:
Medieval theology came to its peak in the work of the one known to Roman Catholics as Saint Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas lived during the High Middle Ages in the years 1225-1274. In his writings, Medieval theology received a systematic, logical, and thorough exposition.
Medieval Theology exhibits a struggle between the spirit and principles of Neo-Platonism and those of Christianity. Van Til says:
Throughout the period of the Middle Ages the spirit of Plotinus and the spirit of Augustine are struggling with one another for supremacy. The gospel of the grace of God through Christ may seem, at times, to be lost. But the self-attesting Christ appears, in the end, to be victorious.
The early Church Fathers sought to present the Christ of the Scriptures to the men of culture of their day. In doing so they all too frequently succumbed to the temptation of submitting the gospel of Christ to the standard of truth devised by the Greeks. So too many of the theologians of the Middle Ages succumbed to the temptation to compromise with the principle of apostacy so strikingly and climactically expressed in the philosophy of Plotinus.[1]
A few pages later, Van Til clarifies the precise nature of the compromise he has in mind.
If it is permissible to speak in general terms of medieval theology then this may be said to be its mark, namely, that committed as it is to the Christian doctrines of God, of creation, and redemption as revealed in Scripture it tones down and often virtually destroys these doctrines by combining them with a philosophy based on the principle of plenitude. To profit from this sad mistake into which we all tend to fall it is imperative that the Christian principle be seen as the polar opposite of the principle of plenitude, the principle of the Great Chain of Being. And to see this it must first of all be observed that both of these principles are principles that claim to interpret the whole of reality. The Christian principle and the principle of plenitude alike include a view of God, of the world, and of man.[2]
By the principle of plenitude Van Til refers to the idea that God as super-being necessarily unfolds his fullness in a great descending hierarchy or chain of being which stretches between himself and non-being. Van Til finds confirmation for his interpretation of Medieval Theology in one of its modern Roman Catholic defenders, Etienne Gilson. Gilson speaks of God as “total being.” As such he
more especially true being: verum esse, and that means that everything else is only partial being, hardly deserves the name of being at all. And thus all around that seems to us most obviously real, the world of extension and change around us, is banished at one stroke into the penumbra [fringe or border area‑-SW] of mere appearance, relegated to the inferior status of a quasi-unreality. It is impossible to insist too much on the importance of this corollary, and its essential meaning at least must now be made clear.[3]
It is as the heir of this great struggle and the systematizer of these two contrary views that we must look at Aquinas.
The medieval theologian Anselm, is the forerunner of Aquinas’ short view of faith and reason and Apologetics. In other words, he is the halfway point or house between Augustine and Aquinas.
Any treatment of Anselm’s apologetic significance must begin with an understanding of his view of faith and reason. He follows Augustine and adopts his motto, Credo ut intelligam. Yet all the emphasis of Anselm was on the ability of reason without faith in the Bible to prove or defend the truths of the Christian faith. There appears to be no doctrine of the Christian faith which one could not prove by means of reason. Gordon H. Clark ably summarizes Anselm’s perspective:
In his general philosophic position Anselm followed Augustine, not slavishly nor sterilely, but pushed on with surprising originality to new fields of inquiry. Adopting from Augustine the motto Credo ut intelligam, he accepted the essential identity of religion and philosophy and the competence of reason to rationalize faith. Faith supplies the propositions with which one must start, propositions relating to the existence of God, the Trinity, the Atonement and so forth; reason is able to elaborate rational proofs of these doctrines. In one sense the work of reason is superior to faith and in another it is not … Apparently Anselm meant that the doctrines of the Bible and of the Church could be demonstrated apart from Scripture on independent grounds. Reason therefore is in itself a source of information, and not simply the syllogistic process of deducing a system of consistent theology from the statements of Scripture.
The question now comes, Can all the doctrines of Christianity be demonstrated without appeal to Scriptural premises? … Anselm seems to take it for granted and attempts to prove not only the existence of God and the Trinity … but the Incarnation as well and particularly the Atonement. In his work Cur Deus Homo, a masterpiece of theology, Anselm is the first in church history to have grasped the precise significance of Christ’s death … In the preface Anselm says of his book that “leaving Christ out of view, as if nothing had ever been known of him, it proves by absolute reasons the impossibility that any man should be saved without him … it is moreover shown by plain reasoning and fact that human nature was ordained for this purpose.” … And at the end of the work Anselm’s pupil gives this conclusion: “By this solution … I see the truth of all that is contained in the Old and New Testaments, for in proving that God became man by necessity, leaving out what was taken from the Bible … you convince both Jew and pagan by mere force of reason.” Similarly in the Monologium he says, “in order that nothing in Scripture should be urged upon the authority of Scripture itself, but that whatever the conclusion of independent investigation should declare to be true, should, in unadorned style, with common proofs and with a simple argument, be briefly enforced by the cogency of reason and plainly expounded in the light of truth.”[4]
This summary of Anselm shows how the classical defense of the Christian faith by means of pure reason is beginning to take shape in this Medieval theologian. Anselm believes that the Christian faith can be defended on the basis of pure reason and without reference to the authority of Scripture.
This tendency is given manifest exhibition in Anselm’s construction of the so-called ontological argument for the existence of God. It is called the ontological argument because it insists that the greatest idea in our minds must also exist in being. Ontology is the study of the nature of being or reality. Ontological means having to do with being. The proof itself is quite short, covering less than two pages. Here it is:
And so, Lord, do thou, who doest give understanding to faith, give me, so far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we believe, and that thou art that which we believe. And indeed we believe that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no God? (Ps. 14:1). But at any rate this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak–a being than which nothing greater can be conceived–understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist.
For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterward perform he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists, because he has made it.
Hence even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding at least than which nothing greater can be conceived. For when he hears of this, he understands it. And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly that than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot exist in the understanding alone. For suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality, which is greater.
Therefore if that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in the understanding alone, the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence there is no doubt that there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.
And it assuredly exists so truly that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is then so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, O Lord, our God.
So truly therefore dost thou exist, O Lord, my God, that thou canst not be conceived not to exist; and rightly. For if a mind could conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absurd. And indeed whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To thee alone therefore it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others. For whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why then has the fool said in his heart, there is no God, since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that thou dost exist in the highest degree of all? Why? except that he is dull and a fool!
What shall we think of Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God? First, it is obvious that it is not as clear and compelling as Anselm claimed it to be. Of course, it is not to be expected that atheists should think it compelling. Nor would their refusal to accept it prove that it is not. But even theists and Christians have found it faulty or confusing. Gordon H. Clark notes that even at the time of Anselm a monk named Gaunilo undertook to refute Anselm’s proof.[5] Second, it seems clear that upon examination, Anselm’s proof assumes an epistemology and philosophy that is influenced by a form of Christianized Platonic philosophy.
Indeed, the very idea that if we think something exists greater than which nothing else can exist, then it must exist seems suspiciously like the idea of Platonism that the human mind participates in the being of the ideal world and derives its ideas from thence. Van Til’s comments on Gilson’s assessment of this argument confirm this point:
It is no wonder then, says Gilson, that Anselm discovered the ontological proof for the existence of God. The whole point of this argument is to the effect that if one denies God one denies being … “The inconceivability of the non-existence of God could have no meaning at all save in a Christian outlook where God is identified with being, and where, consequently, it becomes contradictory to suppose that we think of Him and think of Him as non-existent” … [6]
With these introductory explanations in our minds, we may now proceed to deal with two important features of Aquinas’ Apologetics.
II. Faith and Reason in Aquinas
Aquinas adopts the same distinction between faith and reason which we saw in Anselm. He disagrees with Anselm, however, on an important point. Aquinas does not believe that it is possible to prove all Christian truths (or mysteries) on the basis of reason alone. This disagreement was probably due to the fact Aquinas was trained in the philosophy and logic of Aristotle. Thus, he was stricter about what it meant rationally to prove a doctrine. This disagreement with Anselm led Aquinas to distinguish between philosophy, which was the realm of reason, and theology, which was the realm of faith. Reason is sufficient to demonstrate the truths of philosophy. Only faith in the Bible can lead us to the mysterious truths of the Christian faith. Here is Aquinas’s precise statement in his Summa Theologica:
The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection presupposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith., something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated. [7]
Even more explicit are his assertions in Summa Contra Gentiles:
Since, therefore, there exists a twofold truth concerning the divine being, one to which the inquiry of the reason can reach, the other which surpasses the whole ability of the human reason, it is fitting that both of these truths be proposed to man divinely for belief.[8]
Yet Aquinas made a further distinction. Some truths fall within the sphere of both philosophy and theology. Thus, philosophy and theology overlap. Among the truths in this area of overlap is the existence of God. This area of overlap is the area of natural theology which is able to prove the existence of God and other truths important to religion as well. Thus, reason working in the area of natural theology is able to prove the existence of God and other basic, theological truths. This natural theology forms a kind of introduction or preamble or rational prelude to the Christian faith.
Here is Gordon H. Clark’s summary:
As for his system, the distinction between faith and reason which Anselm had formulated but had not thoroughly applied was adopted by Thomas and worked out in great detail. Theology is founded on revelation; philosophy is based exclusively on reason.
Aside from the Aristotelian epistemology by which Thomas wished to establish the first principles, Anselm would have agreed with all this. But because Aquinas has a stricter sense of demonstration and insists as the above quotations show on formal validity, the disagreement begins to appear in that Aquinas does not regard all revealed truths as susceptible of philosophic proof, at least not by men … For example, the doctrine of the Trinity, in spite of Augustine, Anselm, and Abelard, is no part of philosophy … Similarly Thomas excludes from philosophy the doctrines of the temporal creation, original sin, the incarnation, purgatory, the resurrection of the body, the judgment, heaven and hell …
Some propositions, however, are to be found both in theology and in philosophy. The reason is that the Scriptures are given for the salvation of all types of men, morons as well as geniuses; hence God included in his revelation information which indeed philosophers could obtain naturally, but which the duller and by far the more numerous part of humanity could never have figured out. This is not to say that any one man can believe and know the same truth. Understanding completes and puts an end to faith … But though no person can believe and know a given truth, the truth itself may exist both in theology because it was revealed, and in philosophy because someone understood its demonstration. Such is the case with the existence of God … Thus natural theology, by which is meant the logical demonstration of the existence of God from first principles, is the boundary between theology proper and philosophy … This makes natural theology the center of Thomas’ system and with it his fame is indissolubly bound.”[9]
Mayers confirms what Clark says:
What, then, are the primary apologetic assumptions and implications of Thomas’s attempts to prove God rationally? The most apparent implication is the independence of reason and faith. Reason is neither inherently nor volitionally limited. The philosopher can come to the same conclusion by reason as the theologian does by revelation and faith … Natural theology based on the theistic arguments is developed independently of special revelation and the knowledge thereby of creation … Believer and unbeliever thus can equally know the reality of God, if not all Christian truths. Reasoning is unspoiled in both. The Fall of man in disobedience to God is much less severe and radical here than in Augustine …[10]
Mayers’ opinion seems vindicated by the teaching of Thomas Aquinas. In several places, Thomas argues that the existence of God is not self-evident because sinful men can conceive that God does not exist, and if something is self-evident, it cannot be conceived by anyone as not existing. He proves this by citing “the ancients,” that is, the ancient Greek philosophers. He also cites the fact that the fool denies the existence of God.[11]
The implications of this view of faith and reason for Christian apologetics are very important. Aquinas’ treatment of reason clearly shows a great confidence in reason. It also assumes that faith and reason are independent of each other. It places believers and unbelievers in the same place with regard to the truth of the existence of God. The fall of man and the reality of sin appear to have had little or no effect on the reasons of men.
This subject raises the issue of the effect of human depravity on the reasons of fallen men. In apologetic studies, this is called noetic depravity. In turn, this raises the much bigger question of the whole matter of sin and grace in Aquinas. I will first give a brief description of my understanding of sin and grace in Aquinas. Then, with that information in hand, I will return to the subject of noetic depravity in Aquinas.
With regard to sin and grace, we must start with the perhaps surprising assertion to many that Thomas Aquinas was a thoroughgoing Augustinian in his view of predestination. In one way, this should not be surprising, for everyone in medieval Catholicism felt the necessity to be Augustinian in their views of grace. Nevertheless, most really did not understand or appreciate what Augustine really believed about sin and grace. To his credit, Aquinas was too good a theologian to misunderstand or to disagree with Augustine. Careful as his analysis and approach to this facet of theology was, when read carefully, he was a thoroughgoing Augustinian. This is true with regard to decisive matters.
He was thoroughly Augustinian in his view of predestination. In his treatment of predestination, Aquinas answers a number of questions in a way that only Augustine and his strict followers would answer.[12] Here is a brief summary.
- “Whether Men Are Predestined by God?” Yes!
- “Whether Predestination Places Anything in the Predestined?” No! (Men are passive in this matter.)
- “Whether God Reprobates Any Men?” Yes!
- “Whether the Predestined Are Chosen by God?” Yes!
- “Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination?” No!
- “Whether Predestination Is Certain?” Yes!
- “Whether the Number of the Predestined Is Certain?” Yes!
- “Whether Predestination Can Be Furthered by the Prayers of the Saints?” No, in that predestination is first determined regardless of the prayers of the saints. Yes, in that the effect of predestination—salvation—can be furthered by the prayers of the saints as a means of grace.
This last question and answer exactly parallels Augustine’s argument in his book entitled, Of Rebuke and Grace (as do all the others echo the anti-Pelagian teaching of Augustine.)
Similarly, and not surprisingly, Thomas also agrees with Augustine about what is now known as “irresistible grace.” Once again, through his typical and very analytical treatment, Aquinas follows the course laid out by Augustine.[13] But the pinnacle is reached when Aquinas teaches what amounts to effectual calling or irresistible grace:
… since God’s intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints … that by God’s good gifts whoever is liberated is most certainly liberated. Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it …[14]
With such evidence in front of us, we may rather expect that Aquinas will follow what we know as the Calvinistic scheme by teaching the perseverance and preservation of the saints and the other doctrines of grace. Sadly, this assumption is not the case. Neither Augustine, his strict follower, Gottschalk, nor Thomas Aquinas affirm the preservation of the saints. Grace may be lost unless one is also predestined to persevere. Once more, Thomas Aquinas is a good Augustinian when he says: “Many have meritorious works who do not obtain perseverance …”[15]
Similarly, Aquinas also seems to have held confused and imperfect views of total depravity. Sin, in fact, does not seem to occupy an important place in Thomas’s writings. In Gilson’s index, there is no entry for sin, depravity, the fall, or folly. For a discussion of Thomas’s view of sin, one must consult his doctrine of free will and grace. It is not surprising, then, that Thomas argues that natural light is sufficient for natural knowledge. Consequently, human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin.[16]
The effects of this view of human nature become evident of what was seen above. In several places, Thomas argues that the existence of God is not self-evident because sinful men can conceive that God does not exist, and if something is self-evident, it cannot be conceived by anyone as not existing. He proves this by citing “the ancients,” that is, the ancient Greek philosophers. He also cites the fact that the fool denies the existence of God.[17] Surprisingly, instead of attributing such denials to the noetic depravity of men and the fact that they suppress the truth in unrighteousness (Rom. 1:18), Thomas takes these statements of the fool and the ancients at face value and uses them as an argument against the self-evident character of the existence of God. Nothing could more pointedly inform us of Thomas’s inflated view of the powers of fallen human reason.
Thus, despite the promising character of Thomas’s views of predestination and grace, he falls short of truly appreciating the total depravity of man, including his reason. This, in turn, profoundly controls his approach to apologetics and the theistic proofs.
III. The Five Ways of Aquinas
“The Five Ways” refers to the five arguments which Thomas Aquinas brought in order to prove or demonstrate the existence of God. Those arguments are the argument from motion, the argument from efficient cause, the argument from possibility and necessity, the argument from gradation, and the argument from the governance of the world.[18] The term, demonstrate, is significant because Thomas is asserting that his proofs provide more than suggestive or probable evidence for the existence of God. Clark notes, “Obviously therefore with this Aristotelian background Thomas presents his proofs as formally valid demonstrations.”[19] Carnell writes similarly, “Let us be careful to point out that Thomas is referring to deductive demonstration, not probable induction, in his proof for God. “We can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects.” Summa, I, Q. 2, A. 2. This means that the proof must bear the same compulsion as a mathematical equation or a case of the syllogism.”[20]
Clark and Carnell are certainly correct. It is evident throughout Aquinas’ treatment of the proofs that he intends them as formal demonstrations. He denies that the existence of God is self-evident. In the process, he rejects both Anselm’s ontological argument and Augustine’s argument from truth. He admits: “To know God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us …” Yet he denies that this is “not to know that absolutely that God exists, just as to know that someone is approaching is not to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter that is approaching.”[21] He goes on in the next article to assert: “Hence, the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.”[22] Similarly, in Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas argues:
[3] This, then, is the manner of procedure we intend to follow. We shall first seek to make known that truth which faith professes and reason investigates. This we shall do by bringing forward both demonstrative and probable arguments, some of which were drawn from the books of the philosophers and of the saints, through which truth is strengthened and its adversary overcome [Books I-III]. Then, in order to follow a development from the more manifest to the less manifest, we shall proceed to make known that truth which surpasses reason, answering the objections of its adversaries and setting forth the truth of faith by probable arguments and by authorities, to the best of our ability [Book IV].
4] We are aiming, then, to set out following the way of the reason and to inquire into what the human reason can investigate about God. In this aim the first consideration that confronts us is of that which belongs to God in Himself [Book I]. The second consideration concerns the coming forth of creatures from God [Book II]. The third concerns the ordering of creatures to God as to their end [Book III].
[5] Now, among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God in Himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby His Existence is demonstrated, as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For, if we do not demonstrate that God exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily suppressed.[23]
The Five Ways Presented
In order to introduce the student to the Thomistic proofs for the existence of God, I will borrow Clark’s translation of the first proof from his Thales to Dewey.
The first and more manifest way [to prove the existence of God] is the argument from motion. It is certain and evident to our senses that in the world some things are in motion. Now, whatever is moved is moved by another, for nothing can be moved except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is moved; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality.
Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i. e., that it should move itself.
Therefore whatever is moved must be moved by another. If that by which it is moved be itself moved, then this also must needs be moved by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and consequently no other mover, seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is moved by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at the first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.[24]
Clark notes that all the proofs are “essentially similar.”[25] For the satisfaction of the student I have added a file with this lecture a translation of Aquinas’ five ways and Carnell’s summary of them.[26]
The Five Ways Discussed
If one is to understand the Five Ways and properly assess them, several things must be understood about them.
The first thing that must be understood is that the five proofs are built upon the denial of any innate knowledge of God. Says Clark:
Thomas faced two other contrasting views. One is that the existence of God is self-evident and neither needs nor is susceptible [capable‑-SW] of proof from prior first principles. Those who hold this view argue that God has implanted in all men an elemental knowledge of himself. The idea of God is innate. On this showing any argument or so-called proof could be nothing more than a clarification of already present ideas; and such in effect was the nature of Augustine’s, Anselm’s and Bonaventura’s attempts. Now, in one sense Thomas is willing to admit that God’s existence is self-evident: it is self-evident in itself, it is self-evident to God; but it is not self-evident to us. God has not implanted ideas in the human mind, and all knowledge must be based on sensory experience.[27]
The second thing that must be understood about Aquinas’ five ways is that he claimed biblical support for his methodology. Says Clark:
We can also be assured that the proof is possible by the words of the apostle Paul, “The invisible things of him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). This verse could not be true, says Thomas, unless the cosmological argument were valid. That the demonstration proceeds “from the things that are made” is in accordance with Aristotle’s theory of demonstration. There are two methods of demonstration: one is from cause to effect, the other from effect to cause. “From every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends on a cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist… [28]
The third thing that must be understood is that these proofs assume Thomistic philosophy. In other words they assume Aquinas’ peculiar mix of Christianity and Aristotelian philosophy. Speaking of the first proof Clark remarks:
This quotation, however, is more realistically understood not as a complete demonstration, but as a summary of a demonstration. Obviously, its premises need to have been established elsewhere. Potentiality and actuality, the definition of motion, the necessity of a mover, the repudiation of infinite regress, all are conclusions from a long series of prior arguments and involve discussions not only on physics, but chiefly on epistemology. If there is a break anywhere in this long chain of reasoning, the culminating proof quoted above will depend on a fallacy … Any discussion of Thomas’ philosophy is criticism of the proof of God’s existence, for this proof is the culmination of the philosophy …[29]
This is also evident from what was said above about Thomas’s rejection of the idea that the existence of God is self-evident. This rejection is a rejection of the Christian Platonism which informed the work of Augustine and Anselm. Their arguments worked for them because they held the platonic notion that certain (eternal) ideas are innate to the human mind. Thomas, working with the more empirical views of Aristotle, did not find such a notion credible and, thus, of course, rejected the arguments for the existence of God being self-evident based upon it.[30]
It is this philosophical foundation that opens Thomas’ proofs to criticism. He has committed himself to proving the existence of God within the bounds of his philosophy. Thomistic philosophy is committed to an empirical view of knowledge. Etienne Gilson, the premier Aquinas scholar of the 20th Century affirms this empirical commitment of Aquinas repeatedly in his treatment of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. In a footnote, we have perhaps his clearest affirmation of the empiricism of Thomas:
St. Thomas observes that what is known to us per se becomes immediately known to us through sense. Thus, when we see the whole and the part, we know at once without further search that the whole is greater than the part. In I Sent., 3, 1, 2. It would be difficult to indicate more forcefully the empirical origin of all evidence, however abstract it may be.[31]
All sorts of other things conspire to confirm Gilson’s assessment of Thomas’s empiricism. It is evident in his denial of the self-evident existence of God which we have noticed above. It is evident in the fact that all the theistic proofs begin with empirical reality.[32] It is evident in the pervasive references to Aristotle as the Philosopher in Thomas’s writings combined with his rejection of the innate ideas of Christian Platonism. This statement in the opening pages of Summa Theologica is typical: “No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv. lect. vi.) states concerning the first principles of demonstration.”[33] The famous illustration of Aristotle’s empiricism is found in Raphael’s famous painting entitled, The School of Athens.[34]
Empiricism teaches that sense impressions are the only or primary source of knowledge.[35] Thus, all the objections which have been raised against empiricism are also criticisms of Aquinas’ proofs for the existence of God.
Without denying that there is something compelling about these proofs, it remains true that they are open to criticism by rigorous logic. Carnell spends ten pages in criticizing these proofs. R. B. Mayers and K. J. Clark also believe that the Thomistic proofs are invalid.[36] Some of the most convincing criticisms leveled at these proofs are as follows:
(1) There is no way empirically to demonstrate that the unmoved mover, first cause, necessary being, perfect being, and great designer are identical to the Christian Trinity. Aquinas’ conclusion to his first argument is really only a leap of faith when he says, “Therefore it is necessary to arrive at the first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.” The fact is that not everyone understands it to be the Christian God. Thus, this argument falls short from the standpoint of Christian Apologetics.
(2) The argument from design does not take into account the evil in the world. If the design and wisdom in the world demonstrate a great designer, what do those aspects of the world that appear evil and foolish demonstrate? Carnell remarks, “Conscientiousness in empiricism indicates that life is a mixed affair: partly good and partly bad. Shall we then reason from this to an absolutely good God? It is difficult to see how this follows… When one beholds the history of humanity, the struggle of animals, the untold waste and destruction in nature, the ruthless slaughter of human values, and the death of the universe under the hand of the second law of thermodynamics, it is difficult empirically to affirm that the universe is as perfect as the defenders of Aristotle’s arguments must have it for the arguments to be significant. Is it not evident that when we reason after the pattern of the relation between the artist and his work, the poorer the work the less perfection we attribute to him? A chip on the statue or a flaw on the canvas makes the artist inferior. Is not God, then, less than all perfect? “[37]
(3) The very concept of cause cannot be proven empirically. An empirical epistemology rules out the existence of any non-empirical reality. Empiricism demands something it can see (or sense), if it is to believe. The problem is that no one has ever actually seen or sensed a cause. Carnell says:
Hume carefully showed that what we think is a connection between cause and effect is but a fixation of the mind and does not represent a valid inference from sense perception. Cause and effect are but habits or conventions of the intellect which express invariably related impressions that have taken rise from one’s viewing the concourse of flux. Causation “implies no more than this, that like objects have always been placed in the relations of contingency and succession [In other words, all we can see is that certain things always happen in the same order.‑-SW].” This removes the support of the argument.
Again, what the empiricist wants to know is why the universe need have an efficient cause at all. If no reason need be given for God’s uncaused state, why not shift that prerogative to the universe? [Hume remarks,] “By supposing it to contain the principle of its order within itself, we really assert it to be god; and the sooner we arrive at the Divine Being, so much the better. When you go one step beyond the mundane system [the world‑-SW], you only excite an inquisitive humor [an overly curious spirit‑-SW] which it is impossible ever to satisfy.”[38]
These final comments of Hume lead us to a fourth criticism of these theistic proofs.
(4) The cosmological argument for God’s existence is the argument from the fact that the world must have a cause. The cosmological argument is built upon the assumption of sufficient reason. In other words, the idea is that “nothing can be uncaused or the cause of itself.” But the cosmological argument also is built on the denial of infinite regress. Says Mayers as he continues:
…there must be a final cause or the continuum of cause and effect would “go on to infinity.” The denial of the possibility of an unending sequence of causes and effects would seem to be an assumption “smuggled” into, and not logically demonstrated by, the argument … The cosmological argument thus ultimately begs the question by concluding that God is the first efficient cause, but also an uncaused member, the existence of which was absolutely denied at the beginning of the argument. This is certainly a greater logical inconsistency than accepting an infinite series of causes.[39]
Kelly James Clark cites the response of the famous atheist Bertrand Russell to the cosmological argument.
Why does the universe exist? Russell believes that it just does. Period. And that is the end of the reasoning process. As Russell says: “I should say that the universe is just there, and that’s all.” Russell has chosen at a certain point to give up the principle of sufficient reason. The theist, it is alleged, also gives up the principle of sufficient reason when it suits him. The theist will answer the question “Why does God exist?” in a similar fashion: “He just does.” The application of the principle of sufficient reason must stop somewhere, but it is not clear where one is rationally compelled to stop applying the principle. It is difficult to defend one’s stopping point without appealing to one’s belief or nonbelief in God. Surely the theist will think it appropriate to stop only with God, yet the nontheist will stop at the universe.[40]
This a good place to take up the appeal of these arguments. For it is undoubtedly true that these arguments have manifested over the centuries a certain measure of logical appeal. The power and logic of the criticisms mentioned above do not remove or reduce the sense of many Christians that there is an element of truth in these arguments.
If we would understand this phenomena we must remember the perception of William Adams Brown who is cited by Carnell:
The professed purpose of the argument is to discover a cause adequate to account for the world we see, but the implied assumption is that this cause must at the same time be such as to satisfy the religious longings and needs of man. But this result is possible only as we read into the evidence data which our religious intuitions supply; in other words, as we introduce into our procedure judgments of value of a kind which ordinary scientific reasoning excludes.[41]
Mayers rejects both the validity of the cosmological argument and the idea of infinite regress (that there can be an infinite series of causes). Mayers reasons that the cosmological argument does, however, present us with a choice. “Although the argument puts us on the horns of a dilemma that either there is a First Cause or the universe is brute fact, it provides no rational reason demanded by the argument for why I must grab the First Cause horn other than prior theological assumption or “gut” feeling. This “gut” feeling is important to the evangelical apologist. The intuitive attraction of the cosmological argument is the persuasive and pervading reality of general revelation. General revelation, however, is an a priori fact concomitant with creation and not the derivative of an a posteriori argument from the fact of existence to the cause of such existence.”[42]
Clark enlarges on the appeal of the cosmological argument by noting how dissatisfying it is even to atheists to live in a universe without rhyme or reason. He comments on and then cites Bertrand Russell:
Of course the nontheist must live with the untoward consequences [unpleasant results‑-SW] of rejecting a sufficient reason, cause, or purpose for the existence of the universe. The nontheist must contend with the fact that the world is at best inexplicable and man’s place in the universe is equally so. Russell, in one of his more candid moments, recognizes man’s plight in his purposeless cosmos:
Such, in outline, but even more purposeless, more void of meaning, is the world which science presents for our belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our ideals henceforward must find a home. That man is a product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labors of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of man’s achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins‑-all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul’s habitation henceforth be safely built.
Recognizing meaninglessness is, of course, not a reason for believing that the cosmological argument is sound. The nontheist is not illogical for accepting these consequences.[43]
Kelly James Clark is correct. Empiricism provides no refutation of the despair, which is the alternative to accepting the theistic solution to the cosmological argument. Yet, the candid remarks of Bertrand Russell, cited by Clark, provide a penetrating insight into the reason why so many minds have found the cosmological argument to appeal to their minds. The fact is that the world if viewed as the ultimate reality, is not friendly to human values and ideals. Furthermore, there is a kind of immediate awareness in the human being that the world is itself an effect which must find its cause and explanation outside itself. Similarly, the other Thomistic proofs do point to and even assume (without admitting it) the common human awareness that we and the world we live in are dependent, created (or contingent), designed, and originated. But such perceptions are not distinguishable from the fact that we have an immediate awareness of our Creator. Hence, the appeal of these proofs is simply that they lay hold in many minds of the awareness of our and the world’s dependent, created character. This is to say, however, that these proofs can only succeed when they frankly admit that they presuppose the existence of an independent Creator. This means, however, that they are not proofs in the Thomistic sense at all. They fail and must fail if they purport to begin with the neutral data of sense experience and a neutral empirical epistemology and, from thence, prove the existence of God.
[1]Van Til, Conflict, 2:2:1. It is to be noted that Van Til carefully qualifies his description of medieval theology. He affirms that they held a Christian doctrine of God and creation. It is just that (in Van Til’s view) they compromised this Christian commitment by utilizing concepts from Greek philosophy that are in subtle but destructive ways contrary to its Christian commitments. It is simply wrong for Keith Mathison to assert in the unqualified way that he does that “Van Til asserts throughout his writings that Aquinas denied the Creator-creature distinction and taught that God and His creation exist on a scale of being.” Cf. Tabletalk, August 2019: https://tabletalkmagazine.com/posts/christianity-and-van-tillianism-2019-08/.
[2]Van Til, Conflict, 4, 5.
[3]Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, 64.
[4]G. H. Clark, Thales, 252-254.
[5]Clark, Thales, 257.
[6]Van Til, Conflict, 20.
[7]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 2.
[8]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 4, Paragraph 1.
[9]Clark, Thales, 271-272.
[10]Ronald Mayers, Both-And: A Balanced Apologetic, 102, 103.
[11]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 11, Paragraph 3: “And, contrary to the Point made by the first argument, it does not follow immediately that, as soon as we know the meaning of the name God, the existence of God is known. It does not follow first because it is not known to all, even including those who admit that God exists, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. After all, many ancients said that this world itself was God.” Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1: “On the contrary, no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher … states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God (Ps. Lii. 1). Therefore that God exists is not self-evident.”
[12]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 23, Articles 1-8.
[13]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 112, Articles 1-3.
[14]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 112, Articles 3.
[15]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 114, Article 9. Since the true grace of regeneration was given through the sacrament of baptism, and it was plain that not all the baptized persevered, no one committed to the notion of baptismal regeneration in any sense could hold the Calvinistic view of the perseverance of the saints.
[16]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 2, Question 109, Article 2.
[17]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 11, Paragraph 3: “And, contrary to the Point made by the first argument, it does not follow immediately that, as soon as we know the meaning of the name God, the existence of God is known. It does not follow first because it is not known to all, even including those who admit that God exists, that God is that than which a greater cannot be thought. After all, many ancients said that this world itself was God.” Cf. also Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1: “On the contrary, no one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher … states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God (Ps. Lii. 1). Therefore that God exists is not self-evident.”
[18]See the attachment file with the entire quotation of the five ways from Thomas Aquinas.
[19]Clark, Thales, 273.
[20]E. J. Carnell, Introduction to Christian Apologetics, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1948), 127.
[21]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1.
[22]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 2.
[23]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 9, Paragraphs 3-5.
[24]Clark, Thales, 274. This is cited from Summa Theologica, Part I, Qu. 2, Art. 3.
[25]Ibid.
[26]Carnell, An Introduction to Christian Apologetics, 127-128.
[27]Clark, Thales, 272-273. For the substantiation of Clark’s assertions, cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapters 10-12.
[28]Clark, Thales, 128.
[29]Clark, Thales, 275.
[30]Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, 1956), 48-51.
[31]Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, IN, 1956), 450. For similar statements of Thomas’s empiricism see pages 54-58, 76-83 of the same work.
[32]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 13.
[33]Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Question 2, Article 1.
[34]See the accompanying powerpoint slides of this painting.
[35]Carnell, Apologetics, 126. Carnell indicates that for Thomas “Sense impressions are the only primary source of knowledge. Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensu. There are no `inborn ideas’; nor are there any notions, within the natural range of experience, infused into the mind by a divine influence… ”
[36]Carnell, Apologetics, 129ff.; R. B. Mayers, Both-And, 99ff.; K. J. Clark, Return to Reason (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 17-34.
[37]Carnell, Apologetics, 138.
[38]Carnell, Apologetics, 135, 136.
[39]Mayers, Both, 99-100.
[40]Kelly Clark, Return to Reason, 23, 24.
[41]Joad, God and Evil, 224.
[42]Mayers, Both, 100-101.
[43]Kelly Clark, Return to Reason, 25.
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
by Sam Waldron | Jan 21, 2025 | Apologetics
Augustinian Church
I. The Contrasting Assessments of Augustine
Augustine’s place in the history of Christian Apologetics can be dealt with only if we first understand the immensely different assessments that have been given of what lies at the heart of Augustine’s thought. Discovering the heart of Augustine’s thought is difficult. Van Til raises questions that show that discovering the true heart of Augustine’s thinking is hard. He asks if it is possible to discover only one controlling principle in the writings of such a great man. He also asks if Augustine might have failed in his long and active life to have come to a truly and thoroughly consistent position. He concludes that we may have to be satisfied with simply discerning the general direction of Augustine’s thinking.[1] Not surprisingly, according to Van Til, there are two major interpretations of the general direction of Augustine’s thought.
Some think that the direction of Augustine’s life and thought was to make the starting point of philosophy `inward-ness’, the absolute and immediate certainty of consciousness. Augustine did anticipate Descartes when he said: “I fear not the Academic arguments on these truths that say, `What if you err?’ If I err, I am. For he that has no being cannot err, and therefore my error proves my being.”[2] This certainly sounds similar to Descarte’s Cogito ergo sum. [This is Descarte’s famous argument for his own existence. The Latin may be translated, “I think, therefore I am.”] If this view is correct, then Augustine follows Origen and Plotinus (the great Neo-Platonists) by making the starting point of philosophy `inwardness.’ This view would make Augustine the great teacher of the self-sufficiency (autonomy) of the human consciousness.[3]
Windelband argues that, though there is a contradiction in Augustine’s thought, the basic motif of Augustine’s thought is the idea of inwardness. Van Til cites him as saying:
… the rich masses of thought…are in motion in two different directions … As theologian Augustine throughout all his investigations keeps the conception of the Church in mind, as criterion; as philosopher he makes all his ideas centre about the principle of the absolute and immediate certainty … of consciousness. By their double relation to these two fixed postulates, all questions come into active flux. Augustine’s world of thought is like an elliptic system which is constructed by motion about two centres, and this, its inner duality, is frequently that of contradiction. It becomes the task of the history of philosophy to separate from this complicated system those ideas by which Augustine far transcended his time and likewise the immediately following centuries, and became one of the founders of modern thought. All these ideas, however, have their ultimate ground and inner union in the principle of the immediate certainty of inner experience, which Augustine first expressed with complete clearness, and formulated and used as the starting-point of philosophy. Under the influence of the ethical and religious interest, metaphysical interest had become gradually and almost imperceptibly shifted from the sphere of the outer to that of the inner life. Psychical conceptions had taken the place of physical, as the fundamental factors in the conception of the world. It was reserved for Augustine to bring into full and conscious use, this, which had already become an accomplished fact in Origen and Plotinus.[4]
Others think that the whole direction of Augustine’s life and ministry was pointed toward the great doctrine of the sovereignty of God’s grace. In contrast to the first view stands that of Polman, a Reformed theologian. Van Til says:
Polman points out that Augustine’s mature thought is best expressed in the idea of the sovereign grace of God. It is the triune God who, ultimately, determines the final destiny of every human being. Man’s true freedom is found in the obedience he renders to the Christ who speaks to him in Scripture. And it is by the Holy Spirit’s regenerating power alone that sinners accept the salvation offered to them in Christ. It is, moreover, the God of sovereign grace who directs the course of all history.[5]
Van Til points out the breathtaking contrast involved in the two different assessments of Augustine.
Here then we have as sharp a contrast as is conceivable. Windelband thinks of Augustine’s great service as being that of pointing forward to modern philosophy as it concentrates on the self-sufficiency of man. Polman thinks of Augustine’s great service as pointing forward toward the Protestant Reformation as it concentrates on the self-sufficiency of God and his revelation in Christ.[6]
Van Til underscores this contrast in another way in the following paragraph:
According to Windelband, Augustine’s contribution lies in the fact that he points forward to Descartes; according to Polman, Augustine’s main contribution lies in the fact that he points forward to Calvin.[7]
II. The Contradictory Currents in Augustine’s Thought
What is the reason for such drastically different evaluations of Augustine? They exist because there really were different and contradictory currents flowing in the river of Augustine’s thought. Warfield says, “If we cannot quite allow that there were in very truth many Augustines, we must at least recognize that within the one Augustine there were various and not always consistent currents flowing, each of which has its part to play in the future.”[8] Warfield also speaks of “the only gradual crystallization of his thought around his really formative ideas” and adds “not even at death had perfect consistency been attained in his teaching.”[9] Van Til’s response to this matter is similar to that of Warfield. He says that there was genuine inconsistency in the thought of Augustine himself, an inconsistency of which Augustine himself was never fully aware, but that “Augustine’s mature thought” (to use Polman’s words) shows that his deepest commitment was to the concept of grace (the self-sufficiency of God) and not the idea of inwardness (the self-sufficiency of man). He cites Warfield’s assessment of Augustine:
Our answer may be couched in the words of B. B. Warfield: “Two children were struggling in the womb of his mind. There can be no doubt which was the child of his heart. His doctrine of the Church he had received whole from his predecessors, and he gave it merely the precision and vitality which insured its persistence. His doctrine of grace was all his own: it represented the very core of his being; and his whole progress in Christian thinking consists in the growing completeness with which its fundamental principles applied themselves in his mind to every department of life and thought.”[10]
Warfield here refers to the difference between Romanism and the Reformation. We would extend Warfield’s illustration to the difference between the principle of autonomy [self-sufficiency] that lies back of all Greek and modern philosophy on the one hand and the authority of the self-attesting Christ. Augustine’s basic commitment, even in his early writings, was to the self-attesting Christ.[11]
Three things must be said about these contrasting evaluations of Augustine. First, their basis was that there were, indeed, contradictory currents in Augustine. Second, Augustine’s basic commitments were to the self-attesting Christ and the doctrine of grace. Third, Augustine himself was not fully aware of his own inconsistency.
First, the basis of these contrasting evaluations was that there were, indeed, contradictory currents in Augustine. In order to illustrate this Van Til makes reference to Augustine’s early book On Free Will written against the Manichees. It is interesting to contrast this early work with the one entitled On Grace and Free Will written against the Pelagians at the end of his life. On Free Will clearly assumes the self-sufficient man of Neo-Platonism. On Grace and Free Will just as clearly assumes the self-sufficient God of Christianity. Van Til shows that the first work is deeply stained with Platonic philosophy. Within its pages Augustine uses Platonic philosophy to explain the origin of evil and solve the problem of evil. Basically, Augustine argues that evil is non-being. Man is evil only because he hovers on the brink of non-being.
Here is Augustine’s argument: “And then as to the man who chooses evil, what shall we say of him? How did he originate evil since “truth and wisdom are common to all”? Man’s very being involves participation in form and we admitted “that every form was good”. What then is the cause of evil? Is God? Of course not. We do not know. “That which is nothing cannot be known.” “Take away all good, and absolutely nothing will remain. All good is from God. Hence there is no natural existence which is not from God. Now that movement of `aversion,’ which we admit is sin, is a defective movement; and all defect comes from nothing. Observe where it belongs and you will have no doubt that it does not belong to God. Because that defective movement is voluntary, it is placed within our power. If you fear it, all you have to do is simply not to will it. If you do not will it, it will not exist. What can be more secure than to live a life where nothing can happen to you which you do not will.” [12]
Van Til’s opinion of such argumentation follows:
Are we then, we ask, to follow Origen? Is God to be presented as creating men with equal capacity leaving the final determination of their destiny to themselves? And is Plato going to rule over us instead of Christ? Are we to lose the integration of our personality that we have in Christ by a vain effort at understanding that ends in blind faith? Must I, created in the image of the triune God, having rebelled against my maker but having been saved by him as my redeemer, now think of myself as hovering near the realm of non-being, not able to sin or to be saved?
Augustine does indeed employ the idea of the scale of being in order by it to suggest something of an explanation of the idea of human freedom, and with it of the possibility of the entrance of evil into the world….”Therefore, it is true to say that any nature, so far as it is such, is good.”
Herewith we have reached the bottom of the ladder. Man is good. If he has any being he is good and has truth. So long as he has being and is good he cannot do evil. And he always has and will have being and be good. So he will never originate evil.
Whence comes the evil? It has no positive cause. It comes from a “defective movement.” And “because that defective movement is voluntary, it is placed within our power.” Thus evil must originate from man so far as he participates both in being and in non-being. And herewith the Platonic dilemma earlier noted appears at its baldest. If man has any being and any knowledge he is deiform [the form of deity‑-SW]. As such he need ask no questions and can do no wrong. On the other hand so far as man has no being and no knowledge he cannot know himself and can do nothing. A purely rationalist principle of unity and purely irrationalist principle of diversity cross each other out and even as they do they are supposed to account for human nature.[13]
Rather than seeing the contradiction between the two writings, Augustine defends the fact that On Free Will says little about grace. Van Til notes: “In his Retractations he thinks of himself as having omitted all discussion of grace only because it was not then in order to do so.”
Van Til then traces the gradually emerging dominance of grace through the writings of Augustine. At the same time he points out place after place where Augustine is profoundly influenced by Neo-Platonism. In The City of God, though there is some progress toward a right understanding of grace and predestination, there is still a very appreciative note regarding Plato.
And then listen to what he says about Plato. “It is evident,” he says, “that none come nearer to us than the Platonists.” “For those who are praised as having most closely followed Plato, who is justly preferred to all the other philosophers of the Gentiles …. It is Greek theism…that Augustine confuses with his own biblical conception of providence. This is a falling back on the Neo-Platonism by which at first he tried to justify his faith as rational, by which he sought to explain the origin of evil ….[14]
Second, Augustine’s basic commitments were to the self-attesting Christ and the doctrine of grace. The greatest support of this assessment of Augustine is that Augustine’s development of his doctrine of grace in the anti-Pelagian writings is the emphasis of his latest and most mature thought. The books in which Augustine’s doctrine comes to its ripest and clearest expression are his last ones, shortly before his death.
- On Grace and Free Will: 426-427
- On Rebuke and Grace: 426-427
- On the Predestination of the Saints: 428-429
- On the Gift of Perseverance: 428-429
The contrast between the two assessments of Augustine under discussion is in part a contrast between the earlier and the later Augustine. The earlier Augustine has been described shortly after his conversion as “really a Neo-platonic Christian recluse committed to Neo-platonic contemplation.”[15] This description is confirmed by Augustine’s actions shortly after his conversion. Augustine, with his friends, resolved to return to Africa in order to form a community. This community combined the two ideals of cultured philosophical retirement and the “Christian” monastic society.
Third, Augustine himself was not fully aware of his own inconsistency. The growing clarity of Augustine’s teaching on grace toward the end of his life does not mean that Augustine had achieved complete consistency by the end of his life or that he was even aware of how inconsistent he was. Augustine never did clearly see how alien to Christianity much of the argumentation in On Free Will actually was. Here are Van Til’s comments on Augustine’s statements about his book On Free Will in his Retractations.
In his Retractations Augustine speaks of the Pelagians as a “new brand of heretics who assert the freedom of the will in such a way as to leave no room for the grace of God …. ” But there is no more room in Plato’s view of freedom than there is in that of Pelagius. Augustine did not realize this adequately even after his own doctrine of grace was developed. He says in his Retractations that he had not been “completely silent about the grace of God” in his work On Free Will. He even adds: You see that long before the Pelagian heresy emerged, I disputed as if I were already arguing against it.” Says Burleigh: “Augustine’s defence is not altogether convincing …. ” We agree.
III. The Conflicting Interpretations of Augustine’s Apologetics
Credo Ut Intelligam is a Latin phrase which means, “I believe in order to understand.” It summarizes Augustine’s approach to the relation of the Christian faith to reason. In so doing it is the embodiment of his approach to a rational defense of the faith or Apologetics.
An understanding of what Augustine meant by this (“I believe in order to understand.”) will make clear both the contribution of Augustine to Apologetics and the ambiguity or vagueness of Augustine’s defense of the faith. On the one hand, this phrase makes plain that it is legitimate and proper to believe before reasoned argument. Faith knows on the basis of testimony, that is to say, divine revelation. Without rational arguments men know by nature that there is a God. Therefore, it must simply be believed. As the Scripture says, “he who comes to God must believe that He is.” Says Gordon H. Clark:
Augustine certainly does not begin with physical motion and laboriously argue to an unmoved mover, though he does offer what probably seemed to him not only a convincing but a conclusive demonstration. But it is not the difficult series of syllogisms that Aristotle offered, for Augustine thinks it so easy to prove God’s existence that he does not use extreme care to produce formal validity. Nor does he place the same weight on rational demonstration that Aristotle has done. There is a more natural way to begin. It is natural because all men know there is a God; such knowledge is inseparable from the human spirit. And if some fools say in their heart there is no God, theirs is a willful ignorance; God is still present to their minds, if they would but pay attention. Rather than beginning with rational proof, Augustine chose the way of faith, and in doing so he raised the problem of the relation of faith to reason.
To the secular mind reason and faith are antithetical, the former good and the latter intellectually dishonest. How dishonest then must all secular minds be! Faith is not something strange or irrational, used only in accepting divine revelation; it is an indispensable mental activity. Faith is the acceptance of a proposition as true on the testimony of witnesses …. Nearly all the contents of even the most secular mind are matters of faith. Augustine uses this illustration. A young man believes that a certain older man is his father on the testimony of his mother; and even the identity of the mother is a matter of faith …. Granted that faith is not direct knowledge, still it is not irrational. It is not blind. There are reasons for believing a witness. If a man had never seen the walls of Carthage, it might be irrational to take his word as to their height. But if he is an eyewitness and if he is trustworthy, faith in him is neither unnatural nor unreasonable. In fact, not only is most so-called knowledge faith, but also there can be no knowledge in the strict sense without faith. Our parents and teachers tell us things, and we believe them. Later in life we may reason out some of this information for ourselves. But we could not have obtained the later understanding without the prior faith; and Augustine formulates a sort of motto, which St. Anselm afterward borrowed: credo ut intelligam‑-I believe in order to understand. Understanding as the goal is superior to faith as the starting point; but the start must be made …. The application of this view to the existence of God is that the apostles were eyewitnesses of Christ; both they and he attested their divine message by miracles; and the message informs us that God exists.[16]
This emphasis on faith and man’s natural knowledge of God is Augustine’s contribution to Christian apologetics. Taken together with his emphasis on the sovereignty of divine grace, it points the direction toward a consistently Christian defense of the faith.
On the other hand, Augustine affirms that it is possible to reach the knowledge of God without faith in the Bible. Gordon H. Clark remarks:
Once a person has divested himself of pride so as to believe this message, he can advance to a rational proof of God’s existence. In fact, although faith of some sort is prior to all reasoned knowledge, faith in the Bible is not a necessary prerequisite for avoiding skepticism, learning mathematics, or even proving God’s existence. Though not a necessary prerequisite, it is the easiest way, none the less; and we must remember that the eternal destiny of individuals, most of whom are not philosophers, is too important to hang on the accidents of formal education.[17]
Natural theology means proving that God exists and other truths about God and men from reason and nature without the Bible. Augustine clearly teaches that natural theology is proper and may act as a preamble or preparation for faith in the case of some men. In this, Van Til argues, Augustine betrays an insensitivity to the intellectual (noetic) effects of sin and his own insights on divine grace.
In his theology of grace Augustine has expressed better than any one before him the fact that at the beginning of history Adam and through Adam all men fell into sin and became thereby spiritually blinded to the truth. But as noted above in his early writing Augustine speaks all too often as though the Greeks and especially Plato had not suffered the noetic effects of sin. Are they not, as Paul tells us in Rom. 5:12, seeking to suppress the fact that they are creatures of God and responsible to him? Is not Plato’s idea of man as inherently participant in divinity a virtual denial of man’s creatureliness and sinfulness? Is not Plato’s idea of the inner man who seeks eternal rather than temporal things still the unregenerate man seeking to suppress the voice of revelation that speaks to him and challenges him to obedience in every fact of nature and history? And is not Plato’s Socrates who wants to understand, that is, penetrate the concept of the truth, regardless of what gods or men say about it, the very paradigm of the principle of autonomy?[18]
Thus, on the one hand Augustine points the way to a consistently Christian apologetic. On the other hand, he lays the foundation at the same time for the classical Roman Catholic system of apologetics. Despite all his inconsistency (inconsistency which Augustine himself did not recognize) there emerges in him an explicitly biblical view of free will, sin, and grace.[19] Thus, biblical views of God and man lay the foundation for a biblical apologetic.
Yet, such is the influence of Neo-Platonism upon Augustine that the fruits of his insights must wait a thousand years to bear fruit in a biblical apologetic. Roman Catholics, therefore, have some reason because of this inconsistency to claim Augustine. Says Van Til:
The Roman Catholics claim Augustine as one of their great fathers, chiefly because of the fact that in his doctrine of the church Augustine seems to favor their view rather than that of the Reformers. We cannot discuss this point. Warfield holds that on the church Augustine held to the traditional view and did not do really reformatory work.
However, one further point may be mentioned. The theology of grace of Augustine is obviously opposed to the semi-Pelagianism which, though officially rejected, yet informs most of the theology of Romanism. And then, too, the Romanists may appeal to the remnants of Neo-Platonism in Augustine so as to justify their own construction of a natural theology as a foundation for revealed theology. And as Pelagius appealed to Augustine’s earlier writings in justification for his own view of the human will with some plausibility, so Romanism may do the same. In short, so far as Augustine had not attained to his own mature theology of grace so far a plausible appeal may be made by Romanism to him as one of their fathers.
We must now turn to that Medieval blend or synthesis of faith and natural reason (Greek philosophy) which claimed as its father this same Augustine. After we have looked at the Apologetic developed by the great doctor of Medieval theology, Thomas Aquinas, we will turn to the Reformation which rejected this blend or synthesis on the basis of Augustine’s doctrine of grace.
[1]Van Til, Conflict, 110. Van Til remarks: “Granted then the unexcelled greatness of the man we naturally inquire as to the leading motif of his life. But is it really possible to speak of any such thing as an all-controlling principle in the literary corpus of this great mind? Was he not too great a mind to be bound by any system. And did not Augustine’s thought develop and change as he grew older?
These questions suggest that if we are to understand anything of Augustine at all we shall do best to follow him as he struggled with himself to find himself in his relation to his environment in the course of a long and extremely active life. Our basic question may well be as to the direction in which Augustine was working.”
[2]De Civitate Dei, XI, 26; cf. De Libero Arbitrio, II, 3).
[3]Van Til, Conflict, 111.
[4]Ibid.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Van Til, Conflict, 111-112.
[7]Ibid.
[8]B. B. Warfield, Studies in Tertullian and Augustine (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981) 119.
[9]Warfield, Tertullian and Augustine, 117.
[10]B. B. Warfield, Studies in Tertullian and Augustine (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981) 119.
[11]Van Til, Conflict, 122.
[12]Van Til, Conflict, 147.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Van Til, Conflict, 147.
[15]Robert Letham, unpublished lectures.
[16]Clark, Thales, 226, 227.
[17]Clark, Thales, 226-227.
[18]Van Til, Conflict, 130.
[19]Van Til, Conflict, 116. Van Til cites Adolph Harnack himself as his witness to this fact. “Harnack himself our witness says that it must be said that the sovereign grace of God first found its open and unreserved expression in Augustine.”
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
by Sam Waldron | Jan 14, 2025 | Apologetics
Preface
Usually, the study of church history is surveyed through the usual four divisions of church history (Early, Medieval, Reformation, Modern). As I have reflected upon the best way to survey historical theology for our present purpose, it has appeared to me that an alternate threefold division of historical theology will be more satisfactory. Therefore we will look at Christian apologetics and theological epistemology in …
Section 1: The Early Church
Section 2: The Augustinian Church
Section 3: The Modern Church
Two great perspectives about defending the faith become visible in church history. They constitute the two alternatives that must be evaluated in light of the Word of God. To understand the nature and development of those two alternatives, we must begin at the beginning of the history of the early church and, by means of six key figures, survey their development throughout the entirety of church history. In each of the three periods of church history the contrasting views of two of these key figures will be set before us. In this way, we will better understand these two views and their development. This understanding will help us ask the right questions of our answer key, the Bible. In this way, we will be able to develop a biblical and balanced view of apologetics.
The Early Church
Justin Martyr and Tertullian
Greek Philosophy and Christian Apologetics
Introduction: The Intellectual Setting of the Early Church
A historical introduction to Christian apologetics must include some reference to Greek philosophy. If Christian apologetics is “the vindication of the Christian philosophy of life against the various forms of non‑Christian philosophies of life,” then one must understand those philosophies in order to assess the value of any apologetic.
The history of Greek philosophy can be divided into three fairly well‑marked epochs:
- The Pre‑Socratic Era 585 B. C. ‑ 399 B.C.
- The Era of Plato and Aristotle 385 B. C. ‑ 323 B.C.
- The Hellenistic Age 300 B. C. ‑ A. D. 529
It is, of course, the so‑called Hellenistic age which interests us. In the Hellenistic Age there are three major philosophies: Epicureanism, Platonism, and Stoicism. Our interest is mainly in the latter two philosophies. Kelly remarks, “Both the Stoicism and, to an even greater extent, the Platonism which flourished in the first two Christian centuries … had borrowed from the other, and indeed the intellectual attitude of great numbers of educated people might be described as either a Platonizing Stoicism or a Stoicizing Platonism.”[1]
Our interest in Greek philosophy is not finally in the details of any one of its manifestations but rather in the general views which it held. Several of its general characteristics must now be mentioned:
(1) There is a tendency in Greek thought to adopt a monistic view of being. This means that the Greek philosophers assumed that there was only one kind of being. Anything that existed was being. Being was one and without origin.
(2) There is a tendency to view the world as in tension or balance. It was in tension between being and non-being. What does this mean? Heaven (the world of spirit above) was viewed as real—possessing true being. Matter, the stuff out of which the material world we live in was made, is viewed as non-being. The spiritual world was characterized by a basic one-ness or ultimate unity. Being was basically one. Matter, on the other hand, was endlessly different. It was, therefore, characterized by complete diversity. It was, therefore, impossible to see any harmony or unifying themes in it. It was, thus, meaningless.
(3) There is a tendency among the Greek philosophers to achieve meaning in this world in tension between being and non-being, spirit and matter, reason and meaninglessness by means of the logos. The logos principle unfolds and applies the principle of being and unity to matter or non-being, the principle of meaningless change and diversity. Thus, by imposing order, form, and reason on matter, the logos makes the world as we know it. The logos principle mediates being, unity, and rationality into the meaninglessness, diversity, and constant change of matter. Thus, the logos principle brings about the world as we know it in which exist both universals and particulars.
(4) There is a tendency to identify human reason with the logos principle. There is, therefore, a tendency to deify human reason. It is the representative of the human soul of the being, spirit, and rationality in the world.
(5) Everything that has been said under the first four points leads to the conclusion that in all of Greek philosophy, there is no thought of creation in the Christian sense. “God” is a nameless and indescribable principle of being and rationality. The logos principle emanates from this abstract supreme being and mediates rationality to the world. Being and non-being, rationality and irrationality, spirit, and matter are thought of as equally eternal principles existing in everlasting contradiction and interaction.[2]
I. Justin Martyr
His Significance
The difference of opinion among Christians to which we previously referred as to how to defend the Christian faith emerged with the first Christian theologians who ever set out formally to present and defend Christianity to the surrounding world. Van Til designates the period of the Apologists as “the first major combat between the Christian and Greek paideia.”[3] By paideia here, Van Til means a system of teaching. These early defenders of Christianity were called the Apologists. These Christians lived in the second century, about 100 years after the apostles, around 150-200 A. D. They wrote in order to defend Christians and present Christianity to the Romans and Greeks. Thus, they were very concerned that Christianity should appear reasonable to the world dominated at that time by Greek philosophy.
His Background
The most famous of these apologists was Justin Martyr. He lived approximately A. D. 110-165. One writer makes these very significant remarks about the background and conversion of Justin:
Justin was a Gentile, but born in Samaria, near Jacob’s well. He must have been well educated: he had traveled extensively, and he seems to have been a person enjoying a competence. After trying all other systems, his elevated tastes and refined perceptions made him a disciple of Socrates and Plato. So he climbed toward Christ. As he himself narrates the story of his conversion (in his Dialog with Trypho the Jew—SW), it need not be anticipated here. What Plato was feeling after, he found in Jesus of Nazareth. The conversion of such a man marks a new era in the gospel history. The sub-apostolic age begins with the first Christian author,‑-the founder of theological literature. It introduced to mankind, as the mother of true philosophy, the despised teaching of those Galileans to whom their Master had said, “Ye are the light of the world.”[4]
His Apologetic
It is not surprising that Justin, with this background, used ideas popularized in Greek philosophy to present Christianity to the secular world. As we have seen, Greek philosophy had developed a vague idea of a supreme being at this time who by means of His Logos or Reason gave order, life, and reason to the world of matter. Thus, the Logos which emanated from this supreme being mediated between the supreme being and the world of matter. Human beings were reasonable creatures endowed with free will because in reality a little spark of this divine logos or reason dwelt in them.
Justin Martyr adapted these ideas to Christianity and used them as means to communicate the gospel to the heathen. It was easy to identify the Greek’s supreme being with God the Father and the Logos with the Son or Word of God. The Christian idea of being made in the image of God and possessed of freedom and reason was identified with the Greek idea of men as inhabited by a spark of divine fire. The main writings of Justin Martyr in which he presented his views are His First and Second Apologies directed toward the Gentiles and his Dialog with Trypho the Jew.[5] They will be cited below.
Of course, there were a number of advantages to Justin’s method. No doubt, it made Christianity appear more intellectually respectable to the Greek world. It also helped make the Christian doctrine of the Trinity seem less contradictory to the Greeks. Also, Justin’s identification of Jesus Christ with the Greek Logos helped explain the measure of virtue and knowledge to be found in Greek culture and philosophy.
The problem with Justin’s apologetic was that it assumed a very favorable view of Greek philosophy and its relation to Christianity. Justin’s view was that Greek philosophy was inspired by the same Logos who became incarnate in Christ. What the Greeks had partially and fallibly in the Greek philosophers, that the Christians have completely and infallibly in Christ. This quite positive evaluation of Greek philosophy is stated in his Second Apology.
I confess that I both boast and with all my strength strive to be found a Christian; not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in all respects similar, as neither are those of the others, Stoics, and poets, and historians. For each man spoke well in proportion to the share he had of the spermatic word, seeing what was related to it …. For next to God, we worship and love the Word who is from the unbegotten and ineffable [indescribable—SW] God, since also He became man for our sakes …. For all the writers were able to see realities darkly through the sowing of the implanted word that was in them. For the seed and imitation imparted according to capacity is one thing, and quite another is the thing itself, of which there is the participation and imitation according to the grace which is from Him (II, 13).
Even some Reformed theologians have shared Justin’s somewhat positive view of Greek philosophy. W. G. T. Shedd represents many defenders of the Christian faith who respond positively to Justin’s evaluation of Greek philosophy. He applauds Justin because “He perceives that a system of philosophy like the Platonic is favorable to the principles of ethics and natural religion; … and therefore insists, and with right, that so far as it can properly go, it is not unfriendly to the system of revealed truth.”[6] Shedd thought that it was very wise to take over “Greek theism,” and use it in the defense of Christianity. The perspective of Shedd and Justin Martyr is simply that Platonism is right as far it goes, but it does not go far enough.
The disadvantages of Justin’s defense of the faith are related to his favorable view of Greek philosophy. It seems clear that he was insensitive to or ignorant of the basic contradictions between Christianity and Greek philosophy. The result of ignoring these contradictions would be to misrepresent or pervert the Christian faith even as he was trying to defend it and commend it to others. The evidence for Justin’s ignorance of the contradictions between Christianity and Greek philosophy follows:
First, Justin appeals to heathen analogies to the miraculous history of Christ. He refers to the stories of the Greek myths which speak of terrible sufferings and marvelous ascensions to heaven of the sons of Jupiter. He then remarks that Christians teach “nothing different from what you believe regarding those whom you esteem sons of Jupiter” (I, 21). Thus, Justin can say, “… though we say things similar to what the Greeks say, we only are hated on account of the name of Christ” (I, 24). Justin’s argument may be intended simply to point out that the Greeks taught things similar to what Christians teach. It is injustice, therefore, if Greeks persecute Christians while they themselves teach similar things. Nevertheless, the question must be asked, Does not Justin speak in a very unguarded fashion when he says that Christian doctrine is “nothing different” and “similar to” heathen teachings? Is he not endangering the uniqueness of Christianity?
Second, what Justin teaches about the freedom of the human will is not Christian (I, 43, 61, II, 7). The occasion for Justin’s statements upon this subject is quite interesting. In the midst of arguing for the claims of Christ on the basis of fulfilled prophecy, Justin realizes that his claims may be seen as implying “that whatever happens, happens by a fatal necessity.” In this paragraph Justin, therefore, proceeds to argue that …
We have learned from the prophets, and we hold it to be true, that punishments, and chastisements, and good rewards, are rendered according to the merit of each man’s actions. Since if it be not so, but all things happen by fate, neither is anything at all in our power. For if it be fated that this man, e. g. be good, and this other evil, neither is the former meritorious nor the latter to be blamed. And again, unless the human race have the power of avoiding evil and choosing good by free choice, they are not accountable for their actions, of whatever kind they be (I, 43).
Justin can also speak of the one “who chooses to be born again” in the waters of baptism (I, 61). In his Second Apology, Justin returns to this theme in even more clear language.
The Stoics, not observing this, maintained that all things take place according to the necessity of fate. But since God in the beginning made the race of angels and men with free-will, they will justly suffer in eternal fire the punishment of whatever sins they committed. And this is the nature of all that is made, to be capable of vice and virtue. For neither would any of them be praiseworthy unless there were power to turn to both … (II, 7).
We must not overreact to these statements. Christianity is not fatalism. It maintains the serious, moral responsibility and freedom of men. Due both to Stoicism and Gnosticism there was a fatalistic tendency in Justin’s day which did not do justice to human responsibility and freedom. Yet one must ask, Has Justin been pushed into a view of human freedom which is imbalanced? He never does explain how prophecy and foreknowledge are consistent with his view of human freedom. Is there not, perhaps, here a naive adoption of a Platonic view of human freedom? This question appears to be answered with a yes when in the paragraph following his initial assertion of free will we hear Justin saying, “And so, too, Plato, when he says, `The blame is his who chooses, and God is blameless’ … ” (I, 44).
Third, Justin adopts the Greek idea that the supreme being is nameless. “For no one can utter the name of the ineffable God; and if any one dare to say that there is a name, he raves with hopeless madness” (I, 61). “But to the Father of all, who is unbegotten, there is no name given” (II, 6). Justin misunderstands the incomprehensibility of God to mean the namelessness of God. Again, the influence of Greek philosophy with its idea of the supreme being as an indescribable, abstract principle of rationality and being has influenced Justin.
Fourth, more justification for our concerns about Justin’s positive view of Greek philosophy becomes evident when he says that “He (Christ‑-SW) is the Word of whom every race of men were partakers; and those who lived reasonably are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists; as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and men like them … ” (I, 46) Justin is thinking of the operations of Reason (the Logos) in nature. Therefore, in these statements of Justin there is clear confirmation of our fears. Justin plainly deviates from the Christian faith by teaching the salvation of the Greek philosophers purely through their obedience to natural revelation. This alone shows that he has exceeded the limits of orthodoxy out of his sympathy for Greek philosophy.
Clearly, Justin has purchased the advantages of his defense of the faith only at a great cost to the Christian faith itself. Van Til’s assessment is penetrating. He says that because Justin lived early in church history he had some excuse for not being aware of the dangers of using Greek philosophy to defend Christianity. Yet he points out that Christians must not be deceived into thinking that high and noble forms of non-Christian philosophy are not filled with dangers for the Christian faith.[7] The dilemma which Justin Martyr faced and failed to solve continues to be important for Christians in their Apologetics. How do we explain the good in the world without denying the unique truthfulness of Christianity? How do we recognize the goodness in the world without being tempted to ally ourselves with the world?
II. Tertullian
His General Significance
Tertullian was a Christian pastor who worked and wrote around the years 200-225 shortly after Justin. He is known as an anti-Gnostic father. Gnosticism, the most dangerous of the early heresies to assault the church, stressed the absolute contrast between the world of spirit and the world of flesh. One of its primary heresies was, therefore, that the earthly Jesus and the divine Christ were two different beings. Thus, they were Docetists, those who taught that the Christ only seemed to be a man. Since he was struggling with this heresy which had deep roots in Greek thinking, Tertullian manifested more awareness of the danger of Greek and worldly philosophy than Justin did. The different perspective enunciated by Tertullian may be seen in G. H. Clark’s pithy summary of Tertullian.
Whereas Justin had spoken appreciatively of the pagan literature, Tertullian is best known for his harsh condemnation of it. Skilled in the rhetoric of the law schools, he declaims, What has the Christian in common with the philosopher? Jerusalem with Athens? The Church with the Academy? Revelation with reason? And to illustrate his contempt for all heathen rationality, modern authors sometimes quote him as accepting the Gospel in the words, Credo quia absurdum [I believe because it is absurd‑-SW]. There is no evidence that Tertullian used this particular phrase, although he did say, Sepultus resurrexit; certum est quia impossible est [I am confident of the resurrection; it is certain because it is impossible‑-SW].[8]
His Specific Importance
Because of this attitude about philosophy Tertullian emphasized the importance of simple faith in the Scriptures as the final authority. Listen to what he says:
After Jesus Christ we have no need of speculation, after the gospel no need of research. When we come to believe, we have no desire to believe anything else; for we begin by believing that there is nothing else which we have to believe.” … “My first principle is this. Christ laid down one definite system of truth which the world must believe without qualification, and which we must seek precisely in order to believe it when we find it.” … “What you must seek is what Christ has taught, and precisely as long as you are not finding, precisely until then, you must go on seeking until you do find it.[9]
His Remaining Weakness
Greek philosophy sneaked into Tertullian’s thought too. Specifically, his teaching about the Trinity and the soul were deeply influenced by a Stoic form of Greek philosophy.[10] Even here, however, Tertullian’s teaching was increasingly biblical. It tended more and more to contradict and violate the Stoic philosophy he used to present his Christian teachings. It is obvious, therefore, that the emphasis of Tertullian is on the gulf that separates Christ and Plato and the need for forsaking philosophy to believe the Scriptures.
III. Assessment
The General Concern: Justin’s Apologetics had a subtle but powerful tendency to distort Christianity.
The advantages of Justin’s adaptation of Greek philosophy to the Christian cause carried with them some very great disadvantages. The basic problem was that in adapting Greek philosophy to Christianity there was a subtle, but powerful tendency to adapt Christianity to Greek philosophy.
The problem with Justin’s methodology is that it assumes that the Greek concept of God, the Logos, human reason, and human freedom are the same as that of Christianity. It assumes that one can use Greek philosophy to present Christianity without changing the meaning of Christianity in the process. We must ask, Is human reason and human freedom the same thing when it is viewed as a spark of divine fire inhabiting a material body?
The Fundamental Difference: The Greek and Christian concepts of God are in basic contradiction.
Even more basic is the difference between the Greek and Christian concept of God revealed in Plato’s Socratic dialogue, Euthyphro. Gordon H. Clark describes it, “In the dialogue Euthyphro the question is raised whether pious acts are pious because the gods like them or whether the gods like them because the acts are pious.”[11] Now, think about that question in Christian terms. Are things good and just because God likes them? Or, does God like them because they are good and just? The answer is, of course, that God Himself is the ultimate standard of right and wrong and that things are good and just simply because He esteems them so. Otherwise, you have a standard of right and wrong above God and to which He must subject Himself. But that is not the view that Plato adopts. Clark says:
… he notes the logical possibility that pious acts are pious because the gods like them; but instead of arguing against such a view, he merely brushes it aside as unworthy of consideration. To his thoroughly Greek mind it seemed obviously absurd. But if the gods like pious acts because the acts are pious, it follows that there is a standard, a norm, or a quality of piety superior to the will of the gods. The existence of such a standard independent of the will of the gods is of course consonant with Greek presuppositions.[12]
Van Til’s comment on the Euthyphro is trenchant:
Here then is a complete disjunction. On the one side we have God as the sovereign Law-giver …. On the other side we have an abstract or impersonal law that is assumed to be independent and therefore above any law-giver …. When Socrates demanded that deeds be holy irrespective of what gods or men say about them he was deceiving himself. What he really wanted was a concept of the holy that he, independently of God, could understand and approve. It was his own concept of justice that he set over against the concept of justice as given by any such being as the Creator-Redeemer of men …. the … disjunction … is…between the God of Christianity … and the idea of the self-sufficient man.[13]
The Twisted Results: Justin’s Apologetic bore terrible fruit in the end.
It is obvious that a Christianity clothed in Greek philosophy will subtly, but powerfully deviate from the Bible. This is very evident in Justin’s assessment of the spiritual condition of the Greek philosophers. “He [Christ—SW] is the Word of whom every race of men were partakers; and those who lived reasonably are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists; as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and men like them … ” (I, 46) By this statement Justin has logically denied that the gospel is necessary for men to be saved and has attributed saving light to the operations of the Logos among the Greek philosophers.
Even more serious errors would proceed from the adaptation of Christianity to Greek philosophy. Some of Justin’s spiritual descendants would become the Arian heretics of the fourth century and deny the deity of Christ and the doctrine of the Trinity.
These facts should make us wary of building a defense of Christianity on the foundation of non-Christian philosophy. Christianity, built on the foundation of Greek philosophy, tends to cease being Christianity. We come down on the side of Tertullian when he asks, “What has the Christian in common with the philosopher? Jerusalem with Athens? The Church with the Academy? Revelation with reason?”[14] Nevertheless, if we agree with Tertullian, we must still ask, What about the apparent morality, wisdom, knowledge of God and success of non-Christian cultures? How can this be explained if Christ is the sole source of truth and light? Another question raised here is this: If the Christian has nothing in common with the Greek philosopher, how shall he defend the faith to him? Is there no common ground or point of contact between the believer and the unbeliever? If there is common ground, what is it?
[1]J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) 19.
[2]One meaning of dialectic given in Webster’s New World Dictionary (The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1966) is “the method of logic used by Hegel and adapted by Marx to his materialist philosophy: it is based on the contradiction of opposites (thesis and antithesis) and their continual resolution (synthesis).
[3]Cornelius Van Til, Christianity in Conflict (Unpublished Syllabus) 25.
[4]Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, reprinted 1973) 159.
[5] I will cite the First Apology as (I) with the appropriate paragraph; the Second Apology as (II) with the appropriate paragraph; and the Dialog with Trypho the Jew as Dialog with the appropriate paragraph.
[6]Quoted from Van Til, Conflict, 26-27.
[7]Van Til, Conflict, 27. Van Til remarks, “Again we observe that there was much excuse for the Apologists for not sensing the subtle method by which the enemy was using Greek theism in order, with its idea of a vague primacy of teleology, to lull Christians to sleep. Throughout the history of the Christian church one of the greatest dangers, if not the greatest danger threatening it has been the idea that there are high and noble forms of non-Christian thought that stand ready to join a common expedition against secularism and materialism.”
[8]G. H. Clark, Thales to Dewey, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957) 215.
[9]Van Til, Conflict, 66-67. The citations from Tertullian are from Prescriptions against Heretics, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14.
[10]For the influence of Greek philosophy on Tertullian, cf. J.N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper&Row, 1978), 175, where he says that Tertullian’s materialist and traducianist view of the soul was borrowed from Stoicism. Cf. also p. 345 and on the Trinity, 109-125. Cf. also The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield: Tertullian and Augustine (vol. 4), 3-109 for a lengthy discussion of the influence of the logos christology on Tertullian and his movement away from it in a more and more biblical direction.
[11]Clark, Thales, 57-58.
[12]Clark, Thales, 57-58.
[13]Van Til, Conflict, 4.
[14]Tertullian, “Prescription against Heretics,” trans. Peter Holmes, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (Peabody, MA: Hen- drickson, 1994), 3:249.
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
by CBTS Student | Jan 9, 2025 | Practical Theology, Preaching
Philip and the Ministry of the Word
The ministry of the Word saturated the first generation of elders and preachers as depicted in the book of Acts. Philip in Acts 8:25–40 gives us one example of such ministry. Though the account is used more often to discern the mode and subjects of baptism, the backbone of the passage demonstrates a proper ministry of the Word. Below, we discover four aspects of Philip’s practice for our own encouragement and use.
Philip’s ministry is consistently Christ-focused.
Philip is ministering with other saints in Jerusalem when the messenger of God moves him to leave his congregation for a journey down a desert road (8:26). The account presents Philip as prepared and ready to engage in preaching ministry when the Spirit prompts him to go. He is thus moved to a different place but does not assume a different mantle. Rather, with an eye for ministry he looks to a man who seemingly has everything; the Ethiopian is described as one who has all the finances of Ethiopia’s queen Candace at his disposal. Philip does not shrink from the noticeable socio-economic disparity (8:29). He runs alongside the chariot and hearing the passenger reading from Isaiah 53, Philip recognizes that God has blessed him with an exceptionally Christocentric text. Without the necessity of psychoanalyzing the Ethiopian man, Philip ministers through the consistent exposition of God’s Word. As Andrew Fuller wrote, “The preaching of Christ will answer every end of preaching. This is the doctrine which God owns to conversion, to the leading of awakened sinners to peace, and to the comfort of true Christians. If the doctrine of the cross be no comfort to us, it is a sign we have no right to comfort. This doctrine is calculated to wake up the sluggard, to draw forth every Christian grace, and to recover the backslider.”[1] Philip was consistent in the means of conversion. Holding fast to the gospel with consistent regard—the calling of the Christian to “make them see Jesus”—is an early charge testified to through Philip.
Philip’s ministry presupposes preaching.
It doesn’t matter if there is an audience of one, the Lord designed preaching to be a means of accomplishing the gospel call. After arriving on the road, Philip is not told what he is to do to be useful to the Lord’s prompting. The text presupposes for us the continued preaching ministry of Philip. This is the mentality of an evangelist, as Geoff Thomas notes, to Philip, one man is worth as much as whole city. Thomas further considers the difficulty we don’t see within the story but what so many of us may experience, a man who would leave a congregation for a desert road must have depended upon the strength of Christ’s assurance that this prompting has a purpose we may not even see on this side of heaven.[2] By keeping the gospel consistent in his life, and by preparing to make Christ known, Philip offers an answer when the Ethiopian asks for understanding. Here, Philip found not a target, but a human called of God for such a time as this. We know that Philip preached “the things concerning the kingdom of God and the name of Jesus Christ” (8:12). Christian, are you ready to give an answer no matter the text? Do you hold, as Philip did, that the preaching of the Word is the means God uses to save sinners? If this is true, then we must be ever ready to the ministry of the Word.
Philip’s ministry guides others according to Scripture.
The Baptist confession teaches that Scripture interprets Scripture, and so it is on display for us in Philip’s exposition. Twice in this passage Philip necessarily underscores utilizing God’s Word. He could have easily told the Ethiopian to roll up the scroll while he gave a nice testimony or played an emotionally driven song, but instead the power of the Spirit is displayed in the work of drawing out the text—God’s chosen ordinary means. He starts at the passage opened before the Ethiopian. Next, he opens his mouth (see this significant phrase used likewise in Matthew 5:2), “and beginning at this Scripture, [Philip] preached Jesus to him” (8:35).
The Ethiopian recognizes his own insufficiency to be made right with God. The Holy Spirit has convicted him. John Gill writes, “Now it is the work of the Spirit of God, to lead souls into the love of God, directly, at once, in a straight line … [and after] set persons in the road of obedience.”[3] The Ethiopian is pressed with the gospel worthy of acceptation: Philip asks, “Do you believe with all your heart?” And the man answers, “I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God” (8:37). In obedience, he then receives baptism. Christian, our message has not changed nor has the Spirit who brings power to the ministry of the Word. This account of Philip is an encouragement to us today that we are to be guides for Scripture just as we preach guided by that same Scripture.
Philip’s ministry perseveres no matter the circumstance.
Following his encounter with the Ethiopian, Philip is whisked away by the Spirit seemingly without warning. Even so, the ministry of the Word continues. We read nothing of Philip’s astonishment at this experience (though it is hard to believe he wasn’t amazed!), rather, Philip continues in the same vocation of preaching the Word in Azotus. Highlighted here is the fact that experience and mysterious occurrences are at best secondary to the ordinary means of God’s work in the transformation of His chosen. When Philip “was found at Azotus … he kept preaching the gospel” (8:40). Should there be one soul saved, should there be one village that has not heard the gospel, the circumstances only provide further fodder for preaching. Philip perseveres in the work and is enriched all the more in his communion with the Lord.
Are we amazed that God would cultivate a mission to just one individual so far away? With reverence we rejoice that we are not in service to a statistician but to a sovereign Savior. Philip persevered on the desert road and persevered again in Azotus, a place where no specific results are brought to our attention—still we know God’s hand was there scattering the seeds. Robert Hall wrote on the warrant for evangelism, “However remote you are, however great the distance from him, he kindly invites you to view him as the almighty Saviour; saying, ‘Behold me; Behold me!’”[4] Rather than waiting to perceive a person’s readiness, the Spirit indicates to Philip that God is in charge of salvation—even for one man on a desert road miles away. God’s spectacular love is shown to this eunuch as it was shown to us who were just as far away.
Philip’s ministry of the Word reminds us, as surely as there is no inch void of the Spirit in the Christian’s life, there is no circumstance void of His power. Every circumstance is pregnant with gospel experience. Such truth is what compels the preacher to take to the highways and byways, to cultivate a ready answer no matter the text—and to do so with assurance that he is never alone nor bereft of the Comforter. God’s Word teaches the prudence of consistently focusing on Christ, practicing the ordinary means of preaching, guiding others from Scripture, and persevering no matter the circumstance. The example of the first century assures us all the more that it is the Spirit who makes us useful for His ministry.
About the Author
Christopher Ellis Osterbrock (DEdMin. in Biblical Spirituality, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary; PhD Student in Historical Theology, Puritan Reformed Theological Seminary) is senior pastor of First Baptist Church of Wellsboro, PA. He is author of What is Saving Faith? (March, 2022), as well as editor of several reprints.
[1] Andrew Fuller, Preaching (1833; reprn., Peterborough, ON: H&E, 2018), 57.
[2] Geoffrey Thomas, Philip and the Revival in Samaria (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 2005), 94.
[3] John Gill, “The Love of God Considered,” in Sermons and Tracts, vol. 4 (1814; reprn., Choteau, MT: Old Paths Gospel Press, 1997), 29.
[4] Robert Hall, Help to Zion’s Travellers: Being an Attempt to Remove Various Stumbling Blocks Out of the Way, Relating to Doctrinal, Experimental and Practical Religion (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1851), 126.
This blog post is authored by a student of Covenant Baptist Theological Seminary.
by Sam Waldron | Jan 7, 2025 | Apologetics
I. The Identity of the Subject
The Meaning of Apologetics
Apologetics is derived from the Greek word, apologia. This word is in turn derived from two Greek roots, apo (from) and logo (word or science). The standard Greek lexicon, BDAG, gives the meanings defense, reply, or excuse. Its use in the New Testament is frequent. The noun is used in Acts 22:1; 25:16; 1 Cor. 9:3; 2 Cor. 7:11; Phil. 1:7, 16; 2 Tim. 4:16; 1 Pet. 3:15. The verb is used in Luke 12:11; 21:14; Acts 19:33; 24:10; 25:8; 26:1, 2, 24; Rom. 2:15; 2 Cor. 12:19. A related noun meaning without defense is used in Romans 1:20. These biblical uses of apologia and its relatives show that this word means defense. These uses are consistent with the idea that apologetics is in general the defense of the faith. Even more significant is the fact that several of these uses have pointed relevance to the defense of the Christian faith. Many of these references speak of the legal defense that Paul and other Christians were called upon to make of their faith in a literal court of law. Note particularly the uses in Luke and Acts. These usages are, of course, not without relevance to the subject of apologetics. Even more pointed in their relevance, however, are the usages in Philippians (1:7, 16) which speak of the defense of the gospel and the usage in 1 Peter which speaks of the defense of the hope that is within us (1 Peter 3:15). This latter passage especially warrants careful exposition and will be the subject of such exposition in this lecture. Both the passages in Philippians and 1 Peter assume that the Christian faith is capable of a reasoned defense. On the other hand, the use of the related word, without defense, in Rom. 1:20 indicates that it is really unbelief which is defenseless.
Philippians 1:7 institutes a parallel between the word, defense (apologia), and the word, confirmation (βεβαιώσει). This parallel word signifies according to one lexicon “to confirm, to verify, to prove to be true and certain, confirmation, verification”.[1] This definition is borne out by the single, other use of this word in the New Testament (Heb. 6:16 and also by the uses of the verb (βεβαιόω-Mark 16:20; Rom. 15:8; 1 Cor. 1:6, 8; 2 Cor. 1:21; Col. 2:7; Heb. 2:3; 13:9) and the adjective (βεβαίαν‑-Rom. 4:16; 2 Cor. 1:7; Heb. 2:2; 3:6, 14; 6:19; 9:7; 2 Pet. 1:10, 19). This parallel word indicates that the defense of the gospel is intimately related to its being verified or confirmed to be true. Furthermore, it assumes that the Christian faith is and may be shown to be utterly certain. As a result it may be fully relied upon and thoroughly defended.
The common definitions of apologetics are true to the usage of and concepts conveyed by these biblical words. Webster defines apologetics as “the branch of theology having to do with the defense and proofs of Christianity.”[2] Cornelius Van Til calls it “the vindication of the Christian philosophy of life against the various forms of non‑Christian philosophies of life.”[3] It is thus that part of Christian theology in which we study how we know that Christianity is true and how we show this to others. It is the science, therefore, of replying to the objections of unbelief. Thus, it is often spoken of as the defense of the faith.
Such definitions assume that apologetics is necessary because of mankind’s fall into sin and unbelief. B. B. Warfield, however, asserts that apologetics would have been necessary even without sin.[4] This statement as Warfield intends it contains certain false ideas. Specifically, Warfield thinks that logical argument and extended reasoning derived from evidences which do not presuppose the God of the Bible are necessary if we are to have an intellectual right to our faith. As we will see in these lectures, this view is wrong. Yet, there is a positive value and need for Warfield’s assertion that apologetics would have been necessary regardless of the fall. It reminds us that apologetics involves a science that is not a product of the fall. This brings us to the second word.
The Meaning of Epistemology
Epistemology is derived from the two Greek words, επιστημη (knowledge) and λoγoς (word or science). These root words suggest that epistemology means the science of knowledge. Webster, thus, defines this science as “the study or theory of the origin, nature, methods, and limits of knowledge.” It is, then, the science that answers the question, “How do you know?” Observe several things about this science. First, notice that epistemology does not, like apologetics, presuppose unbelief. It is, if I may so speak, a positive science. Epistemology, while it would not have been as problematic or, perhaps, as interesting in a world where there was no unbelief, would still have been a legitimate study. Second, apologetics must, therefore, presuppose epistemology or an epistemological approach. It is naive at best and disastrous at worst to suppose that we may engage in apologetics without serious consideration of epistemology. Much of popular apologetics attempts to defend the Christian faith without a concern or word about the issue of epistemology. Such defenses of the Christian faith are in danger of minimizing the very fact which makes them necessary. It is sin and unbelief which make apologetics necessary. May we assume that such a radical evil has not impacted the minds and, therefore, epistemologies of those to whom we are defending the faith? Is it not possible, if this is the case, that this very reality must be taken into account if our apologetics are really to leave our hearers without a defense? Third, epistemology has to do with the most foundational philosophical issues. It involves questions about knowledge and, therefore, questions about the nature and source of our knowledge of God. Surely we may not talk about apologetics and, therefore, apologetic strategies and arguments by which to defend the faith and attack unbelief (which is what is properly meant by apologetics) until we have clarified to ourselves the nature and source of our knowledge of God.
II. The Necessity of the Subject
Preface
As we will see in our historical overview of and introduction to Christian apologetics, there is a part of the Christian tradition which has tended to reject apologetics as unnecessary and a waste of time. This viewpoint has been associated with what has been called fideism (Fide is the Latin word faith. Hence, fideism is literally faith-ism and implies the demand for faith without providing adequate intellectual grounds for believing. Logically, then, fideism undermines apologetics.) For this reason, and because it is important to underscore the practical necessity of the study of apologetics at the beginning of a course on the subject, the classic biblical statement of the duty of apologetics must now be carefully expounded. That classic statement is found in 1 Pet. 3:15.
Introduction
Its Context:
1 Peter is a letter of encouragement to Christians suffering for their faith in a Gentile world. Our passage, 3:15, occurs in a section filled with brief admonitions for suffering Christians (verses 8‑16). Clearly, our duty to defend the faith is not suspended by our having to suffer for it. Plainly, apologetics may be carried on even in the midst of persecution.
1 Peter is also a letter written to young believers (1 Pet. 2:2; 4:4) in contrast to 2 Peter, a letter written to the same churches at a later and more mature period in their life (2 Pet. 1:12; 3:17). This is the original context of this key apologetic text. How appropriate, then, for young believers who are members of our churches, to be trained to give a reason for their hope. How necessary, therefore, that Christian teachers be able to train the new converts in giving a defense of their faith.
Its Theme:
Verse 15 is an admonition or command to Christians to defend their faith when they are called upon to do so. The key word is “defense”. It means a reply, an answer, a defense. It is often used of a formal or legal‑-even a courtroom‑-defense (Acts 25:16; 26:1, 2; 25:8; 2 Tim. 4:16). There is good reason to think that the word means a formal defense in 1 Peter 3:15. It is used with two other words with legal overtones‑‑to ask (aitew‑-Acts. 12:20; 25:3, 15) and a reason (logoj‑-Matt. 5:32; 12:36).[5] This does not mean that Peter is thinking of actual court trials in this text.[6] It does mean that he is thinking in terms of a more or less formal defense “to everyone who asks a reason.”
Its Outline:
1 Peter 3:15 divides straightforwardly into five points regarding our defense of the faith:
- Its Nature
- Its Prerequisite
- Its Preparation
- Its Occasion
- Its Manner
1. Its Nature: “give an account of the hope that is in you”
- What is “the hope” that we are to defend?
For the meaning of “hope” note 1 Pet. 1:3f., 13, 21f. and 3:5, the other four occurrences in the letter. It is a hope rooted in God, begotten by the gospel, looking for the eternal glory, which radically changes our lives. In brief, our hope is simply our Christianity itself looked at as our hope. It is this we are to defend. It is the defense of the faith to which this passage calls us.
- What kind of defense are we to make?
The term translated “account” or “reason” is the Greek word, logos. It connotes the idea of a reasoned statement. Reymond says, “The Greek word translated reason is logon, from logoj, which root, regardless of whether one would translate it “word,” “explanation”, “speech”, “sentence”, etc. includes implicitly the idea of rationality, reasonableness, or thought.”[7] The Christian is to show that his faith is rational, reasonable, and factual not irrational and contrary to reality. He is to show that his hope is grounded in truth and that his expectation will be fulfilled.
First Observation:
Reymond says, “The command clearly implies that the Christian faith is fully capable of a reasonable defense. The inspired apostle would not command the Christian to defend that which is rationally indefensible.”[8] John Brown asserts that this text teaches “that this hope is not a groundless one, a reason can be given for it, it can be defended.”[9] Christianity is, thus, not an anti-intellectual leap of faith. Our hope has a rational and objective basis. Apologetics is, therefore, possible, reasonable, and necessary.
2. Its Prerequisite: “sanctify Christ as Lord”
There is a necessary pre‑requisite if one is to boldly defend Christianity in the face of persecution. One must resist being intimidated by the persecutor (v. 14b). The question, however, which must be answered is, How am I to do this? Verse 15a provides the answer in the words, “sanctify Christ as Lord.” The Apostle Peter is alluding to Isa. 8:12 f. We are to set apart Jehovah. We are to exalt Him. He is holy—the separate one—, separate from us in His purity and in His transcendence. We are to regard him as such so that in fearing Him, we no longer fear men and He becomes a sanctuary for us. He is to be our fear and our faith.
Though there is a textual variant in 1 Peter 3:15, the probable reading is that given in the NIV and NASB: “Sanctify Christ as Lord.” In other words, Peter regards Christ as the Lord of Hosts of Isa. 8:13. We are to regard Him as the Holy One, set Him apart as our Lord and God, fear and trust Him as the supreme Lord. We are to fix our hope in Christ as God over all and in doing this cease to fear men and be emboldened to defend the faith.
Second Observation:
The standpoint or starting‑point of the Christian’s defense of Christianity is that of faith. Full confidence in the truthfulness of Christianity must be the fundamental presupposition of his defense. This is implied both by the admonition to sanctify Christ as Lord and thus be always ready and also by the fact that it is the hope in us that we are defending. Reymond says, “the text assumes a heart stance of faith (‘the hope that is in you’): on the one hand, a self‑conscious commitment on the part of the Christian; on the other, the recognition of this commitment on the part of the unbeliever who is asking a reason for the Christian’s hope.”[10] The implication of this is that we do not momentarily suspend our faith in Christianity when we come to defend it and adopt a position of so‑called “unbiased neutrality” in which we try to be open-minded or impartial about whether Christianity is true. Rather our defense must grow out of our faith and hope and be built on the truth of the Word of God. The charge that will immediately be made against this methodology is that it is circular reasoning. Are we not assuming at the outset that which we need to prove? There is a good answer to this charge but for the moment it is sufficient to note that the Bible calls on us to believe in Christ and regards everything short of that not as neutral objectivity or fair-mindedness, but as wicked unbelief.
3. Its Preparation: “always being ready to make a defense”
- The Necessity of Preparations
The word translated “ready” means both ready and prepared. Literally, the original reads, “But sanctify Christ as Lord in your hearts ready (or prepared ones) always for defense.” Cf. Matt. 22:4, 8; Mark 14:15; Luke 14:17. (The verb is used in Mark 14:12, 15, 16; Rev. 19:7, 21:2.) John Brown says, “To be ready, is to be prepared when called on, to state and defend the Christian hope.”[11] The necessity of such preparations is confirmed by the courtroom analogy which Peter uses. A lawyer does not rise to defend his case in court without thorough preparation, so too Christians ought not to be caught unprepared to defend their hope.
- The Nature of These Preparations
What, however, is the nature of the preparations we are called on to make? How are we to prepare? Our preparations must be both spiritual and intellectual.
The admonition to “sanctify Christ as Lord in our hearts” informs us that our preparations should be spiritual preparations. By exalting and setting apart Christ as holy in our hearts and minds, by regarding Him as the holy incarnate God we should bolster and maintain a believing and reverent frame of mind.
Our preparations must also be intellectual. The courtroom analogy which Peter carries through in the words, apologia, a legal defense; aitew, a legal inquiry or request; and, logon, a legal ground, points us to the need for intellectual preparations. The term, logon, means a reasoned statement and implies the need for intellectual preparations. Christians must be able to give a “formal”, that is, reasonable defense of their faith. This demands some form of intellectual preparation. A defense of our hope must include two elements. We must be able, first, to state and, second, to defend the hope which is in us. In other words, we must understand what our hope is, and we must understand how to defend our hope.
Third Observation:
Being prepared (and thus making preparations of both a spiritual and intellectual nature) to give a reasonable defense of our faith is every Christian’s duty and therefore especially a Christian teacher’s or pastor’s duty. (Hence this course is a necessary part of a normative, theological curriculum.)
4. Its Occasion: “to everyone who asks you to give an account for the hope that is in you”
Several Comments are appropriate here:
(1) Peter assumes that the hope in us will become visible in the way we live and that people will, therefore, ask us about it.
(2) It is our duty to always be ready to answer everyone who asks. Reymond says, “The command expressly calls upon every believer to be ready upon every occasion to give to everyone who asks the reason for his faith commitment.”[12] Violation, therefore, of this command is sin.
(3) It is not necessarily our duty actually to answer everyone who asks.[13] This is no command to respond to the baiting of mockers (Prov. 9:7-9; Matt. 7:6). Those who are only seeking an opportunity to ridicule and make light of holy things should not (at least on some occasions) be answered.[14] They are not seriously or sincerely asking.
Fourth Observation:
There is the possibility of communication between believer and unbeliever. This command assumes that there is common ground. This may not seem to be a terribly profound remark. Our study of the history of apologetics should, however, enable you to realize how important this statement is. This has been a great issue among Christian apologetes. Simply put, the problem is that the believer has nothing in common with the unbeliever spiritually (1 Cor. 2:14-16), but that is precisely the area of discussion in which all apologetics must move. Reymond again aptly remarks, “This injunction expressly assumes the possibility of communication between believer and unbeliever, otherwise, the exhortation would be pointless. The precise basis of this possibility of communication constitutes the apologetic problem of the nature of common ground or a point of contact between believer and unbeliever.”[15]
5. Its Manner: “yet with gentleness and reverence” (NASB); “But do this with gentleness and respect” (NIV)
I would translate this, “with courtesy and respect.”
- The Meaning of the Phrase
The Greek word, prauteitoj, means gentleness or courtesy. BDAG gives the meanings “gentleness, humility, courtesy, considerateness.” The word, fobon, means, of course, fear. The question here is, however, whether this word refers to the fear of God or “respect” for men. It would be easy to argue that Christians should only fear God, but never men (1 Pet. 2:17; 3:6, and 14). There is certainly a wrong fear of men. However, the New Testament and other texts in 1 Peter clearly indicate that there is a proper fear to be given even to sinful men for the sake of the divine order (Eph. 5:33; 1 Pet. 2:17, 18; 3:2). Since this reference to fear is coupled with gentleness, it appears clear to me that it refers to proper respect for men. Peter is speaking of a gentle and respectful demeanor toward the unsaved.[16]
- The Significance of the Phrase
This phrase begins with a strong word meaning but or yet. The implication is that if Christians properly set apart Christ as Lord in order to defend their faith, they may easily fall into the error of being discourteous, disrespectful toward those with whom they are speaking. The reason for this is related to the very nature of a true Christian apologetic. A proper defense of the faith takes its stand uncompromisingly in its faith in Christ and states unhesitatingly that there is no possibility that its position is wrong and not a shred of intellectual justification for any other position. In a word, proper defense of the faith is totally dogmatic. This dogmatic attitude in human affairs is often related to and associated with excessive zeal and pride which in turn give rise to discourteous and disrespectful behavior. Peter warns that there is no place for such things in a true defense of the faith. A “you idiot” attitude must not be conveyed.
Fifth Observation:
Notwithstanding the “dogmatic” character of a true defense of the faith, our manner must be one of humble courtesy and respect. The command to defend the faith and evangelize the lost does not exempt us from all the other commands of the Bible or from being sensitive to the dynamics and ethics of inter-personal relations.
III. The Approach to the Subject
The Necessity of a Biblical Approach
The general apologetic position which will be advocated in these lectures is that of presuppositionalism. The precise meaning of this word will be clarified later. Cornelius Van Til, the acknowledged father of presuppositionalism, did little exegetically to develop the biblical basis of his position. Even though he claimed that his position was biblical and held the highest view of the authority of the Bible, yet he left the clarification of the exegetical basis of his apologetics to the other members of the Westminster faculty. Thus, it is crucial that these lectures devote themselves to the exegesis and applications of important biblical passages and themes on the subject of apologetics.
But there is another and even more basic reason why I speak of the necessity of a biblical approach to Christian apologetics. I believe that the Word of God is and must be authoritative for all of human life and, therefore, of course, for theological epistemology and Christian apologetics. Furthermore, I believe that the Word is sufficient for every endeavor which the Christian ministry presses upon the Christian minister (2 Tim. 3:16, 17). One of these endeavors is certainly the defense of the faith (1 Pet. 3:15). Hence, it is both terribly foolish and downright illegitimate to fail to seek the source of theological epistemology and Christian apologetics in the Word of God itself.[17] It may be true that this methodology already assumes a certain (presuppositional) apologetic approach. I think it does. Whether it does or not, however, I am confident that genuine Christians—no matter what their apologetic preferences—will have a difficult time denying the propriety of my procedure. In a word, theological epistemology and Christian apologetics are systematic theology. As systematic theology they must be built on the results of exegetical theology. But this brings me to a second point regarding the proper approach to this subject.
The Necessity of a Historical Approach
Just as we noted the priority of exegetical theology to systematic theology, so also we noted the logical priority of historical theology to that discipline in which our present subject is encompassed. It should not surprise the student, therefore, to discover that I also speak of the necessity of an historical approach to theological epistemology and Christian apologetics. There is much in many ways to be learned about apologetics from church history. An understanding of church history will enable the student to understand the very technical terminology that is thrown around in apologetics. He will be enabled to understand “where those he reads are coming from.” Also, historical theology will (under the light of Scripture) begin to suggest the broad lines of a Christian apologetic. We believe that the Spirit of God has prevented the church from totally departing from a proper defense of the faith. But our interest in historical theology is in a very real and central sense much less focused on these impressive values, than on another very simple issue. If the Bible is our answer key for Christian apologetics, it will do us little good if we do not know the proper questions to ask of it. Score keys are of little value at all if we do not come to them with a list of questions to be answered. So also our Bibles will be of little use to us, at least of little use to us as compared with the use they might be, if we do not come to them with the great issues and questions firmly in our minds which historical theology has debated.
[1]Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament based on Semantic Domains, ed. by Johannes P. Louw and Eugene A. Nida, vol. 2 (Bible Society of South Africa, Cape Town, 1989) 340.
[2]Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language, (The World Publishing Company, Cleveland, 1966).
[3]Cornelius Van Til, Apologetics (Literary Licensing, 2011). This is from an actual class syllabus.
[4]B. B. Warfield, Studies in Theology, 4.
[5]Lenski, 1 and 2 Epistles of Peter, The Three Epistles of John and the Epistle of Jude (Ninneaplis: Augsburg, 1964) 150.
[6]John Brown, 1 Peter (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust) 2:90.
[7]Robert Reymond, The Justification of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1984) 2.
[8]Reymond, The Justification of Knowledge, 2.
[9]Brown, 1 Peter.
[10]Ibid.
[11]John Brown, 1 Peter, 93.
[12]ibid.
[13]John Calvin, Commentaries (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981) en loc.
[14]The qualification is necessary because of the paradoxical balance required in Proverbs 26:4-5..
[15]John Calvin, Commentaries (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981) en loc.
[16]Henry Alford, Alford’s Greek Testament, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980) 4:362, says “This fear is not the fear of God exclusively, nor that of men, but the respect for man, and humble reverence of God.” Note also Leighton, 1 Commentary on 1 Peter (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1972) 328; Calvin, en loc.
[17]I anticipate here the following question: Are you inferring that Van Til committed this error when he did little exegetically to develop the biblical basis of presuppositionalism? My response is that Van Til relied on the fine exegesis of those around him at Westminster Seminary. Thus, he did not commit this error because his apologetics was bathed in and surrounded by the exegetical labors of men like Ned Stonehouse, John Murray, and E. J. Young.
Dr. Sam Waldron is the Academic Dean of CBTS and professor of Systematic Theology. He is also one of the pastors of Grace Reformed Baptist Church in Owensboro, KY. Dr. Waldron received a B.A. from Cornerstone University, an M.Div. from Trinity Ministerial Academy, a Th.M. from Grand Rapids Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. from Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 1977 to 2001 he was a pastor of the Reformed Baptist Church of Grand Rapids, MI. Dr. Waldron is the author of numerous books including A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, The End Times Made Simple, Baptist Roots in America, To Be Continued?, and MacArthur’s Millennial Manifesto: A Friendly Response.
